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Abstract I 
Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged that international trade is a major pathway for the spread of 
invasive species.  International agreements and domestic legislation aim to reach a 
balance between facilitating trade and providing nations with the right to protect their 
environmental, public and economic health.  This is achieved through the 
development of standards that prescribe procedures that must be followed before a 
commodity is imported.  Under Section 22 of the Biosecurity Act (1993) Biosecurity 
New Zealand of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) develops import 
health standards for the importation of commodities and sea containers and for the 
approval and management of transitional facilities. 
 
Under current regulations, before being allowed to enter New Zealand, a sea container 
must first be accompanied by appropriate documentation for the sea container itself 
and any contents (this includes cargo manifests, any required treatment certificates for 
the cargo and cleaning certificates for the sea container itself).  Upon arriving in New 
Zealand the sea container is transported to a transitional facility for inspection and 
unloaded once biosecurity clearance has been obtained.  There are approximately 
7,000 transitional facilities (both on and off wharf) throughout New Zealand and 
inspections are conducted by persons that have obtained accreditation from MAF for 
inspections (MAF accredited persons).  
 
Based on current importation procedures and other information made available, 
mathematical models were developed for three sea importation pathways (sea 
containers, woodpackaging and used vehicles) that involved the inspection of 
imported units by MAF accredited persons.  These models were designed to predict 
the effectiveness of the current border inspection policies and procedures.  Inspection 
accuracy was found to have the most influential impact on slippage (the rate at which 
contamination passes through border procedures undetected) along the measured 
pathways.  Under current conditions, an estimated 5.75% of all sea containers, 4.12% 
of all sea containers containing woodpackaging and 1.63% of all used vehicles that 
enter New Zealand annually are contaminated in some manner despite having 
biosecurity clearance.  A 3% increase in inspection efficiency reduced slippage to 
Abstract II
0.5% of sea containers, 2.16% of woodpackaging and 0.001% of used vehicles 
entering New Zealand annually. 
 
Given that the accuracy of the inspection was the most influential aspect of the border 
management procedures, mathematical models were develop to predict the cost of 
compliance recovered by MAF if all inspections were conducted by MAF inspectors 
as apposed to MAF accredited persons.  Under current regulations the cost of 
compliance (if MAF inspector conducted inspections of all imported units) was 
estimated to be $117.36 million for sea containers, $35.16 million for woodpackaging 
and $5.44 million for used vehicles.  Increasing the inspection accuracy to the ideal 
100% increased the cost of compliance by 75.36%, 61.96% and 61.92% for sea 
containers, woodpackaging and used vehicles respectively. 
 
These findings indicate that Government investment in the training of inspectors 
throughout New Zealand would improve current border detection rates.  Under 
current regulations, the cost incurred by MAF inspectors inspecting all imported units 
is recoverable.  Currently the cost of compliance is approximately 1% of the value of 
annual imports.  These costs are seen by the import sector as part of their daily 
business and understand that these measures are in place for the long term 
sustainability of their businesses (Anon. 2005). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
 
 
“…So freedom to trade, and the benefits that results, must be balanced against the need 
to protect people, animals and plants from unacceptable risks to health and safety…” 
(Anon. 2003a). 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Ecosystems exist within natural barriers (such as oceans, deserts and mountain ranges) 
enabling them to maintain delicate equilibria, which evolve over time.  The balance 
maintained within these systems is susceptible to any changes originating from either 
within the system itself or from external influences (Pirages and DeGeest 2004).  The 
expansion of the human race around the world has lead to the breakdown of these natural 
or geographical barriers allowing introduced new organisms to affect existing ecosystem 
(Anon. 2001d, Korniss and Caraco 2005).  It is not possible to accurately document the 
full extent of these influences, but there are examples where the effect has been 
documented with some care, for example the colonisation of New Zealand by Europeans 
(Thomson 1922). 
 
The technological advancement of humans enabled them to colonise countries or 
landmasses which were neither in close proximity nor inhabited by similar organisms 
(Pirages and DeGeest 2004).  These previously closed or isolated ecosystems are now 
open to external influences through the movement of people, plants, animals and micro 
organisms.  The more recent advances in technology have enabled the rapid expansion 
of globalisation, alterations in human population sizes and their distribution.  These 
changes have influenced the manner in which humans interact with their environment, 
disrupting well established and ancient balances within ecosystems (Pirages and 
DeGeest 2004). 
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The first reported trade ship departing from New Zealand with built-in freezing 
machinery carrying mutton destined for London was the Hinemoa in 18901.  The 
invention of refrigerated cargo ships in the late 19th century was pivotal in the trade of 
animals, plants and their products, and to New Zealand’s developing economy.  With 
such advancements in trade come the inescapable risks of transmitting pests, diseases 
and hazards that are associated with animals, plants and their products.  As with any 
central government, one of New Zealand’s government’s key goals is to protect the life 
and health of New Zealanders and native and introduced animals and plants (Anon. 
2003a). 
 
New Zealand’s economic and environmental health is vulnerable to the introduction of 
unwanted pests and diseases as it relies on its primary production and unique 
biodiversity.  Therefore there is a constant need to provide protection from such 
introductions through the maintenance and continuous improvement of New Zealand’s 
biosecurity management systems (Lambie 2002).  The rapid increase in trade 
globalisation has exceeded the capabilities of New Zealand’s port and airport border 
control services both in terms of funding and facilities (Anon. 2001c), making 100 % 
inspection rates at every point of entry unworkable.  Consequently, up until the end of 
2004, inspections were conducted on a percentage of total imports basis with risk 
analysis enabling this approach to be more accurate at targeting high risk goods (Green 
2000).  However, in order to overcome existing inefficiencies, as of January 2005 the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) implemented a 100% (6 sided inspections) 
external inspection policy for all containers entering New Zealand. 
 
1.2  Introductions into New Zealand 
Almost all human societies have long been dependent on the deliberate transport and 
introduction of plants and animals as a means to satisfy basic human needs (Anon. 
2001d), although most such imports failed to successfully establish (Mack and Lonsdale 
2001, Korniss and Caraco 2005).  Our actions as global plant dispersers can be 
beneficial, neutral, or detrimental.  So establishing plants beyond their native ranges has 
                                                 
1
 Maritime Records ship index sourced from http://www.nzmaritime.co.nz 
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been not only beneficial but also essential to modern agriculture (Mack and Lonsdale 
2001). 
 
Introductions of exotic species of plants and animals by humans have greatly modified 
New Zealand’s ecosystems and are continuing to do so (Goldson 2002).  Prior to the 
European’s arrival in New Zealand, Polynesians introduced plants for cultivation, a 
variety of dog, the Polynesian rat (Mus exulans) and at least one species of flea (though 
this has been debated) (Thomson 1922).  Captain Cook first arrived in New Zealand in 
1869, where crew collected native samples and although he did not record any 
intentional introductions, there is reason to believe that during those berths and extended 
stays in Poverty Bay and Anaura Bay some European seeds and the black rat (Mus 
rattus) were accidentally introduced (Thomson 1922).  As there were no records kept, it 
is not possible to even approximately date the introductions of any species pre-dating 
1773.  The arrival of Captain Cook at Dusty Sound (and later at Queen Charlotte Sound) 
in 1773 is the first date at which it can accurately be said that the European introductions 
of exotic species into New Zealand commenced (Thomson 1922).  At those landings, it 
was recorded that Captain Cook sowed several European seeds, some of which are 
known to have survived.  During the subsequent landings by Captain Cook and other 
captains they recorded the introduction of species such as pigs, goats, geese, potato, 
maize, wheat, and others.  Although liberations into the wild were not successful, the 
specimens gifted to the Maori were by in large cultivated with success (Thomson 1922, 
Crosby 1986).  The motives for introducing many of the plants and animals into New 
Zealand were initially to provide a food source for other vessels; then later for financial 
gain, sport or for pets (although the latter importations were very infrequent) (Pracy 
1962, Cowan et al. 1997). 
 
Coinciding with both intentional and unintentional introductions of animals and plants 
were the introductions of micro-organisms.  As with most indigenous peoples, Maori 
had low immunity due to the absence of the B-type blood, and were free of the 
pathogens which plagued Europeans, with Captain Cook noting that the Maori were in a 
fine state of health (Crosby 1986).  Captain Cook, his crew and all the subsequent 
travellers and immigrants introduced many human pathogens including tuberculosis and 
many sexually transmitted diseases. 
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The impact that introduced animals and plants had and continue to have on New Zealand 
ecosystems are of serious concern to conservationists. Of the 54 mammal species that 
were introduced into New Zealand, 20 species came from England (for example, feral 
cat (Felis cattus L.), and ferret (Mustela furo L.), and 14 species from Australia.  The 
Australian brushtail possum (Trichosurus vulpecula (Kerr)) was the only introduced 
species that is common and widespread and did not originate from England (King 1990).  
As with the initial introductions made by Cook and others, liberations were not always 
successful in establishing. Both private (acclimatisation societies) and governmental 
introductions and liberations of many flora and fauna continued as settlers looked to 
duplicate many of the best features of their homeland.  This included 130 different 
species of birds, of which only 36 established, 54 species of mammal with only 33 
species establishing and around 1700 species of flowering plants, and some 1100 species 
of insects (King 1984).   
 
1.3  New Zealand’s Border Control History 
Very early in New Zealand’s colonial history legislation was passed to cope with animal 
and plant pests, (which were being introduced along with livestock, seed and plants, and 
had begun to threaten the productivity of new settlements), and to provide revenue for 
the developing colony.  Most of New Zealand’s legislative development, inspection of 
incoming goods and people and collection of import tax revenue was undertaken by the 
Department of Customs, New Zealand’s oldest governmental department (McGill 1991). 
 
Since its establishment in 1840 the New Zealand Customs Department has undergone 
many changes, though its fundamental role remains the control over the movement of 
goods and people across New Zealand’s international borders (Anon. 2004).  From early 
on customs officers were charged with multiple duties including Postmaster, Harbour 
Master, and in some cases, Quarantine Officers, and had the authority to licence bonded 
stores and auctioneers.  All of these duties also involved the collection of funds for the 
developing colony (McGill 1991).  In 1844 the Government introduced a Property Tax 
(taxing all property and income), abolishing Customs, for the purpose of a fairer more 
even taxation scheme.  However, in 1845 after a severe drop in tax revenue, the 
Governor repealed the Property Tax and re-established Customs (McGill 1991).  The 
Duties of Customs Ordinance was passed in 1846 by which horses, mules, asses, sheep, 
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cattle and all other live stock and animals, as well as seeds, bulbs and plants were 
admitted into New Zealand duty free: although there were no inspections at this period 
to guard against various pests being introduced along with the stock (Thomson 1922). 
 
The first and most famous surveillance boat to enter New Zealand’s Customs service 
was a cutter called Hawk, registered at Auckland on 10 April 1881.  Under the command 
of Captain Henry Parker the Hawk operated in the seas out of Auckland, where the 
vessel intercepted smugglers until 1887, when she was sold.  The name Hawk became 
tradition, with patrol boats out of Auckland up to and including the current patrol boat 
also named Hawk (McGill 1991). 
 
In 1858 the Customs Regulations were passed, making provisions for the Department of 
Customs to be administered by the Commissioner of Customs (the now Minister of 
Customs).  The Customs Regulations (1858) were succeeded by the Customs Act 1913, 
which updated the legislative basis of the Customs Department.  The next legislation 
passed, which influenced Customs, was the introduction of the Sales Tax in 1933; this 
legislation was only temporary and was succeeded by the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) Act in late 1933.  In 1966 the Customs Act 1913 was succeeded by the Customs 
Act 1966.  The Customs Act was repealed in 1996 and was succeeded by the Customs 
and Excise Act 1996.  The Customs and Excise Act 1996 also established the current 
New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS), which replaced the then Customs Department2.  
 
The legislation currently utilised by the NZCS covers all aspects of customs control and 
border management.  This comprises 38 pieces of principal legislation including The 
Customs and Excise Act 1996, the Customs and Excise Regulations 19963, the 
Biosecurity Act 1993, the Hazardous Substance and New Organism Act 1996, the 
Import Control Act 1988, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and the Trade in Endangered 
Species Act 19894, as well as other relevant border control legislation such as the 
                                                 
2
 http://www.customs.govt.nz/about/Our+History.htm 
3
 http://www.customs.govt.nz/library/Legislation/default.htm 
4
 http://www.customs.govt.nz/library/Legislation/Principal+Legislation+used+by+Customs.htm 
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Conservation Act 1987, the Forests Act 1949, the Marine Pollution Act 1974, the 
Transport Act 1962 and the Wildlife Act 19535. 
 
1.4  The Sea Pathways 
Transporting goods by sea has been the most predominant form of transport since 
humans began colonising the world.  Even today, the majority of commodities are 
transported in containers via the sea.  Given the increase in the movement of sea 
containers as a result of international trade and globalisation, the risk associated with sea 
containers has also increased.  These risks are the focus of international agreements, 
national importation regulations and border security. 
 
1.4.1  Sea Containers 
Although transporting goods in large containers of various kinds had been used in inland 
and overseas distribution for many years, only since 1926 were containers widely used 
by the London Midland and Scottish railways, and since the World War 2 containers 
have been used in the Great Britain-Ireland trade.  Despite the advantages of 
containerisation being well reported, it was not until the late 1960’s that containerisation 
became internationally used (Hulme 2009).  The number of shipping lines using 
containers grew from only 5 in 1966 to about 200 in 1969, with the International 
Standards Organisation standardising container size in 1967 (Johnson and Garnett 
1971).  And today, giant container ships transport containers and their goods between 
purpose built ports that facilitate the rapid transfer of the sea containers from the cargo 
ships to road, rail and canal transport for over land transport to their final destination 
(Hulme 2009). 
 
Given that the majority (approximately 90%) of modern trade is transported around the 
world in sea containers, increasing globalisation and trade also means an increase in the 
movement of sea containers.  Sea containers are large and can carry a vast number of 
different commodities from a wide range of origins.  Although measures are taken to 
prevent the movement of unwanted commodities and organisms within and on sea 
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 http://www.customs.govt.nz/library/Legislation/Other+Relevant+Border+Protection+Acts.htm 
Chapter 1: Introduction 7 
containers, smuggling and contamination still occurs.  The number of sea containers 
entering New Zealand increases yearly (see Chapters 3 and 8) therefore there is a 
constantly growing need to develop more efficient methods of inspecting and treating 
sea containers. 
 
In addition to the risks associated with the actual movement of commodities in 
containers; there are also acknowledged biosecurity risks associated with the vessels 
themselves (e.g. by their ballast water, haul fouling and sea chest and internal piping 
contamination) (Hewitt et al. 2004).  The ballast water risks are managed through the 
exchange of ballast water in international water before the vessel enters into New 
Zealand waters.  Haul fouling risks are minimised through the speed at which the vessels 
travel, however, haul fouling has been an acknowledged biosecurity integrity gap both in 
New Zealand and internationally, especially in terms of sea chest and internal pipe 
contamination (Hewitt et al. 2004). 
 
The Marine Biosecurity Team of the Ministry of Fisheries (MOF) was established in 
1998 and had the responsibility of reducing these integrity gaps for New Zealand.  
However in 2004, the responsibilities of the Marine Biosecurity Team were transferred 
to MAF Biosecurity New Zealand.  A function of managing New Zealand’s borders 
involves auditing existing border control measures, and where appropriate implementing 
measures to improve border security.  In 2003 MAF released the Sea Container Review, 
which was an audit of the existing border measures for the importation of sea containers 
and it established the effectiveness of the inspections of sea containers.  This report also 
highlighted potential improvements to the existing procedures and potential new 
technologies. 
 
1.4.2  Sea Container Review 
The Sea Container Review is a survey developed by a multi-disciplinary inter-agency 
team to assess the possibility of uncleared biosecurity risk goods passing through New 
Zealand’s border and to identify any contaminants present.  This involved quantitatively 
assessing the occurrence of risk material in containers and the ability to identify 
containers requiring inspection or goods clearance (based on manifest accuracy), as well 
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as assessing the effectiveness of current risk management techniques (such as cleaning 
certificates and on-wharf inspections) and the movement of containers around New 
Zealand.  The survey focuses on the actual border pathway risks rather than the risks 
posed by individual commodities and pests that are associated with commodities. 
 
The specific objectives of this survey were to: 
• “verify the accuracy of the manifested contents and packaging descriptions; 
• find out the nature of sea container contaminants; 
• ascertain the true internal contamination rate for both certified (with cleaning 
certificates) and uncertified sea containers entering New Zealand; 
• determine the efficacy of the current on-wharf inspection methods  for detecting 
risk material in or on imported sea containers; 
• investigate the costs and benefits of using a portable probe camera to inspect 
containers on the wharf; 
• ascertain the movements of sea containers in New Zealand; 
• quantify the biosecurity risk posed by the sea container pathway, and the level of 
risk mitigation offered by current biosecurity clearance procedures” (Anon. 
2003i) 
 
Auckland, Tauranga, Napier and Lyttelton ports were surveyed, which combined 
handled 83 % of the nation’s total containers for 2001/02, also ensuring a regional 
distribution of the results.  A total of 11,265 containers were surveyed, 7,405 in 
Auckland, 1,824 in Tauranga, 3,723 in Napier and 1,663 in Lyttelton, with Full 
Container Load (FCL), Less than a Container Load (LCL) and empty containers 
inspected (Anon. 2003i). 
 
The survey found that 14.6 % of the containers contained biosecurity risk cargo6 at door 
inspection.  Of the containers cleared at door inspection, 2.6% were found to contain 
biosecurity risk cargo at follow up inspections.  Approximately 17% of all loaded 
containers surveyed contained biosecurity risk cargo.  The highest occurring point of 
                                                 
6
 Includes manifested and unmanifested risk cargo: with the majority cleared through normal cargo 
operations (Anon. 2003i). 
Chapter 1: Introduction 9 
origin of the contaminated cargo was from the Pacific Islands (73%) and the lowest from 
Asia and the Middle East combined (9%). 
 
In this survey the most common risk goods7 discovered were foodstuffs followed by 
used vehicles, machinery and other equipment, pet food, grain and timber.  Although 
Australia was the largest source of food stuffs for the period 2001/02 (40% of total 
foodstuff imports), only 22% of Australian containers contained risk goods.  The survey 
results showed that approximately 14% of the risk cargo in the surveyed containers did 
not comply with relevant import health standards (IHS) on arrival in New Zealand and 
was seized.  With 35% of seized cargo being vehicles and machinery, 24% were cane-
ware and used tyres, 12% were foodstuffs, and timber, wood and handicrafts accounting 
for 8%. 
 
Of the 10,285 loaded containers that underwent door inspections during the survey, 
4,294 were discovered to contain wood packaging material.  Of the containers free of 
wood packaging material at door inspection, 102 containers were found to contain wood 
packaging material during follow up inspections.  Approximately 48.7% of loaded 
containers were found to contain wood packaging material. 
 
Of all the containers surveyed 4.5% were found to have some form of contaminants at 
door inspections, 20.7% of containers followed up were also found to have 
contaminants, therefore there was approximately 24.4% contamination rate of all 
containers.  Soil was found to be the most common contaminant throughout the survey. 
 
The survey found that approximately 7.4% of loaded containers contained goods which 
were not indicated on the manifest (excluding Freight of All Kinds (FAK) and ‘general 
goods’ cargo-type descriptions).  Although unmanifested, the cargo was not seen to pose 
a biosecurity risk to New Zealand.  Approximately 1.7% of containers were found to 
contain unmanifested biosecurity risk cargo. 
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 “ Any organism, organic matter, substance or other thing that it is reasonable to suspect constitutes, 
harbours or contains an organism that may cause unwanted harm to natural or physical resources or 
human health in New Zealand; or that may interfere with the diagnosis, management, or treatment, in 
New Zealand, of pests or unwanted organisms” (Anon. 2003i). 
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During 2001/02, although outside of the survey, New Zealand Quarantine Officers at a 
transitional facility in Auckland unpacked 6,302 FAK containers, 7.9% of containers 
were found to have additional cargo not included on the manifest.  Of all the 
unmanifested containers found in the survey, 66.7% were held for documentation or 
quarantine reasons (Anon. 2003i). 
 
Of the containers inspected, 30.4% of the loaded containers contained packaging 
material that was inconsistent with that of the manifest description.   However, many of 
the mis-manifested packaging materials were found to be non-risk.  Unmanifested wood 
packaging material was found in 32.6% of loaded containers.  Approximately 8.5% of 
loaded containers inspected (excluding FAK and ‘general goods’ containers) had 
unmanifested packaging material that required treatment or destruction. 
 
During the survey approximately 14.8% of loaded containers and 6.5% of empty 
containers were on arrival were found to be contaminated with live or viable organisms.  
Many of these organisms already occur in New Zealand and are not regulated8, however, 
6.1% of loaded and 1.6% of empty containers inspected were found to be contaminated 
with regulated organisms.  For a detailed description of the types of live or viable 
organisms found refer to pages 24-25 and Appendix 1 of (Anon. 2003i). 
 
Of the 10,302 containers surveyed 82% had packaging certificates being identified as 
correct.  Although over 90% of all containers arrived in New Zealand with cleaning 
certificates, their internal contamination rate was not significantly different from the rate 
associated with the containers without certificates.  The review highlights here that 
although cleaning cannot guarantee 100% contamination-free containers, the cleaning 
certificates could be the reason that 80% of the containers arrive free of internal 
contaminants. 
 
                                                 
8
 “For the purpose of this review regulated includes all organisms not present in New Zealand (harmful or 
otherwise), except those for which entry approval has been granted by ERMA (regulated under the HSNO 
1996); and organisms that would be subject to official biosecurity measures prior to importation, upon 
detection at the border or if found in New Zealand (regulated under the BSA 1993)” (Anon. 2003i) 
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Although the door inspection process is effective at detecting internal wood packaging 
(detecting 84.7% of internal wood packaging material) the process only detected 28.1% 
of fungi on wood, 20.5% of bark on wood, 21% of bark, 7% insect damage and only 5% 
of live insects on wood.  The process also detected 72.2% of external soil contaminants, 
10.6% of internal seeds, soils and plant materials, 4.2% of live insects, 4% of live 
spiders and only 5.9% of regulated/new fungi9 
 
  Recommendations 
The Sea Container Review proposed a series of potential risk mitigation measures to 
reduce the biosecurity risk associated with the importation of cargo via the sea container 
pathway.  The review highlights that many of these proposed measures overlap or are 
linked and that some measures would need to be implemented in conjunction with others 
to be fully effective.  The first five recommendations are summarised below, for the full 
list refer to pages 38-49 of (Anon. 2003i). 
 
  a) Biosecurity Awareness Material 
This involves providing accurate up to date information on New Zealand’s biosecurity 
requirements regarding sea containers in the appropriate languages to all areas of the 
industry, for example offshore exports, shipping companies, port companies and 
importers. 
 
The review highlights that increased biosecurity awareness has the following 
advantages: 
• “will lead to greater compliance and reduce costs; 
• Reduction in biosecurity risks; 
• Such programmes could be expected to show a quick return, as very little 
material is currently available; 
• can leverage off work already done by the Protect New Zealand programme; and  
• can be linked into the biosecurity requirements of other countries”. 
And the disadvantages with this measure include the following: 
                                                 
9
 (Anon. 2003i) page 28 
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• “the cost of preparing the material; and 
• on-going funding may not be available”10. 
 
  b) Offshore Certification 
The review proposes that the current certificate process could be widened to also cover 
the exterior of sea containers.  Certification will continue to be the responsibility of the 
shipper; with uncertificated containers being regarded as high risk and inspected on 
arrival. 
 
The review suggests that offshore certificates have the following advantages: 
• “risk mitigation carried out offshore; 
• shared responsibility; 
• facilitated entry of the container; 
• some cost borne by the exporter; and  
• in some circumstances, certification may provide equivalence for some arrival 
processes and further facilitate delivery”. 
And the seen disadvantages are as follows: 
• “cost of awareness and auditing programmes; and  
• difficult to monitor processes to ensure compliance”.11 
 
 c) International Harmonisation of Biosecurity Standards for 
Containers 
The review suggests that New Zealand together with the international trading 
community continue to promote harmonisation of biosecurity standards for containers 
and containerised cargo.  Along with the possibility of further developing information 
management, biosecurity awareness and certification, the review suggests the creation of 
international container risk profiles, and that the international community undertakes 
investigations into new and innovative technology to improve effectiveness and cost 
efficiency. 
                                                 
10
 (Anon. 2003i) page 38 
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The review suggests that these processes could have the following advantages: 
• “enhanced awareness of the biosecurity risk and requirements for sea 
containers; 
• a standard “look and feel” to container biosecurity documentation and 
requirements, which would result in greater recognition and compliance; 
• will lead to greater compliance and reduction in global biosecurity costs; 
• risk profiles can be built into more quickly and targeted more finely by 
incorporating data from larger counties; and  
• can be built on existing international relationships and structures’. 
And the disadvantages are as follows: 
• “difficult and time-consuming to get international agreement on standards; and 
• New Zealand may require higher standards of compliance than international 
agreements can deliver.”12 
 
  d) Intelligence-based Electronic Risk Profiling System 
A electronic risk profiling system, targeted at high risk containers, with links to 
appropriate governmental agencies and industry was also one of the recommendations in 
the Auditor-General’s Management of Biosecurity Risk Report 2002: Case Study 6 
(Anon. 2002f). 
 
The review highlights a series of 12 advantages that electronic risk profiling could offer, 
the top five are as follows: 
• “increased efficiency and effectiveness by targeting high-risk containers, cargo, 
origins, shippers and importers; 
• faster processing for MAF, shipping companies, port companies and consignees; 
• could form part of a whole government import goods management system or a 
joint Australian biosecurity and customs system; 
• allows large amounts of data to be captured and analysed, and can therefore be 
used as an ongoing profiling tool for identifying higher-risk containers; and 
• information on the biosecurity status of specific containers could be made 
available online to all affected parties”.13 
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  e) External Visual Inspection 
With this measure the review proposes the inspection of the external surfaces of 
containers for contaminants.  This could occur at several stages along the container 
logistics pathway.  A requirement for a six-sided external examination could be 
incorporated into the existing process which already requires external examination for 
the structural integrity of the container before packaging and shipping.  Again, these six-
sided external examinations for contaminants on the wharf are an ideal option for high-
risk containers. 
 
1.5  Thesis Objectives 
 
A review of the factors influencing the integrity of New Zealand’s biosecurity 
management process has identified three main areas of weakness: current inter-
departmental harmonisation and funding responsibility, funding of biosecurity and 
border inspection under development (Budd 2000).  As biosecurity risk for all trading 
nations is of increasing concern, research and development of information and 
technology regarding the possible reduction of potential risks is a growing area (Anon. 
2003i). 
 
The biosecurity risk associated with some pathways into New Zealand, such as 
passengers and their luggage, can be managed through undertaking 100 % inspection.  
Prior to the implementation of the six-sided full sea container inspection regulation in 
2001, MAF inspected an estimated random quarter of all incoming and outgoing sea 
containers (Anon. 2002f, d, 2003a).  Since 2001, 100% of all sea containers entering 
New Zealand undergo six-sided full inspection.  It is widely acknowledged that no one 
method could adequately reduce all the risks associated with the importation and 
exportation of commodities using sea containers (Anon. 2003i). 
 
The Sea Container Review (Anon. 2003i) recommends an integrated system involving 
numerous steps which are flexible enough to cope with all the variation in containers, 
commodities, importers, exporters, points of origin and chain of custody.  With the 
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reports major recommendation being the development of an intelligence-based risk 
assessment system which will be used with other measures such as supervision of 
unpacking and the facility audit results.  This system is recommended to be a 
government owned system to be used across all associated agencies creating a national 
information data base, with the possibility of combining the needs for New Zealand and 
Australia. 
 
The objective of this research is to identify information and technology gaps as well as 
overlaps and to identify and develop possible solutions that could provide New Zealand 
with a more cost effective and efficient biosecurity information management system for 
three sea importation pathways.  This research will focus on the pre-border and border 
aspects of the sea container pathway and the biosecurity management systems in place in 
accordance with the recommendations set out by MAF (Anon. 2003i) and the OAG 
(Anon. 2002f), more specifically it addresses the following key tasks: 
 
• Assess the linkages between international agreements and domestic legalisation 
and how they influence operational methods utilised in New Zealand; 
• Determine what biosecurity risks are and how risks are managed at the border 
level: 
o Transitional Facilities,  
o Airports and, 
o Sea ports; 
• Determine a relationship between the number of sea containers and used 
vehicles, and the number of potential contaminants entering New Zealand;  
• Assess which aspect of the biosecurity management of sea containers and used 
vehicles has the most influence on the biosecurity risk New Zealand faces; and 
• Assess the potential costs of improving current biosecurity management systems 
 
The scope of the research was decided on the basis that pre-border and border controls 
have been identified as the most essential elements of any biosecurity management 
system and the focus of recommendations of various government agencies.  Therefore, 
while it is acknowledged that incursion and pest management are an integral aspect to 
protecting New Zealand’s environmental, economic and public health, this research does 
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not include incursion and established pest species management and their associated 
costs, nor does it included the responsible agencies’ response time to the discovery of a 
new incursion. 
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1.6  Thesis outline 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Literature review of history of sea transportation and New Zealand’s border 
management and outlines this study’s research objectives. 
Chapter 2:  Biosecurity 
This chapter defines biosecurity and biosecurity risk, and outlines the development of 
biosecurity in New Zealand. 
Chapter 3:  New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 
Overview of New Zealand’s major trading partners and identification of New Zealand’s 
top three trading partners 
Chapter 4:  International Trade Agreements and Administrative Bodies 
Summarisation of the international trade agreements New Zealand is signature to. 
Chapter 5:  Domestic Legislation and Administrative Bodies. 
An overview of New Zealand’s national legislation relevant to biosecurity, border 
management and of the administrative bodies responsible for managing New Zealand’s 
biosecurity. 
Chapter 6:  New Zealand’s Borders and Biosecurity Management 
Definition of borders and how they are crossed and a distribution of New Zealand’s 
points of entry and transitional facilities as well as an outline of import health standards 
for the importation of sea containers and the Biosecurity (costs) Regulations 2005 are 
also outlined. 
Chapter 7:  Slippage along Three Importation Pathways. 
Presentation of a series of models that estimate the slippage along the sea container, 
woodpackaging and used vehicle pathways into New Zealand and sensitivity analysis of 
the slippage rate under different border management procedures. 
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Chapter 8:  Estimating the Cost of Future Slippage. 
Example costs estimates for importers for inspecting each unit imported along the three 
pathways (sea containers, woodpackaging and used vehicles) utilising the models 
developed in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 9:  Discussion 
Discussion of the outcomes of this research. 
Chapter 10:  Conclusion and Management Implications. 
Summary of the findings of this study and discussion of their management implications 
for border management. 
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Chapter 2 
Biosecurity 
 
“How we “see” biosecurity as a nation has fundamental influences on how we evolve 
systems to protect our ecology and economy.”  (Anon. 2000) 
 
2.1  Introduction 
When discussing the management involved in protecting New Zealand’s 
environmental, public and economic health, it is important to use consistent 
terminology.  Until recently, the term Biosecurity was loosely used within New 
Zealand governmental departments to describe managing New Zealand’s border to 
prevent the introduction of regulated and unwanted species and organisms.  The aim 
of this chapter is to set out clear definitions for biosecurity and outline the 
development of biosecurity within New Zealand.  The first is achieved through 
highlighting the difference between security and biosecurity as well as through 
describing what constitutes a risk to security and biosecurity.  The process through 
which biosecurity is developed within New Zealand has described through 
summarising the major audits of New Zealand’s recent biosecurity history. 
 
2.2  What is Security? 
Although the concept of security is an old one, its definition and focus have changed 
to meet the demands of globalisation.  In an attempt to define “security” in terms of 
international relations, (Huysmans 1998) highlights that in principle there is no limit 
to the definitions of security.  However, he also concludes that human actions are 
primarily driven by a fear of death objectified as a fear of those who have the capacity 
to inflict death upon others “… the fact that is decisive for his (i.e. man’s) social and 
political attitudes and ideas is that other human beings are able to inflict death upon 
him” (Huysmans 1998).  When defining “security” (Huysmans 1998) also points out 
that there are two major schools of thought; the reasoning that security is about the 
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pursuit of freedom from threat, and that external actions negatively affect a nation’s 
national security by degrading the nation’s most important values. 
 
The terrorist attacks in the USA (September 2001) and in Bali in 2002 have lead to 
the world becoming more aware of risks to domestic or national assets (Anon. 2003g) 
(Meyerson and Reaser 2002).  In a recent report to the New Zealand Controller and 
Auditor-General, domestic security was defined as “… preventing or defending 
against threats that are conventional in approach (i.e. not by traditional military 
means) and are directed towards the interior of a state rather than its external 
forces.”14  This definition is consistent with the American definition of ‘Homeland 
Security’- “… is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
United States, reduces America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage 
and recover from attacks that do occur” (Anon. 2002h). 
 
Threats to domestic or national security arise from a wide spectrum of criminal 
actions from external and in some cases internal sources.  However, domestic security 
can also be affected by international and national events that are not necessarily 
criminal.  These include outbreaks of infectious diseases, which have the potential to 
negatively impact a nation’s economic, social and environmental health, such as Foot 
and Mouth Disease, SARS (Anon. 2003g) and the Avian Flu15.  During the 1980s and 
1990s debates regarding the definition of security began to consider whether or not 
the meaning of security should be widened from a mostly military focus to include 
different sectors and referent objects, i.e. adding economic, societal, political and 
environmental risks (different sectors) to the traditional military agenda and 
expanding it by adding individual, ecological system and community to the usually 
state centred agenda (referent objects) (Huysmans 1998). 
 
Traditionally, in New Zealand domestic security has focused on the monitoring of 
movements of people and goods at ports of entry.  However, given the recent events 
and changes in the international trading environment, New Zealand has begun to 
increase the efforts preventing unwanted goods and people from even departing for 
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New Zealand.  Internationally, efforts have also concentrated more on all stages of the 
movement of goods and people, from their point of origin to their final destination 
with the aim of increasing security and to facilitate the trade and movement of 
legitimate commodities and people (Anon. 2003g). 
 
2.3  What is Biosecurity? 
In relation to security, the term biosecurity generally refers to the aspects of national 
security that have the potential to adversely affect a nation’s biological health (in 
terms of economic and environmental health) through the importation of goods, 
persons and craft.  The term ‘biosecurity’ has a variety of meanings in common usage 
and at time differing emphases (Meyerson and Reaser 2002, Waaga 2007).  In 
addition, different words in common usage such as bio-safety and biological security 
have been used in the same context as biosecurity16.  These inconsistencies have lead 
to confusion within the literature and also in national and international trade and 
customs legislation (Cooney and Lang 2007).  For example, in contrast to New 
Zealand, in the USA the term biosecurity is the sum of risk management and defence 
against biological threats, however, the emphasis is on countering bioterrorism, i.e. 
biological threats or biological agents that have potential to cause harm from 
individuals or groups that are politically, religiously or ideologically motivated 
(Anon. 2001a, Meyerson and Reaser 2002).  While, similar to New Zealand, in 
Australia biosecurity is defined as the prevention of the entry, establishment or spread 
of unwanted pests and infectious disease agents in people, animals, plants or the 
environment (Anon. 2003f).  
 
In New Zealand, biosecurity, as defined by the Biosecurity Strategy Development 
Team, “…is the protection of New Zealand’s economy, environment and people’s 
health from the risks posed by pests and diseases” (Anon. 2001c).  This definition 
takes into account the prevention of new pests and diseases from arriving, and the 
control and eradication of pests and disease pre-existing within New Zealand (Anon. 
2002a).  It has often been said that New Zealand has a world leading biosecurity 
system, (Anon. 2002g) (Anon. 2003j) (Anon. 2003a), which involves strict controls 
                                                 
16
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosecurity 13 December 2006 
Chapter 2: Biosecurity 22
on all aspects of the management of New Zealand’s biosecurity, for example, pre-
border and border controls, surveillance and pest management. 
 
During the past ten years, New Zealand has managed its biosecurity risks with great 
emphasis on protecting New Zealand’s agricultural sectors from exotic pests and 
diseases (Anon. 2000) with relatively high success (Anon. 2001c).  Increasing 
volumes of international trade and travel mean that all countries, including New 
Zealand, are required to be more vigilant in protecting against the spread of pests and 
diseases that threaten the health of people, animals, plants and the environment in key 
areas such as airports, seaports and transitional facilities (or satellite ports) (Lambie 
2002).  Accordingly, the emphasis of biosecurity within New Zealand has moved to 
include human health as well as protecting native and valued introduced flora and 
fauna, and indigenous terrestrial and aquatic environments (Anon. 2003j).  The most 
significant shift was the passing of the Biosecurity Act 1993 (BSA 1993) by the New 
Zealand Parliament.  The BSA 1993 takes into account the nature and effect of 
introduced organisms on people, plants and animals and the New Zealand economy; 
which are also continued through the launch of the New Zealand government’s 
Biosecurity Strategy in 2003. 
 
Public awareness of biosecurity issues within New Zealand has recently increased, 
with both public and industrial sectors having expressed concern that the biosecurity 
management systems currently in place are not as efficient and targeted as required, 
given the increase in international trade and travel (Anon. 2001c).  These concerns are 
illustrated by recent incursions including the painted apple moth (PAM) (Teia 
anartoide) (Anon. 2002d), the red imported fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) (Anon. 
2002e) and the southern saltmarsh mosquito (Ochlerotatus camptorhynchus) (Anon. 
2002c). 
 
2.4  Biosecurity Risk 
The term risk refers to the potential negative impact on something of value; with the 
common usage of risk referring to the probability of a loss or threat to anything of 
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value17.  The perceptions of risks differ amongst the population, depending on 
education culture and attitude towards their surroundings.  Perceived environmental 
risks include ecological impact, human benefits, knowledge and controllability of 
impacts (McFarlane 2005).   
 
In terms of biosecurity, a risk constitutes an organism that has the potential to 
negatively impact on a nation’s environmental, economic and public health (Anon. 
2003j).  There are many forms of biosecurity risks that can enter any country (Anon. 
2003j); the species that are considered a biosecurity risk are non-native species that 
have the potential to be invasive species (Anon. 2001d, Sumner 2003).   
 
Although there are non-native species that have been intentionally introduced with 
beneficial outcomes, (such as species that form food corps and live stock as well as 
those that are used for landscape restoration and biological control), non-native 
species that have the potential to have detrimental effects on natural and productive 
environments and public heath are considered to be non-native invasive species 
(Vitousek et al. 1997, Pimentel et al. 2000, Sumner 2003, Pimentel et al. 2005, 
Simberhoff et al. 2005).  Introductions of non-native invasive species have had and 
can have severe environmental and economic impacts on a nation (Pimentel et al. 
2000, Pimentel et al. 2005).  Such impacts include native species extinction, alteration 
or loss of natural ecosystems (Vitousek et al. 1997), loss of production in the 
agriculture (Ross 2004), forestry (Zahid 2008, Vizzini 2009) and fisheries (Wonham 
2001), and large economic costs for pest species management (Pimentel et al. 2000, 
Pimentel et al. 2005) and public health (Eritja 2005).   
 
Facilitated by the rapid expansion of global trade, transport, and travel, invasive 
species and their effects are increasing at an unanticipated rate (Anon. 2001d, Sikder 
et al. 2006).  Invasive species enter a country by means known as pathways; this 
includes intentional and unintentional importations.  Unintentionally introduced 
invasive species can be transported in or on commodities such as produce (Anon. 
2002b), nursery stock (Reichard and White 2001) and livestock (Anon. 2003i) or in 
the transport equipment such as packaging materials (Haack 2006, Haack and Petrice 
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2009) or ship’s ballasts water (Bulman 1998, Gadgil and Bulman 2002, Anon. 2003j, 
Hewitt et al. 2004). 
 
Given that the nature of the numerous pathways is diverse and constantly changing 
(Anon. 2003i), prevention (though preferred is very complex and not always 
achievable) is dependent on the capabilities of other trading nations’ effective 
management of invasive species and their possible pathways (Anon. 2001d).  Invasive 
species, once established, pose a threat to the region, the region’s trading partners and 
to any other country along the trade route (Floerl and Inglis 2005).  A major aspect of 
prevention is identifying possible pathways and assessing their risk levels according 
to their potential impacts and then developing the management procedures to reduce 
possible risks (Floerl and Inglis 2005, Sikder et al. 2006,). 
 
Risk assessment is used as a means to reduce the potential biosecurity risks associated 
with the movement of international trade through evaluating the risks connected with 
specific commodities as well as the origins of the commodities and vessel (Floerl and 
Inglis 2005).  As a member of the WTO (see Chapter 4) New Zealand has to justify 
any restrictions or biosecurity measures through science based risk analyses (Anon. 
2002f).  The development of IHS has enabled MAF to target high-risk pathways and 
commodities and set procedures designed to lessen the associated risks.  For example, 
65% of invasive ants are linked to sea containers that originate from the Pacific 
Islands.  Therefore all containers from that region are considered high risk, and 
consequently these containers (along with all containers from other high risk regions) 
are inspected fully, both externally and internally, by a MAF inspector upon arrival in 
New Zealand (Nendick and Sarty 2006). 
 
2.5  The development of biosecurity within New Zealand 
Throughout the early settlement of New Zealand many exotic species were introduced 
to contribute to the pleasure and profit of New Zealand’s settlers; this is reflected by 
the legislation of the time.  Early legislation was passed to promote the establishment 
of introduced species, including the Protection of Certain Animals Act 1861, banning 
the hunting of introduced animals until 1870.  In 1866 the Act was amended for the 
hunting on private land.  This was followed by the Animal Protection Act 1867 which 
Chapter 2: Biosecurity 25
also aimed to encourage the importation of exotic species.  This Act was amended 21 
times until it was succeeded by the Animals Protection and Game Act 1921.  Under 
the Animals Protection Act amended of 1907, open hunting season remained at one 
month per year (Thomson 1922). 
 
However, the protection of introduced species was removed in 1923, and by 1930 
government culling of deer had begun and possums were officially declared a pest 
species.  The Wildlife Act 1953 was the first Act for the protection of indigenous 
wildlife, the regulating of game shooting and the control of wild exotic pest animals.  
By 1956 all deer, thar, chamois, wild goats, feral pigs and possums were declared 
pests under the Noxious Animals Act 1956.  This Act was followed by the 
Agricultural Pest Destruction Act 1967 and then the Wild Animal Control Act 1977; 
both were established to make better provisions for the control of introduced harmful 
wild species and to provide the means of regulating recreational and commercial 
hunters. 
 
Although biosecurity as a national concept did not exist until the 1990s, legislation 
protecting New Zealand’s biological health from unwanted organisms and pests, 
began to be developed earlier.  For example protecting New Zealand’s forests began 
with the Forests Act (1949), which came into force on the 1st January 1950.  It 
enabled the then Ministry of Forestry to protect New Zealand’s forest resources from 
any forest products (whether imported or exported) that may pose any threat to the 
industry.  Section Part IV: Miscellaneous Provisions s. 69-72 of the Forestry Act 1949 
also provided the Ministry with regulations with which to control or manage existing 
tree diseases.  Although the legislation that followed the Forests Act 1949 did not 
specifically refer to any biosecurity obligations, it indirectly enabled Ministries to 
protect New Zealand’s environment.  This legislation includes the Conservation Act 
1987, which was created with the purpose of promoting the conservation of New 
Zealand’s natural and historic resources as well as establishing the Department of 
Conservation under Section five of the Act.  The Public Finance Act 1989 enables the 
government to obtain the necessary funds for biosecurity activities. The Forests 
Produce Import and Export Regulations 1989 were passed as a consequence of and 
succeeded Section 69 of the Forest Act 1949.  These regulations set out the 
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requirements to be met by importers and exporters of any forest products and provide 
the legal basis of inspecting imported forest products for insect pests and diseases. 
 
Biosecurity as a national concept began in 1990 with the introduction of the 
Biosecurity Act (BSA 1993) in 1993 (See Chapter 5).  The BSA 1993 was vital in the 
reformation of the laws regarding wild animal management pre-existing within New 
Zealand and the protection of New Zealand’s natural and agricultural resources. The 
purpose of the Biosecurity Act is as follows: “An act to restate and reform the law 
relating to the exclusion, eradication, and effective management of pests and 
unwanted organisms.”  The BSA 1993 works in conjunction with 43 other public Acts 
as well as private Acts (Appendix III) to cover all the different aspects of biosecurity. 
 
There are currently five government agencies that are involved in the management of 
New Zealand’s biosecurity:  
• Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry (MAF), 
• Ministry of Fisheries (MOF), 
• Ministry of Health (MOH), 
• Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA),  
• Department of Conservation (DOC). 
 
Each agency is directly responsible for managing the biosecurity risk within their 
respective sectors under the BSA 1993.  The Memorandum of Understanding between 
MAF, DOC, MOF and MOH was written to provide an overarching framework for 
the agencies to work efficiently together on biosecurity matters18.  The government’s 
biosecurity program is coordinated by MAF, in agreement with the other four 
agencies and controls overall terrestrial and freshwater biosecurity (Anon. 2006d). 
 
In 1999, the Biosecurity Authority was established by MAF “…to protect New 
Zealand’s unique biota by managing biosecurity risks.”  This was to include the 
development of effective risk management programs such as science based import 
health and border protection standards and the continual surveillance of New 
Zealand’s animal, plant and forest health.  MAF Biosecurity Authority was 
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responsible for exotic pest and disease control, including a supportive role in the 
development of pest management strategies and a rapid response capability to 
invasions from exotic organisms.  As part of MAF the Biosecurity Authority was 
responsible for leading and coordinating the governments’ biosecurity programs in 
partnership with other agencies.  However, MAF underwent major restructuring at the 
end of 2004, and the then Biosecurity Authority was replaced with MAF Biosecurity 
New Zealand in November 2004. Despite the restructuring, the roles and functions of 
this division have essentially remained the same. 
 
Throughout its development process New Zealand’s biosecurity system has been 
under regular review.  This included a review of the Management of Biosecurity Risk 
by the Auditor General’s office in 2002, the development of the National Biosecurity 
strategy in 2003, The Sea Container Review, (Chapter 1) and a review of MAF 
Biosecurity New Zealand’s border management in: “Managing biosecurity risks 
associated with high-risk sea containers”, report by the Auditor General’s office in 
2006. 
 
2.6  Recent Reports on New Zealand’s Biosecurity System 
2.6.1 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: Management of Biosecurity 
Risks.  Report of the Controller and Auditor General 2002 
The purpose of this audit was to examine and provide information to Parliament and 
the public on how MAF manages New Zealand’s biosecurity risks.  The audit was 
carried out through the examination of the biosecurity risk management system’s 
structure, policies and procedures19.  However, it did not examine the effectiveness of 
MAF Quarantine service, marine biosecurity (responsibility of the Ministry of 
Fisheries) and the roles of regional councils, nor did it review biosecurity related 
legislation20.  The results of this audit are reported in six parts and seven case studies.  
The report’s findings and recommendations are summarised below. 
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The report highlights that experts in New Zealand and from other countries have 
consistently expressed that New Zealand’s biosecurity arrangements are amongst the 
best in the world, referring to the overall professionalism, fairness, and the 
consistency and transparency of New Zealand’s approach.  This is shown by other 
nations adopting measures that New Zealand has implemented. For example, 
Biosecurity Australia adopted aspects of MAF’s risk analysis into their own processes 
following New Zealand’s approach to the importation of table grapes from 
California21. 
 
The report also recognises that biosecurity is multifaceted and that effective risk 
management requires all relevant government officials to work closely and effectively 
together.  Although the three main agencies involved (MAF, MOH and DOC) have an 
established relationship, the report suggests that there is a need to improve 
communications between them by acting on the following: 
• “clear roles and responsibilities; 
• clear accountability for the biosecurity program; 
• agreement on a common outcome; and 
• an agreed common framework for assessing risks and priorities”22. 
 
The report further recognises that the deficiency in common goals and outcomes for 
New Zealand’s biosecurity system have lead to a lack of accountability and difficulty 
for departments to reach agreement from their different perspectives.  All theses 
inadequacies have given rise to the development of an ad hoc system, with little 
systematic cost-benefit analysis.  One example is the rapid implementation of 
additional border controls measures in response to the potential increased risk of foot 
and mouth disease following the international out-break in 2002, which has lead to a 
large, unexpected increase in expenditure23.  
 
The report acknowledges that the allocation of funds and resources is a complex 
matter with many sectors requiring large additional funds to respond to recent threats, 
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for example for the response to the detection of the southern saltmarsh mosquito and 
new airport security equipment (such as X-ray machines and dogs).  The report 
recommends that all biosecurity risks should be assessed on the same basis, thus 
removing the likelihood of bids for funding being assessed applying different 
methods. 
 
It is further acknowledged that the general public and the industry sector play a major 
role in biosecurity measures.  Public and industry awareness strengthens New 
Zealand’s biosecurity by increasing compliance with quarantine requirements and 
raise the chance of detecting new pest and diseases early. For example members of the 
public alerted officials to the presence of pests such as the southern saltmarsh 
mosquito, the painted apple moth and the red imported fire ants24. 
 
The report also recognises that although MAF in part has to rely on overseas agencies 
to ensure that goods exported to New Zealand meet the relevant biosecurity 
requirements set out in the IHS, total compliance with these measures in work 
undertaken overseas can not be guaranteed.  Thus pre-border and border measures and 
successful international relationships help encourage cooperation and compliance25. 
 
The report highlights that at the time of the audit, the three main operational groups 
(animal, plant and forest) that make up MAF Biosecurity were working independently 
of each other, thus unable to effectively use their collective knowledge and skills.  
The audit found that the three main groups inconsistently managed incursion 
responses, leading to varying rates of success26.  The report acknowledges that MAF 
has recognised these discrepancies and has begun addressing the issues. 
 
The report’s findings also highlight that the biosecurity system is over extended, 
finding several examples of high workload pressures in MAF Biosecurity and other 
agencies, at times leading to re-prioritisation of important work. 
 
                                                 
24
 (Anon. 2002g) page 36 
25
 (Anon. 2002g) page 37 
26
 (Anon. 2002g) page 38 
Chapter 2: Biosecurity 30
Recommendations 
The Whole Government  
The report by Auditor General’s office, MAF: Management of Biosecurity Risks, 
recommends improving the co-ordination between the four main departments by 
reviewing and updating the Memoranda of Understanding27; this should include 
documenting how and what decisions are reached.  Recommendations are made to 
establish ground between the departments to ensure a consistent approach and setting 
of specific goals and outcomes clearly defined by the Biosecurity Strategy (see 
section 2.6.2 below).  To strengthen accountability the report suggests that the roles, 
membership and mandate of the Biosecurity Council should be reviewed, a task 
recommended to be undertaken by the Council’s Technical Forum.  The report 
recommends further that the Director-Generals and Chief Executives of the relevant 
government departments meet regularly and report to the minister and as a group they 
should also be responsible for strategic planning. 
 
Since its establishment in1999 the Biosecurity Authority produced a series of reports 
including the Biosecurity Strategy.  The strategies development began in 1999 and 
underwent a series of drafts until its publication in August 2003. 
 
2.6.2  Biosecurity Strategy 2003 
 
In August 2003 the Biosecurity Council released the strategy “Protect New Zealand: 
The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand”.  This strategy has a wide scope providing 
recommendations and goals for the New Zealand government in all areas of New 
Zealand’s biosecurity. The strategy document is divided into four parts, and a 
summary of each part is given below. 
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  Part 1 
  Goals 
The strategy outlines goals for the management of New Zealand’s Biosecurity in 
2010.  These are as follows: 
 
• “Protecting marine and terrestrial primary industries and facilitating exports 
and tourism; 
• Protecting New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity – our native species, 
natural habitats, ecosystems and landscapes; 
• Enabling sustainable use of natural resources and protection of natural 
environment; 
• Maintaining the relationships between Maori and their culture and traditions 
with ancestral lands, waters, sites, waahi tapu and taonga; 
• Protecting the health of New Zealanders from zoonotic and pest-borne 
diseases and from venomous species; and 
• Reducing the damage caused by pest and diseases introduced in the past”. 28 
 
  Boundaries 
Although the strategy has a relatively wide scope covering a number of issues, it is 
constrained by the following boundaries: 
The strategy paper does not address the framework for the management of intentional 
introductions of new organisms into New Zealand, a subject covered under the 
HASNO Act 1996, nor does it focus on the role and capability of ERMA. Biological 
terrorism is also an area not encompassed by the strategy 29. 
 
  Part 2. 
  MAF as lead agency: 
The Biosecurity Strategy highlights the need to have a central government agency to 
take total responsibility for all areas of New Zealand’s Biosecurity.  The strategy 
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recognises that MAF is the logical department to become this agency.  With this 
responsibility the Biosecurity council would expect MAF to develop systems and the 
capability for protecting all aspects of New Zealand’s biosecurity.  Changes would be 
necessary, largely to define responsibilities more explicitly and to make decision 
making more transparent.  Improvements in the connections between government 
agencies and between aquatic, environmental and health sectors, both public and 
private, are also highly recommended by the authors, encouraging the delegation of 
tasks to other government departments, where there is specific knowledge; however, 
the overall responsibility will remain with the Director-General of MAF30. 
 
  Gaps in the system 
The current system is fragmented across several agencies, which makes identifying 
gaps within the system difficult.  The strategy paper highlights the lack of attempt or 
incentive of all agencies involved in assessing the gaps across New Zealand’s entire 
biosecurity system.  As it stands, the current system operates in isolated pockets 
addressing individual sector interests with no total overview.  The report concludes 
that the current system is not strategic, which allows for the escalation in overall 
costs.  The consequences of such a system can be seen by the incursion of the Painted 
Apple Moth and its management31 .  Another point highlighted in the strategy is the 
existence of different stages of development in the various sectors, which coincides 
with some sectors having critical gaps in baseline knowledge or lacking in capabilities 
such as diagnostic tools and treatment tools32. 
 
Overall the strategy paper identifies a total of 80 gaps in the processes of the current 
system during the development of the strategy and associated cabinet papers.  The 
gaps are found across all areas of the current system in varying degrees of severity.  
The strategy gives nine examples of gaps, the first of which could be deemed the most 
important.  Some are listed below:  
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• “Important biosecurity data is stored in a range of information systems run by 
different groups.  This results in gaps and duplication, inconsistency and poor 
accessibility of information.  A coordinated information strategy is needed to 
ensure this information is shared. 
• A more proactive approach is needed in assessing emerging threats, to enable 
identification of potential pests and pathways and implementation of measures 
to prevent their entry, spread and establishment. 
• There are significant knowledge gaps in risk analysis, for example the 
likelihood of different products (commodities) carrying pests and viruses and 
their response to various treatments.  Such gaps can only be addressed by 
research that, since the agents are always exotic, could be carried out in the 
research institutes abroad or under suitable containment provisions in this 
country.” 33 
 
The strategy paper recommends a standardisation of all processes and attributes the 
lack of consistency within the system and related activities to the haphazard nature of 
the systems overall development.  It also acknowledges that the system’s 
fragmentation reflects its underpinning knowledge and decision systems.  Critical 
information for the decision making process is not communicated between 
government agencies, or the information is incomplete, and people who require access 
to systems do not have it.  Processes for assessing external impacts and evaluating 
their consequences are either missing, rudimentary, or operating in isolation. 
  Science 
The strategy paper highlights that science is critical to the foundation of biosecurity as 
a whole and identified the following key issues: 
• “Connections: the need to integrate science into biosecurity policy and 
decision making, not just in the implementations of incursion response; 
• Capability: the need to protect and develop science capability across the 
spectrum, from pre-border through to pest management; 
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• Balance of Investment: the need to move more investment into pre-border (i.e. 
prevention) and to develop ’whole-of-government’ priorities for spending”.34 
 
The strategy recommends: 
 
• “A guideline for biosecurity research needs to be developed to create overall 
agreed long-term research priorities to guide the Foundation for Research, 
Science and Technology (FRST) and the agencies; 
• Scientists should be more actively involved in decision making, not just 
brought in to help with incursion responses.  This ad-hoc and reactive use of 
science needs to be reviewed, as it risks poorer decisions and reduced science 
capability. 
• There needs to be an assessment of the benefits of pre-border interventions 
and related research, and combined with the prioritisation work to ascertain 
whether a case can be made for more research funding. 
• Greater emphasis is needed on developing long-term partnerships with 
scientists and with government agencies to build capability and knowledge,  
all with appropriate cost control. 
• An open information exchange between all parties involved is needed.  
Scientific information for biosecurity management is a public good and a 
critical component in decision-making, yet access to it varies across the 
spectrum.” 
 
  Priorities and Funding 
The strategy addresses the need for an increase in funding over the coming years 
based on justified priorities and the support from all biosecurity agencies.  The 
strategy also expresses concerns that current allocation of funds and resources may 
not be optimal.  A majority of the funding is allocated to known risks and activities in 
preference to acknowledged risks, of which there is very little known.  The strategy 
paper also outlines the funding for New Zealand’s biosecurity system.  The 
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government has overall responsibility for funding and taxpayers are not entirely 
liable, while about 20% is recovered from third parties35. 
 
  Part 3 
The strategy paper also repeatedly states that effective biosecurity systems rely on 
constantly updated information on pests, pathways and capabilities to manage any 
potential and existing risks. 
 
  Risks 
Risks are considered to be any exotic species that could threaten to harm any of New 
Zealand’s native species, environments and public heath.  These potential pests or 
risks range from microbes to plants and animals in both aquatic and terrestrial 
environments.  Although New Zealand has a few native pest species, the majority of 
species that are considered to be pest originate from other countries36. 
 
  Pathways 
Intentional introductions were prevalent throughout the early European settlement of 
New Zealand.  However, even though currently there are strict controls in place 
limiting legitimate introductions to lower the potential threat to New Zealand, the 
greatest risks are associated with accidental introductions, the smuggling of organisms 
and contaminated goods37. 
 
Over the past five years there has been an approximately 50% increase in the number 
of containers entering New Zealand from an increasing number of points of origin, 
each with varying priorities and interest in maintaining international biosecurity.  To 
coincide with these increases, the strategy paper presents examples of potential threats 
to New Zealand’s biosecurity associated with trade utilising sea containers, as 
follows: 
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• Packaging material harbouring wood-boring insects could impact on our 
forest and cause significant damage to wooden buildings. 
• Pooled water harbouring mosquito larvae could carry serious human 
diseases. 
• Increasingly containers contaminated with seeds, plants material, insects, 
spiders and even snakes are landed in NZ.38 
 
In addition to these threats, the products in the containers may also be risk goods such 
as fruit or meat, which can be hosts for a range of pests.  As it is impractical to check 
all containers at the wharf upon arrival; many containers are transported inland for 
kilometres before being unloaded without supervision.  Many containers are judged 
low risk based on cargo manifest and their points of origin.  With regard to New 
Zealand’s own biosecurity priorities, New Zealand, like many other trading nations, 
has obligations to meet international commitments under multilateral environmental 
agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the U.N Convention 
on the law of the Sea, which include specific provisions for the protection, eradication 
or management of pest species.  
 
There are other pathways by which potential threats may enter New Zealand, such as 
air-cargo, ballast water, tourists and their effects and mail.  Under several 
international trade agreements countries are expected to prevent the spreading pests.  
New Zealand is also working towards the adoption of international controls on ballast 
water to reduce the risk of transferring marine species between countries. 
 
The strategy paper emphasises that pre-border measures are strengthened through 
Importation Health Standards (IHS). These standards were established to reduce the 
risk of harmful species and substances entering New Zealand in traded goods.  IHS 
require the implementation of commodity-specific protocols of commodities and 
packaging prior to shipment.  These include heat treatment of imported foods, disease 
testing of animals and inspection of used vehicles. 
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IHS have traditionally focused on the terrestrial and primary production and not on 
environmental pests, the strategy underlines the need for new approaches to address 
the gaps through newer, more balanced IHS39.  The strategy also acknowledges that 
the current system is under stress, as many of the earlier standards need to be 
reviewed and updated. 
 
It is further acknowledged that New Zealand’s marine border controls have been 
unable to meet the increase in risk and have thus attributed the failure to:  
• A lack of capacity which has forced a triage approach, i.e. systems are only 
treated if an impact is highly likely; 
• A lack of explicit inter–agency arrangements for comprehensive border 
management; and 
• A significant lack of management tools for key pathways. 
 
  Surveillance 
As the strategy acknowledges that incursions are inevitable40, there must be a wide 
range of surveillance activities directed at both the detection of species and 
monitoring of the health and pest status of plants, animals and ecosystems.  A review 
of the biosecurity surveillance systems in 2002 highlighted among others the 
following six main issues: 
• “Some programmes appeared to be working well; for example, fruit fly and 
mosquitoes at ports; 
• There has been a major progress in establishing a rational approach to 
marine surveillance programmes; 
• Many surveillance activities had very little technical support; 
• There were gaps in the systems; 
• There was significant under-investment in some areas, particularly on new 
threats to indigenous biodiversity; 
• There are about ten new species incursions in New Zealand each year”. 
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  Pest Management 
Managing and controlling the pest and weeds already established in New Zealand 
represents over half of the total biosecurity expenditure annually, with the Department 
of Conservation (DOC) spending $53 million and regional councils $26 million.  
Despite recent advances in the prioritisation of pest management by both DOC and 
regional councils41, there is still insufficient national leadership and overview.  The 
Council expects a review of the current system and the rationalisation of legislative 
tools for pest management, eventually leading to a long term containment of pests 
under appropriate sections of the Biosecurity Act 1993. 
 
Part 4 
The Part of the Strategy paper consists of case studies of some recent incursions, the 
glossary, list of submitters and the bibliography.  The case study for the biosecurity 
ricks associated with sea containers is summarised as below: 
 
2.6.3  Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: Managing biosecurity risks 
associated with high-risk sea containers.  Report by the Auditor 
General’s office in 2006 
The objective of this report was to examine and inform Parliament and the public of 
the accuracy of the high risk profiling of sea containers and the subsequent 
inspections and decontamination.  This was achieved by examining how MAF 
identifies and manages the biosecurity risks associated with high-risk containers 
focusing on three areas: 
• The implementation of the Sea Container Import Health Standard; 
• How MAF identifies the high risk containers; and 
• How MAF ensures inspection and decontamination accuracy. 
 
However, this audit did not include the IHS themselves, the procedures for managing 
the risks associated with the contents of the containers or the effectiveness of the 
management of low-risks containers, which are inspected by MAF accredited persons. 
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The Sea Container Import Health Standard (IHS) 
The IHS for sea containers from all countries was introduced in September 2003 and 
fully implemented by 31 December 2003.  The 2006 Auditor General’s report found 
inconsistencies in the compliance with, and enforcement of the sea container IHS; 
including how MAF conducts self-audits of compliance and how MAF prosecutes non 
compliance. 
 
The Auditor General’s report also commented on the strain the new IHS caused on the 
communication between the two departments that are responsible for the management 
of sea containers, Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) (responsible for policy) and the 
MAF quarantine Service (responsible for implementing policy). 
 
Risk profiling for sea containers 
The report found that the risk profiling conducted by the Border Management Group 
within BNZ was not as effective as it could be.  Limitations in electronic resources 
were identified as a major factor. In particular, specific information needed for risk 
profiling is not available as an electronic resource.  The computer system used by 
BNZ in risk profiling is the New Zealand Customs Service computer system; for 
which improvements are in progress.  Quarantine declaration forms are also used in 
risk profiling; however, they need to accurately reflect the containers cleanliness, 
contents and packaging material to enable accurate profiling.  Once the proposed 
auditing is fully implemented, the accuracy and usefulness of quarantine declaration 
forms can be verified. 
 
Biosecurity clearance for high-risk containers 
Biosecurity clearance, the permission for goods and vessels to enter New Zealand, is 
given once the requirements of the IHS for sea containers from all countries are met to 
the satisfaction of a MAF inspector.  The report found inconsistencies in the training 
of MAF inspectors. Inspectors were unable to meet workloads, no clear protocols are 
kept for contaminated containers, and the inspectors themselves are not subject to 
ongoing competency tests.  An inspection is to be conducted inside the Quarantine 
Service areas within 14 hours of the container being unloaded from the vessel; the 
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report found that this time was frequently exceeded.  Decontamination of containers 
(either cleaning or fumigation) is conducted in MAF approved facilities; however, the 
effectiveness of the fumigation is not audited nor are the audits conducted as regularly 
as MAF requires. 
 
MAF has set up arrangements other than those specified in the IHS with some 
industry groups to manage the biosecurity clearance for their sea containers. These 
arrangements are known as “equivalent systems”.  However, the report found there to 
be no guidance for the setting up of these equivalent systems or for auditing to ensure 
that these systems manage the biosecurity risks to a specific level. 
 
Recommendations 
The 2006 Auditor General’s report made 15 recommendations, with the first five 
recommendations listed below: 
• Enforce the requirement of the IHS for Sea Containers from all Countries, i.e. 
for importers to provide information on the destination of a container once it 
leaves the wharf; 
• Investigate and implement measures to secure greater compliance with the 
IHS for Sea Containers from All Countries; 
• Ensure that processes are consistently followed for dealing with sea 
containers that arrive without or with incorrect quarantine declarations; 
• Work with New Zealand Customs Service to address existing limitations for 
electronically recording biosecurity information  of sea containers, and the 
inability to confirm that all high risk containers are being identified;  
• Enter results of sea container checks by accredited persons into QuanCargo in 
a timely fashion.42 
 
2.7  Synopsis 
Given that biosecurity is a relatively new science, its definition is still unclear; with 
several other words being used for the same purpose, such as biosafety and biological 
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security.  These inconsistencies in conjunction with differing priorities between 
trading nations have lead to confusion in the international legislation and to 
subsequent trade disputes (see Chapters 4 and 9).  In New Zealand, biosecurity 
focuses on preventing the introduction, intentional or accidental, of regulated or 
unwanted organisms.  This is achieved through the implementation and enforcement 
of the Biosecurity Act in 1993 and subsequently the IHS for specific commodities, 
packaging material and freight containers (both sea and air).  Monitoring New 
Zealand’s border is the responsibility primarily of Biosecurity New Zealand, however, 
the New Zealand’s Customs Service also plays a role in monitoring New Zealand’s 
borders (see Chapters 5 and 6).  The management systems in place are constantly 
being audited to provide the New Zealand Government and the public with an 
assurance that New Zealand’s borders are adequately monitored. 
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Chapter 3: 
New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 
“Although the value of merchandise imports may correlate well with measures of 
biological invasion, it is likely that knowledge of the volume, frequency, origin and 
destination of all imports as well as the mechanism by which goods are transported 
will help better characterise risks.” (Hulme 2009) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Since European colonisation, New Zealand has relied heavily on trade.  Up until 
1915, 90% of New Zealand’s trade was with the United Kingdom and Australia.  The 
percentage of trade with the United Kingdom started declining in the 1950s and today 
the UK receives about 10% of New Zealand’s total exports.  New Zealand now trades 
with a wider range of countries and with much larger volumes and since new trading 
initiatives also create new opportunities and new pathways for alien and invasive 
species (Green 2000) there has been an increase in unintentional introductions that 
arrive in association with visitors and traded commodities.  There are two major 
transport methods used in international trade, air cargo containers and sea containers, 
however, due to the vast quantity of trade, the majority of traded commodities are 
transported with sea containers. 
 
In the Year ending June 2004, New Zealand imported sea containers from a total of 
135 different trading partners, with containers being shipped from a total of 924 
different ports (unpublished MAF data).  The number of sea containers entering New 
Zealand increased by approximately 180% over the last 12 years, with over 260, 000 
full container load (FCL) containers and 160,000 empty containers entering New 
Zealand sea ports in the year ending June 2002 (Anon. 2003i). 
 
The sea container pathway has been internationally recognised as the major pathway 
for most incursions resulting from international trade.  In New Zealand the sea 
container pathway has been linked to most of the recent incursions (for example the 
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painted apple moth on imported used vehicles (Anon. 2002d)).  The frequency of 
incursion detected has been linked with the increase in volume of cargo movement via 
the sea container pathway (Anon. 2002g), therefore trading partners will be assessed 
on volume traded and where possible in conjunction with commodities traded.  
Volume was chosen rather than value, as value traded has little reflection on potential 
biosecurity risks on any pathway.  Commodity traded, although the most logical 
choice, was not chosen, as there is already a great deal of work done on the 
prevention, security clearance and inspection of commodities considered to be high 
risk goods, as there is with commodities and vessels from origins known to be of high 
risk (for example the development of Import Health Standards by the New Zealand 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF)). 
 
3.2  New Zealand’s Imports and Exports from 2002-2004  
International trade is expressed in terms of total value traded, volume trade and 
commodities; therefore trading partners are also generally assessed on the value 
traded, volume trade and commodities traded.  For this research New Zealand’s top 
five trading partners will be assessed by volume and value trade in order to clearly 
demonstrate the difference between the two.  It is important to keep in mind that value 
or volume alone do not account for potential high biosecurity risk.  With the sheer 
volume from some points of origin the risk of biosecurity breaches increases, despite 
that the container and cargo may by cleared as low risk, since there is a an increased 
risk of contamination through probability alone. 
 
3.2.1  Value traded 
With the information available from Statistics New Zealand, the New Zealand’s top 
five trading partners based on total trade value for the year ending June 2004 were (in 
descending order) Australia, United States of America (USA), Japan, The People’s 
Republic of China (China) and the United Kingdom (UK).  This ranking is applies to 
both imports and exports.  The percentage of New Zealand’s total trade accounted for 
by these trading partners is summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. New Zealand Trade Profile Ranked by Export Value.  Ranks are expressed in totals 
(NZ$000, FOB for exports and CIF for imports) with percentage of total trade indicated in brackets, for 
the year ending June 2004 (Data source Statistics New Zealand). 
Country Export Import Total 
Australia 5,737,530 (19.99%) 7,361,695 (22.05%) 13,693,867 (21.60%) 
USA 4,212,937 (14.68%) 3,932,961 (11.78%) 8,693,867 (13.00%) 
Japan 3,270,836 (11.40%) 3,849,932 (11.53%) 7,136,008 (11.30%) 
China 1,580,293 (5.51%) 3,067,309 (9.19%) 4,686,473 (7.40%) 
UK 1,412,188 (4.92%) 1,909,414 (3.27%) 2,538,484 (4.00%) 
Top 5 total 16,983,786 19,302,211 36,285,998 
Grand total 29,876,545 33,390,359 63,266,905 
 
 
Total exports (excluding re-exports of $1.2 billion) for the year ended June 2004 were 
$30.04 billion, up by 3.4% ($1.8 billion) on the year ended June 2003.  Australia 
continues to be New Zealand’s major exporting market, accounting for 20% ($5.7 
billion) of New Zealand’s total exports (Table 3.2).  Export to the USA, New 
Zealand’s next biggest exporting market, which account for 15% ($4.2 billion) of the 
total exports.  New Zealand’s third biggest export market is Japan, at 11% ($3.3 
billion) of total exports.  Combined the top three export markets accounted for 44% of 
New Zealand’s total exports by value. 
 
Total imports increased from 1990 to 2004 by 3.8% to $33.4 billion, an increase of 
$1.23 billion.  Imports from Australia continue to be New Zealand’s biggest source, 
accounting for 22% of total imports ($7.4 billion) in 2004 (Table 3.3).  The United 
States and Japan were New Zealand’s next biggest source of imports, accounting for 
12% of total imports each in the same year.  Combined the top three source markets 
accounted for 49% of New Zealand’s total imports.  Imports from the People’s 
Republics of China continued to grow in 2004, increasing by 14%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 45 
Table 3.2. Total New Zealand exports to New Zealand’s five major trading partners (NZ$ 000 FOB) 
for the years ending June 1990 until June 2004 (P refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New 
Zealand 2004). 
Year Country of Origin 
 Australia USA Japan China UK 
1990 2,795,475 1,974,701 2,540,277 151,054 1,088,683 
1995 4,009,382 1,943,876 3,387,862 528,878 1,208,552 
1997 4,117,611 2,177,330 3,089,693 593,315 1,273,485 
1998 4,407,947 2,780,618 2,959,437 658,886 1,214,227 
1999 4,792,053 3,118,437 2,962,370 646,158 1,274,096 
2000 5,561,175 4,135,848 3,935,161 927,628 1,384,086 
2001 5,624,894 4,728,176 4,061,089 1,345,495 1,504,012 
2002 6,326,468 4,921,650 3,732,483 1,434,263 1,579,663 
2003 6,050,024 4,366,193 3,541,146 1,456,684 1,361,217 
2004P 5,737,530 4,212,937 3,270,836 1,580,293 1,412,188 
 
 
 
Table 3.3.  Total New Zealand imports from New Zealand’s five major trading partners (NZ$ 000 CIF) 
(P refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand 2004). 
Year Country of Origin 
 Australia USA Japan China UK 
1990 3,228,846 2,823,497 2,467,968 190,467 1,159,561 
1995 4,584,242 3,942,786 2,947,592 751,921 1,246,433 
1997 5,515,990 3,880,028 2,579,515 1,022,871 1,116,406 
1998 5,128,782 4,478,680 2,661,406 1,186,901 1,185,963 
1999 6,536,181 4,494,342 3,358,038 1,431,634 1,103,409 
2000 6,803,842 5,293,007 3,445,146 1,924,489 1,173,228 
2001 6,938,659 5,042,329 3,493,441 2,207,386 1,218,184 
2002 7,188,328 4,776,659 3,617,950 2,371,320 1,207,361 
2003 7,277,947 4,067,042 3,876,249 2,687,376 1,120,450 
2004P 7,361,695 3,932,961 3,849,832 3,067,309 1,090,414 
 
 
For the period June 2002 to June 2004, Australia was the major source of import 
values for five of New Zealand’s six sea ports (Auckland, Tauranga, Wellington, 
Christchurch, Timaru and Dunedin) contributing between 18.22% (Auckland) and 
39.17% (Tauranga) of total yearly import values (Table 3.4).  The Port of Timaru is 
the exception, only receiving 4.75% of yearly value trade from Australia.  The largest 
proportion, 20.31%, of yearly imported value for Timaru originated from Japan.  
Other large sources of import values for Auckland were Japan (14.41%) and China 
(10.86%); USA (24.52%) and China (5.57%) for Tauranga; for Wellington and 
Christchurch were Japan (23.12% and 20.31% respectively) and China (5.57% and 
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9.02% respectively); for Timaru were Republic of Korea (12.99%) and Australia 
(4.76%); and for Dunedin were Germany (9.88%) and Japan (7.45%).  The countries 
listed in Table 3.4 contributed to at least 60% of total import values for all six New 
Zealand sea ports, ranging from 61.52% for Timaru to 90.96% for Wellington. 
 
Table 3.4.  A yearly average of Total value of imports from countries of origin for six New Zealand 
seaports for the years 2002 until 2004 (NZ$ million), with percentage of total import value per port 
indicated in brackets, for countries with >1% of total incoming containers.  (* Republic of Korea).   
   Country New Zealand Sea Port 
 Auckland Tauranga Wellington Christchurch Timaru Dunedin 
   Australia 261.02 (18.22) 98.36 (39.17) 65.73 (35.06) 61.89 (28.99) 1.22 (4.76) 5.62 (22.26) 
   China 155.54 (10.86) 13.98 (5.57) 9.56 (5.10) 19.26 (9.02) 0.76 (2.96) 1.41 (5.59) 
   USA 136.21 (9.51) 61.57 (24.52) 7.18 (3.83) 9.76 (4.57) 1.04 (4.08) 0.81 (3.20) 
   Singapore 19.93 (1.39) 6.48 (2.58) 4.05 (2.16) 4.55 (2.13) 0.19 (0.75) 0.43 (1.76) 
   Japan 206.35 (14.41) 9.61 (3.83) 43.35 (23.12) 40.98 (19.19) 5.19 (20.31) 1.88 (7.45) 
   Hong Kong 7.621 (0.53) 0.55 (0.22) 0.39 (0.21) 0.75 (0.35) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
   Thailand 34.79 (2.43) 2.37 (0.94) 5.51 (2.94) 3.34 (1.56) 0.17 (0.67) 0.17 (0.68) 
   Indonesia 20.99 (1.47) 2.08 (0.83) 3.32 (1.77) 3.94 (1.84) 0.09 (0.37) 1.06 (4.19) 
   Malaysia 30.96 (2.16) 2.71 (1.08) 3.01 (1.60) 4.36 (2.04) 0.62 (2.42) 0.33 (1.29) 
   Netherlands 18.35 (1.28) 1.07 (0.42) 1.43 (0.76) 1.21 (0.57) 0.14 (0.55) 0.49 (1.92) 
   Germany 95.22 (6.65) 2.68 (1.07) 7.28 (3.88) 8.88 (4.16) 0.74 (2.89) 2.49 (9.88) 
   UK 64.12 (4.48) 2.00 (0.80) 3.96 (2.11) 5.40 (2.53) 0.73 (2.87) 0.76 (3.01) 
   Korea* 39.80 (2.78) 4.03 (1.60) 7.98 (4.26) 5.28 (2.47) 3.32 (12.99) 0.39 (1.54) 
   Italy 47.85 (3.34) 1.69 (0.67) 2.00 (1.07) 4.06 (1.90) 0.81 (3.16) 1.15 (4.57) 
   Taiwan 32.62 (2.28) 3.32 (1.32) 4.37 (2.33) 4.38 (2.05) 0.38 (1.50) 0.58 (2.28) 
   Belgium 21.90 (1.53) 0.53 (0.21) 1.39 (0.74) 1.41 (0.66) 0.31 (1.22) 0.42 (1.67) 
   Total 1193.28 (83) 213.01 (85) 170.53 (91) 179.45 (84) 15.72 (62) 18.00 (71) 
   Grand Total 1432.47 251.10 187.48 213.51 25.56 25.25 
 
 
In summary, in terms of value traded on a national level, New Zealand’s top three 
major trading partners for the year ending June 2004 were Australia, USA and Japan, 
with the top three accounting for 47% of New Zealand’s total value traded.  In 
contrast, on a port level, the ranking varied depending on ports.  However, Australia 
was still the most predominant trading partner, accounting for the largest import 
values traded for five of the six sea ports.  Japan was also a major source of import 
value traded for five of the six ports, contributing either the second or third largest of 
import value traded.  The USA, however, only accounted for a large proportion 
import value trade for one sea port, Tauranga.  Auckland sea port accounted for the 
highest import values (NZ$ 1432.47 million), with Dunedin accounting for the lowest 
at NZ$ 25.25 million. 
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3.2.2  Volume Traded 
There has been a steady increase in the number of sea containers entering New 
Zealand for the past ten years (Figure 3.1).  With the total number of containers 
entering New Zealand for the year ending June 2004 having increased 153% from the 
year ending June 1994. 
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Figure 3.1.  Total annual containers landed in New Zealand from 1993 until 2004, with percentage 
increase since 1993-94 (the baseline) displayed above respective columns.  (Data source MAF 2004). 
 
The distribution of FCL (Full Container Load) and Empty containers for the period 
2000 until 2004 showed that there is an overall increase in the number of containers 
entering New Zealand over the four year period (Figure 3.2).  The number of FCL 
containers entering exceeds that of Empty containers, although they show a 
corresponding increase.  The seasonal fluctuations in the total number of containers 
entering New Zealand were mostly driven by the number of FCL entering. 
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Figure 3.2.  Total monthly containers entering New Zealand for the period of June 2000 until June 
2004; Total Numbers (●), FCL (○) and Empties (▼).  (Data source MAF 2004) 
 
The distribution of the containers entering through six of New Zealand’s sea ports 
shows that the majority of container movement for the period 2000 until 2004 
appeared to occur in Auckland, which accounted for 48.2% of the total number of 
containers entering New Zealand (Figure 3.3).  For Auckland there also appeared to 
be a marked difference between the number of FCL containers and Empty containers 
entering.  The next biggest port was Tauranga, which accounted for 20% of the total 
container entering New Zealand.  Although in contrast to Auckland, there was little 
difference in the overall number of FCL and Empty containers entering (however, 
there were some seasonal fluctuations in numbers of FCL, empty and total containers 
arriving).  The smallest number of containers entering New Zealand occurred in ports 
of Timaru and Dunedin, with both ports receiving less than 5000 containers from 
2000 until 2004. 
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Figure 3.3.  Total numbers of containers entering New Zealand per port of entry for the period Jan 
2000 until June 2004.  Total Numbers (●), FCL (○) and Empties (▼) (Data source MAF 2004). 
 
The distribution of the countries of origin for the total number of containers entering 
New Zealand for the first half of 2004 shows that, based on total volume traded (the 
number of containers entering), New Zealand’s top five trading partners for 2004 
were (in descending order) Australia (32.33% of the total volume traded), China 
(10.19%), USA (6.21%), Singapore (3.51%) and Japan (3.24%) (Table 3.5).  It is 
interesting to note that the third biggest proportion (6.22%) of containers entering 
New Zealand in 2004 come from unknown origins a total of 13959 containers 
(unpublished MAF data).  Table 3.6 also lists the number of ports that the containers 
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originated from per country exporting to New Zealand.  China had the highest number 
of different ports (84) exporting to New Zealand followed by USA (54), Malaysia 
(52), and Indonesia and UK (44), with Korea (south), Hong Kong, and Belgium 
having the least number of ports exporting to New Zealand (1, 2 and 4 respectively). 
 
Table 3.5.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering New 
Zealand for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data source MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly average % of Total Total 
   Australia 27 8829 32.33 70632 
   China 84 2781.6 10.19 22253 
   Unknown n/a 1699.4 6.22 13595 
   USA 58 1696.1 6.21 13569 
   Singapore 4 959 3.51 7672 
   Japan 54 884.9 3.24 7079 
   Hong Kong 2 873.6 3.2 6989 
   Thailand 14 846.8 3.1 6774 
   Indonesia 44 818.5 3 6548 
   Malaysia 52 759.6 2.78 6077 
   Netherlands 5 728.5 2.67 5828 
   Germany 24 667.5 2.44 5340 
   UK 44 666.6 2.44 5333 
   Korea - south 1 677.4 2.17 4742 
   Italy 31 560.6 2.05 4485 
   Taiwan 5 488.3 1.79 3906 
   Belgium 4 302 1.11 2416 
   Total 453 24239.4 88.46 193238 
   Grand Total 924 27306.1  218448 
 
 
The largest proportion of containers entering Auckland in the first half of 2004 
originated from Australia (27.31% of total containers) (Table 3.6), followed by China 
(11.31%) and USA (42%).  The number of containers arriving from ‘unknown 
countries’ accounted for 7.48% of total containers entering Auckland with a total of 
9600 containers in 2004.  China had the highest number of ports exporting to New 
Zealand through Auckland (74) followed by USA (42), Japan (41) and then Australia 
(22). 
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Table 3.6.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Auckland for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data 
source MAF 2004).  
   Country Number of Ports Monthly average % of Total Total 
   Australia 22 4379.25 27.31 35034 
   China 74 1813.25 11.31 14506 
   USA 42 1313.63 8.19 10509 
   Unknown  n/a 1200.00 7.48 9600 
   Hong Kong 2 609.88 3.80 4879 
   Singapore 3 569.50 3.55 4556 
   Netherlands 3 508.50 3.17 4068 
   Japan 41 485.88 3.03 3887 
   Thailand 9 468.00 2.92 3744 
   Germany 18 447.25 2.79 3578 
   Total 76 11795.13 73.56 94361 
   Grand Total 730 16033.75  128270 
 
 
Table 3.7 displays the number of containers entering New Zealand though the sea port 
of Tauranga for the top ten countries of origin during the first half of 2004.  Again, the 
largest proportion of containers entering New Zealand through Tauranga for the same 
period originated from Australia (42.8%), followed by China (6.52%) and USA 
(5.12%) (Table 3.7).  As with Auckland, a large proportion of containers arriving at 
Tauranga were from ‘unknown origin’ (8.12%) and of the top ten countries China had 
the highest number of ports exporting to Tauranga (41), with USA exporting from 23 
ports and Australia 15. 
 
Containers originating from Australia made up the largest proportion (42.75%) of 
containers entering New Zealand through Wellington sea port in the first half of 2004, 
with China totalling (8.39%) and Japan (5.33%) (Table 3.8).  In contrast to Auckland 
and Tauranga, containers that originated from ‘unknown countries’ were not in the top 
ten; accounting for only 0.88% of total containers arriving.  Among the top ten 
countries China had the highest number of ports exporting containers to Wellington 
(44) followed by Malaysia (16) and Japan (15). 
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Table 3.7.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Tauranga for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data 
source MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly Average % of Total Total 
   Australia 15 1664.63 42.72 13317 
   Unknown n/a 316.5 8.12 2532 
   China 41 254.13 6.52 2033 
   USA 23 199.63 5.12 1597 
   Thailand 7 153.5 3.94 1228 
   Indonesia 16 148.13 3.80 1185 
   Singapore 3 146.88 3.77 1175 
   Malaysia 15 100.13 2.57 801 
   Papua New Guinea 8 94.13 2.42 753 
   Hong Kong 1 91.13 2.34 729 
   Total 129 3168.75 81.33 25350 
   Grand Total 370 3896.25  31170 
 
 
Table 3.8.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Wellington for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data 
source MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly Average % of Total Total 
   Australia 9 868.38 42.75 6947 
   China 44 170.50 8.39 1364 
   Japan 15 108.25 5.33 866 
   Indonesia 14 100.50 4.95 804 
   Malaysia 16 97.88 4.82 783 
   Korea - south 1 89.86 3.87 629 
   Thailand 5 74.38 3.66 595 
   Singapore 2 58.75 2.89 470 
   Hong Kong 1 46.13 2.27 369 
   Taiwan 5 44.38 2.18 355 
   Total 112 1658.98 81.11 13182 
   Grand Total 268 2031.50  16252 
 
 
For the first half of 2004, containers originating from Australia recorded the largest 
proportion (43.31%) of containers arriving in Lyttelton followed by China (10%) and 
Indonesia (5.20%) (Table 3.9).  Containers entering New Zealand through Lyttelton 
from ‘unknown origins’ made up 4.23 % (604 containers) of the total containers 
arriving in New Zealand in 2004.  Of the top ten countries, China exported containers 
from the highest number of ports (37), with Australia from 15, and Indonesia, Japan, 
and Malaysia from 10 ports. 
Chapter 3: New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 53 
Table 3.9.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Lyttelton, Christchurch, for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing 
countries.  (Data source MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly Average % of Total Total 
   Australia 15 772.13 43.31 6177 
   China 37 178.25 10.00 1426 
   Indonesia 10 92.625 5.20 741 
   Unknown n/a 75.50 4.23 604 
   Japan 10 73.25 4.11 586 
   Malaysia 10 67.63 3.79 541 
   Thailand 5 65.63 3.68 525 
   Singapore 5 65 3.65 520 
   Korea - south 1 70 2.94 420 
   Hong Kong 1 50.25 2.82 402 
   Total 32 1510.25 83.73 11942 
   Grand Total 228 1782.88  14263 
 
 
At the port of Timaru, containers originating from China made up the largest 
proportion (18.50%) of total containers arriving in the first half of 2004, followed by 
Japan (12.30%) and UK (9.86%) (Table 3.10).  Containers arriving from ‘unknown 
countries’ contributed 7.42% of the total containers entered New Zealand in 2004 
through Timaru.  Of the top ten countries exporting into Timaru, China export from 
the highest number of differing ports (17), followed by Italy (11) then Japan with 10. 
 
Table 3.10.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Timaru for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data source 
MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly Average % of Total Total 
   China 17 66.38 18.50 531 
   Japan 10 44.13 12.30 353 
   UK 7 35.38 9.86 283 
   Unknown n/a 26.63 7.42 213 
   Finland 5 19.38 5.40 155 
   Korea - Republic 2 19.13 5.33 153 
   Korea - South 1 21.86 5.33 153 
   Netherlands 1 17 4.74 136 
   Germany 3 16.63 4.63 133 
   Italy 11 10.50 2.93 84 
   Total 57 276.98 76.42 2194 
   Grand Total 152 358.88  2871 
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In the year ending June 2004 containers originating from Australia accounted for the 
largest proportion (39.15%) of containers entering New Zealand through Dunedin, 
followed by the UK (9.39%) and the Netherlands (7.49%) (Table 3.11).  Containers 
arriving from ‘unknown origins’ only accounting for 0.98% of containers entering 
New Zealand through Dunedin, with a total of 45 containers arriving in 2004.  Of the 
top ten countries, China exported from the largest number of ports (21), Australia and 
Italy from 10 each and the UK from 7. 
 
Table 3.11.  Country of Origin, number of ports per country of origin, average number of containers 
landed per month, proportion of total containers landed and total containers landed, entering the New 
Zealand sea port of Dunedin for the first half for 2004 for the top ten importing countries.  (Data source 
MAF 2004) 
   Country Number of Ports Monthly Average % of Total Total 
   Australia 10 224.13 39.15 1793 
   UK 7 53.75 9.39 430 
   Netherlands 1 42.88 7.49 343 
   China 21 34.63 6.05 277 
   Germany 3 34.13 5.96 273 
   Indonesia 5 31.38 5.48 251 
   Singapore 1 19.88 3.47 159 
   Malaysia 5 17.13 2.99 137 
   Vietnam 2 16.13 2.82 129 
   Italy 10 13.50 2.36 108 
   Total 65 487.50 85.15 3900 
   Grand Total 147 572.50  4580 
 
 
In summary, Australia, China and USA were New Zealand’s top three international 
trading partners in terms of volume trade (incoming containers) for the first half of 
2004.  The order of the top three differed, however, when containers entering New 
Zealand were examined at a port level.  Despite some changes in the order, Australia 
remains the predominant origin of containers throughout New Zealand for the first 
half of 2004, being the largest source of containers for five out to the top six New 
Zealand sea ports.  China was also a large contributor, being present in the top three 
sources of containers for five out of the top six New Zealand sea ports.  However, 
USA was only present in the top three countries for two of the six New Zealand sea 
ports. 
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China exported from the largest number of domestic ports to New Zealand.  USA and 
Australia were also among the countries exporting from high numbers of respective 
domestic ports, although their numbers were remarkable lower than those of China. 
 
3.2.3  Trade commodity 
The distribution of HS commodities categorised43 from each exporting country (with 
proportion of containers entering NZ >1%) through six of New Zealand’s sea ports 
showed that Auckland had the highest average number of commodity categories 
imported (89) while Dunedin had the lowest average (29) (Table 3.12).  China 
exported the highest average number of commodity categories (79) throughout the six 
New Zealand seaports, followed by Australia with 78 and USA with 68. 
 
 
Table 3.12  The average number of imported commodities (HS2) per country of origin (> 1% of 
containers) for the six major ports in New Zealand for the years ending June 2002 until June 2004, in 
descending alphabetical order. New Zealand’s top three trading partners based on volume traded are 
represented in bold type.  (Data source Statistics New Zealand 2004) 
  Country New Zealand Sea Port Average 
 Auckland Tauranga Wellington Christchurch Timaru Dunedin  
  Australia 97 96 83 92 30 68 77.67 
  Belgium 72 48 38 44 19 32 42.17 
  China 95 87 89 90 59 54 79.00 
  Germany 94 66 57 64 49 41 61.83 
  Hong Kong 85 67 45 49 12 5 43.83 
  Indonesia 76 68 61 64 31 26 54.33 
  Italy 88 69 58 67 38 35 59.17 
  Japan 87 61 59 68 60 19 59.00 
  Korea 88 54 60 80 51 12 57.50 
  Malaysia 81 60 55 57 14 10 46.17 
  Netherlands 87 50 55 62 31 23 51.33 
  Singapore 73 50 32 48 14 9 37.67 
  Taiwan 89 63 53 74 31 21 55.17 
  Thailand 87 69 63 71 30 29 58.17 
  UK 94 72 68 74 60 39 67.83 
  USA 95 92 76 81 22 39 67.50 
  Average 86.75 67.00 59.50 67.81 34.44 28.88  
 
 
                                                 
43
 Categories are classified in accordance with international standards, the Harmonised System 
Commodity Description and Coding System; referred to as The Harmonised System or HS codes, for 
this research the HS2 codes were used, which contains 97 categories (http://www.stats.govt.nz) 
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Although the ranking of the top three imported commodities changes between 1998 
and 2004 (Table 3.13), the top three imported commodities were Vehicles, Machinery 
and Electrical Machinery until 2000, with Mineral Fuels replacing Electrical 
Machinery thereafter.  Of the total imported commodities the top three for 2004 were 
Vehicles (16.02% of total imported commodities), Machinery (13.58%) and Mineral 
Fuels (9.37%). 
 
Table 3.13.  Percent of total for the top ten import commodities for the years ending June from 1998 to 
2004 imports, in descending order for 2004 (P refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New 
Zealand 2004) 
HS code 
  Commodity Year 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004P 
87 
  Vehicles 10.19 12.31 12.31 11.48 13.80 15.50 16.02 
84 
  Machinery 15.70 14.21 13.04 12.88 13.74 13.47 13.58 
27 
  Mineral Fuels 6.05 5.68 7.94 11.15 9.02 9.80 9.37 
85 
  Electrical Machinery 10.28 10.41 10.06 10.62 8.82 8.39 9.33 
39 
  Plastic 4.29 4.11 4.08 4.19 4.13 3.98 3.67 
88 
  Aircraft 1.70 3.31 5.15 2.77 2.61 2.50 3.39 
90 
  Photographic 3.31 3.14 2.90 3.08 3.10 3.01 3.10 
48 
  Paper 2.95 3.05 2.85 2.85 2.94 2.87 2.80 
30 
  Pharmaceutical 2.75 2.81 2.48 2.45 2.40 2.32 2.36 
72 
  Iron and steel 1.64 1.45 1.38 1.41 1.54 1.53 1.63 
 
 
In contrast to imported commodities, the ranking for exported commodities remained 
constant from 1998 until 2004 (Table 3.14).  The top three export commodities for 
2004 were Dairy (17.94% of total exported commodities), Meat (15.61%) and Wood 
(7.22%). 
 
In summary, Auckland Sea Port received on average the largest variation of 
commodities for the first half of 2004, with Australia, China and USA exporting 
commodities from between 95–97 of the 97 HS2 categorises.  For the year ending 
June 2004, Vehicles, Machinery and Mineral Fuels (HS2 codes 87, 84 and 27 
respectively) were the top three commodities imported, with Dairy, Meat and Wood 
(HS2 codes 04, 02 and 44 respectively) being New Zealand’s major exported 
commodities. 
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Table 3.14.  Percent of total exports for the top ten exports commodities for the years ending June from 
1998 to 2004, in descending order for 2002 (P refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New 
Zealand 2004) 
HS Code   Commodity Year 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004P 
04   Dairy 17.08 17.44 15.73 18.75 19.04 16.69 17.94 
02   Meat 13.56 13.02 13.58 13.50 14.24 14.56 15.61 
44   Wood 6.72 6.88 8.13 7.07 7.64 8.44 7.22 
08   Fruit 4.17 4.88 3.91 3.37 3.72 3.65 4.37 
84   Machinery 3.99 3.89 3.80 3.45 3.64 3.99 4.34 
03   Fish 4.81 5.42 4.94 4.43 4.50 4.30 3.87 
76   Aluminium, Articles 4.47 4.39 4.48 4.17 3.78 3.46 3.50 
98   NZ misc. Provisions - - - - 0.37 4.27 3.35 
11   Starch 3.60 4.20 4.00 4.66 4.45 4.06 3.34 
51   Wool 4.77 3.93 3.73 3.25 3.03 3.34 3.09 
 
 
 
3.3  New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 
From the above import and export data, the majority of New Zealand’s trade is with 
Australia, followed by China and the USA.  To provide an overview of the potential 
for biosecurity risks involved with these trading partners a more detailed description 
of New Zealand’s trade with these three trading partners is summarised below, in 
descending order of proportion of total trade. 
 
3.3.1  Australia 
Motor Vehicles, Petroleum Oil (not crude) and Aluminium oxides were New 
Zealand’s major imports from Australia for the year ending June 2004 (Table 3.15).  
However, the ranking of the top three commodities varies between years.  Motor 
Vehicles was the only of the top three commodities for which imports increased 
(24.22%) between 2002 and 2004, with Petroleum Oil and Aluminium oxide both 
showing a decrease of import greater than 10% (19.87% and 11.01% respectively).  
The majority of imported commodities showed an increase (excluding Petroleum Oil 
(not crude and crude) and Aluminium oxide); computers showed the greatest increase 
in imports, increasing by 178.41%, while Petroleum oil (crude) showed the greatest 
decrease (26.47%). 
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Table 3.15.  Top ten imports commodities (HS4) from Australia for the years ending June from 2002 
to 2004, in descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P 
refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 CIF) 
HS coding 
  Commodity Year % Change 
 
 2002 2003 2004P  
8703 
  Motor Vehicles 462571 565774 574618 24.22 
2710 
  Petroleum oil (not crude) 618118 657070 495297 -19.87 
2818 
  Aluminium oxide 277224 238059 246715 -11.01 
2709 
  Petroleum oil  crude 313241 222232 230321 -26.47 
3004 
  Medicaments 180326 187540 211679 17.39 
8471 
  Computers 58434 111169 162688 178.41 
8704 
  Trucks and Vans 87179 119019 128316 47.19 
2204 
  Wine 106651 117572 118786 11.38 
4818 
  Paper towels, etc 89349 87606 111932 25.28 
8524 
  Records, Tapes, etc 84130 84964 107333 27.58 
 
 
In the year ending June 2004, Timber, Gold and Petroleum Oil (crude) were New 
Zealand’s major exports to Australia (Table 3.16).  As with New Zealand’s imports 
from Australia, the order of ranking of the top three varies for the three years, 
however, the top three commodities remained the same.  Exports of both Timber and 
Gold between 2002 and 2004 increased by less than 10% (5.25% and 0.74% 
respectively), while Petroleum Oil (crude) exported deceased by 41.81%.  The 
majority of exports increased with the exception of Petroleum Oil (crude), Cheese, 
Live horses and Chemical wood pulp. Cruise Ships, ferry boats showed the greatest 
increase, increase from the export value of $414,000 in 2002 to $91,024,000 in 2004; 
a 21886.47 % increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: New Zealand’s Major Trading Partners 59 
Table 3.16.  Top ten exports commodities (HS4) to Australia for the years ending June from 2002 to 
2004, in descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P 
refers to provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 FOB) 
HS coding   Commodity Year % Change 
  2002 2003 2004P  
4407   Timber 228926 247987 240946 5.25 
7108   Gold 238095 213281 239857 0.74 
2709   Petroleum oils crude 398658 339853 231970 -41.81 
0406   Cheese 167008 147232 136205 -18.44 
8418   Refrigerators, freezers, etc 110287 113054 111769 1.34 
5703   Carpets, tufted 72186 87371 92915 28.72 
8901   Cruise ships, ferry-boats  414 61 91024 21886.47 
0101   Live horses 91132 69808 84190 -7.62 
4703   Chemical wood pulp 109955 101229 83006 -24.51 
2106   Food preparations 53883 51691 81602 51.44 
 
 
3.3.2  People’s Republic of China (China) 
Computers, Suits (women’s or girl’s) and toy/models were the New Zealand’s top 
three imports from China for the year ending June 2004 (Table 3.17).  The ranking 
order of the top three imports was the same for 2002 to 2004, with the exception of 
Toys/models being replaced with Jersey in 2003.  All commodities (with the 
exception of Jersey) showed increases during 2002 to 2004, with the import of 
Transmission apparatus increasing fourfold, from the import value of $18,516,000 in 
2002 to $73,679,000 in 2004, (297.92%).  Jersey etc showed the only decrease (-
0.92%).   
 
In the year ending June 2004, Milk powder, Wool and Logs were New Zealand’s top 
three exports to China (Table 3.18).  The ranking of the commodities, as with imports, 
remained the same for 2003 and 2004 but differed for 2002.  Milk powder was the 
only of the top three commodities that showed an increase in exports from 2002 to 
2004 (75.52%) while the export of Wool and Logs decrease by 23.71% and 12.61% 
respectively.  The majority of imports showed an increase, with the exception of 
Wool, Logs and Sheep meat (23.71%, 12.61% and 2.51% respectively); Milk powder 
showed the greatest increase (75.52%) followed by Fats of animals (68.20%), while 
Wool showed the greatest decrease in imports at 23.71%. 
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Table 3.17.  Top ten imports commodities from China for the years ending June from 2002 to 2004, in 
descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P refers to 
provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 CIF) 
HS code 
  Commodity Year % Change 
 
 2002 2003 2004P  
8471 
  Computers 119856 145887 216706 80.81 
6204 
  Suits; women's or girls 86721 98864 102634 18.35 
9503 
  Toys; models 69407 72689 78442 13.02 
6110 
  Jerseys etc 74836 67108 74147 -0.92 
8525 
  Transmission apparatus 18516 41503 73679 297.92 
6403 
  Footwear; rubber, plastic etc 67074 68807 71735 6.95 
6109 
  T-shirts etc 61759 63009 71690 16.08 
8516 
  Electric heaters and dryers 54217 58955 62644 15.54 
8528 
  Television receivers 34002 40838 60242 77.17 
4202 
  Trunks and cases 52966 52614 56571 6.81 
 
 
Table 3.18.  Top ten exports commodities to China for the years ending June from 2002to 2004, in 
descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P refers to 
provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 FOB) 
HS code   Commodity Year % Change 
  2002 2003 2004P  
0402   Milk powder 179361 266858 314812 75.52 
5101   Wool 216286 149695 165010 -23.71 
4403   logs 118563 134210 103617 -12.61 
4703   Chemical wood pulp 80381 41451 86522 7.64 
0504   Offal 54000 71739 77459 43.44 
1502   Fats of animals 36442 47110 61294 68.20 
4102   Raw skins, sheep 49904 65196 58146 16.52 
0204   Sheep meat 49284 48769 48049 -2.51 
4701   Wood pulp 37242 34113 47139 26.57 
4407   Timber 41385 43171 46668 12.77 
 
 
3.3.3  United States of America (USA) 
The top three commodities imported from the USA (HS4 codes) were Aircraft, 
Computer and Aircraft parts in the year ending June 2004 (Table 3.19).  The ranking 
order for the top three commodities remained the same for all three years.  In contrast 
to Australia and China, the majority of commodities imported show a decrease 
between June 2002 and June 2004, with the exception of Motor vehicles, Electric 
generating sets and Trucks and Vans (increasing 0.22%, 2424.52% and 12.88% 
respectively).  Telephone equipment was the commodity which showed the greatest 
decrease in imports (-39.40%) while Electric generating sets showed the greatest 
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increase, increasing from the import value of $3,381,000 in 2002 to $85,354,000 in 
2004. 
 
Table 3.19.  Top ten imports commodities from USA for the years ending June from 2002 to 2004, in 
descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P refers to 
provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 CIF) 
HS code   Commodity Year % Change 
  2002 2003 2004P  
8802   Aircraft 502769 469722 330121 -34.34 
8471   Computers 252081 233247 212102 -15.86 
8803   Aircraft; parts 188028 115614 126724 -32.60 
8473   Machinery; parts 152108 124250 115633 -23.98 
9018   Medical or veterinary instruments 121426 107030 110655 -8.87 
8703   Motor vehicles 110192 136144 110433 0.22 
8502   Electric generating sets 3381 4190 85354 2424.52 
8704   Trucks and Vans 53414 44459 60289 12.88 
8411   Turbo-jets 61789 21671 55752 -9.77 
8517   Telephone equipment 84451 73391 51174 -39.40 
 
 
Frozen beef, Casein and Sheep were the top three commodities (HS4 codes) New 
Zealand exported to the USA in the year ending June 2004 (Table 3.20).  The ranking 
order for the years 2002 and 2003 were the same although they differed from the 
order for 2004, with Timber replacing Sheep meat until 2004.  As with New 
Zealand’s imports from USA, the majority of New Zealand’s exports to the USA 
decreased between the years ending June 2002 and June 2004, with the exception of 
Sheep meat, Apples and Wines (increasing by 4.96%, 4.36% and 62.93% 
respectively).  Both Timber and Fish fillets showed the greatest decrease (-44.58% 
and -41.25% respectively), while Wines showed the largest increase, increasing from 
the export value of $48,237,000 in 2002 to $78,594,000 in 2004. 
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Table 3.20.  Top ten exports commodities to USA for the years ending June from 2002 to 2004, in 
descending order for 2004, with the percent change calculated between 2002 and 2004 (P refers to 
provisional data) (Data source Statistics New Zealand) (NZ$ 000 FOB) 
HS code   Commodity Year % Change 
  2002 2003 2004P  
0202   Frozen beef 994147 829624 888086 -10.67 
3501   Casein 565027 457623 364939 -35.41 
0204   Sheep meat 232828 233057 244375 4.96 
4407   Timber 286700 356092 158901 -44.58 
0406   Cheese 255061 147065 125360 -50.85 
8903   Yachts and other vessels 60770 37464 92508 52.23 
0304   Fish fillets 156637 129401 92019 -41.25 
0808   Apples 84555 64595 88240 4.36 
8708   Motors vehicles; parts 111264 123163 79980 -28.12 
2204   Wine 48237 67411 78594 62.93 
 
 
3.4  Synopsis 
 
The number of sea containers entering New Zealand has be increasing steadily over 
the past decade, with recorded increases of approximately 150-180% (unpublished 
data MAF 2004) (Anon. 2003i).  With this increase in container numbers there has 
been an associated increase in biosecurity risks (Vitousek et al. 1997, Anon. 2003i, 
Levine and D’Antonoio 2002, Meyerson and Mooney 2007).  The risks associated 
with sea containers include the containers themselves (Bulman 1998, Anon. 2002f), 
the cargo (Bulman 1992, Gadgil and Bulman 2002), the packaging material and the 
accuracy of manifest descriptions for contents and packaging (Anon. 2003i). 
 
As the biosecurity risk associated with trade is more dependent on the numbers of 
containers entering, the contents of the containers and the origin of the containers than 
on the value of trade (Hulme 2009); for the purpose of this research, New Zealand’s 
top three trading partners were determined by the number of containers entering New 
Zealand per country.  Therefore, Australia, China and USA will, for the purpose of 
this study, be considered New Zealand’s three major trading partners. 
 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia exported a total of 70,632 containers to New Zealand in the first half 2004, 
from a total of 27 different ports containing commodities from all of 97 of the HS2 
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commodity categories, into all six of New Zealand’s major sea pots and accounted for 
32% of New Zealand’s total containers imported of the first half of 2004.  While the 
majority of imports from Australia arrive in New Zealand via sea containers, 
commercial cargo does arrive via airfreight and in March 2001 a Red Imported Fire 
Ant nest was discovered on the grounds of the Auckland International Airport near an 
area where air cargo crates were stored. Two days prior to the discovery in Auckland, 
a nest was discovered in Brisbane, Australia (Anon. 2002e), and the import pathway 
was identified, although no direct link to a pathway was proven.    
 
It is reported that Australia intercepts a larger number of potentially invasive species 
associated with imports, including approximately 600 insect species annually 
(Maynard 2004). For example in 1998 the Monterey Pine Aphid (Essigella 
californica) was intercepted in Sydney, Australia on avocados imported from New 
Zealand.  As the aphid was not reported to be feeding on the avocados themselves, 
this intercept highlights the occurrence of hitchhiking of invasive species on non-host 
material (Maynard 2004). 
 
CHINA  
China exported a total of 22,253 containers to New Zealand in the first half of 2004, 
from a total of 84 different domestic ports.  Goods included 95 of the 97 HS2 
commodity categories, with computers, Women’s and Girl’s Suit, and Toys/Model 
being the top three commodities.  The total import from China had a yearly value of 
NZD$3.067 billion for the year ending June 2004, with containers arriving in all six 
of New Zealand’s major sea ports and accounting for 10% of the total number of 
containers arriving in New Zealand for the first half of 2004.  While there have not 
been any reported incursions in New Zealand linked directly to China, there are 
several species native to China that are now classed as invasive species elsewhere, for 
example Asian long-horn beetle (Anoplophora glabripennis) which was identified on 
hardwoods in Brooklyn, New York, U.S.A in 199644, the emerald ash borer (Agrilus 
Planipennis), which was identified in Ohio, U.S.A in 200345, the multiflora rose (Rosa 
multiflora), which was intentionally introduced into the U.S.A but was recently 
                                                 
44
 http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/plant_pest_info/asian_lhb/index.shtml 
45
 http://www.agri.ohio.gov/eab/ 
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classed as a invasive species46 and the white pine blister rust (Cronartium ribicola) 
which was introduced into the United States about 190047 (Ding et al. 2008). 
 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN 
The USA exported a total of 13,569 containers to New Zealand in 2004 from a total of 
58 different domestic ports, with containers arriving at all six of New Zealand’s major 
sea ports and accounting for 6.22% of total containers entering New Zealand.  The 
commodities imported included 95 of the 97 HS2 commodity categories, aircraft, 
computers and aircraft parts being the top three commodity categories (by volume) 
that New Zealand imported.  The total imports form USA had a yearly value of NZD$ 
4.212 billion for the year ending June 2004. 
 
While machinery parts and computers were the major imports from The USA, New 
Zealand also imported a wide range of consumable products including Table Grapes 
from California (to the value of $8 million per annum).  In October 2000 and again in 
November 2000, live spiders (including the black widow spider) were found in 
bunches of Californian Tables Grapes.  As a result, imports of the grapes were 
suspended and importation standards were altered to further increase the pre-
shipment, during shipment and border treatments in order to reduce the possibility of 
incursions (Anon. 2002b). 
 
Regardless of value or volume traded, the top five origins of biosecurity risk cargo for 
the year 2001/2002 were The Pacific Islands, Africa, Central/South America, North 
America and Australia (Anon. 2003i), based on the occurrence of unwanted species 
and organisms inhabiting these points of origin and the frequency of past detection at 
border inspections.  For example, 65% of invasive ants are associated with sea 
containers that originate from the Pacific Islands (Nendick and Sarty 2006). 
 
The countries that New Zealand exports to must also protect their borders from 
species that are established in New Zealand (either native or introduced) for example 
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the export of unprocessed timber from New Zealand to the USA (Prestemon 2008) 
and New Zealand grown apples exported to Australia (Anon. 2003f). 
 
As a biosecurity risk, it is of interest to note that a total of 13,595 containers entered 
New Zealand from ‘unknown origins’ in the first half of 2004, with these containers 
arriving at all six of New Zealand’s sea ports.  Information as to the contents of these 
containers was not available nor was the reason for the import information 
discrepancies. 
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Chapter 4 
International Trade Agreements and 
Administrative Bodies 
 
“Biosecurity is of growing interest as a result of major international developments 
including globalisation of the world economy, the rapid increase in communications, 
transport and trade, technological progress, and increased awareness of biological 
diversity and environmental issues.”  (FAO committee on agriculture) 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Given that the movement of any vessel, cargo or human poses a significant 
biosecurity risk, it is essential for biosecurity measures and activities to be regulated 
by international agreements and organisations to maintain fair trade.  There are 
numerous international trade agreements that regulate all aspect of international trade, 
although not all agreements are ratified and are therefore not legally binding.  This 
chapter provides a summary of the international organisations and their relevant 
agreements that have implications for New Zealand’s biosecurity management; this 
includes outlining general aspects of international trade agreements and their 
respective administrative bodies, as well as describing the multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements in more detail.  These descriptions afford an overview of the 
international trade environment within which New Zealand must manage to facilitate 
trade while protecting its environmental and economic health through biosecurity 
management. 
 
Members of international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) require both national and 
international frameworks and standards that support and regulate each other and 
manage and control all aspects of trade, including biosecurity.  Member countries are 
Chapter 4: International Trade Agreements and Administrative Bodies 67 
required to participate within the limits of their respective resources in relevant 
international organisations and agreements, particularly the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex), the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) and the 
FAO International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).  Member countries are also 
expected to accept measures in place by other member countries, provided that they 
are based on international measures or scientific research.  To further harmonise 
international trade, members may be requested to consult on measures with the aim of 
achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements.  Member nations are to notify the 
relevant international organisations of any changes and provide any information on 
their measures to member countries. 
 
As a member of the WTO and FAO, New Zealand has the sovereign right to decide its 
own level of protection while insuring our exports meet the level of protection 
required by the importing country.  New Zealand’s domestic legislation complements 
the SPS and IPPC agreements, as it embodies and promotes the use of the science-
based risk assessment that New Zealand has adopted in managing the risks associated 
with the international movement of goods and people (Anon. 2003i). 
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is another important organisation in 
terms of international trade safety, by ensuring cargo is shipped cost effectively, 
cleanly and safely through shipping and sea container standards48.  The IMO was 
established in 1958 and is a specialised agency of the UN, with 167 member states.  
IMO standards include maritime biosecurity management, for example, standards on 
Ballast water exchange.  Although the IMO’s standards are an important aspect of 
shipping and container safety they have limited influence on New Zealand’s 
biosecurity management per se. 
 
4.2  Multi-lateral Trade Agreements 
New Zealand is a member of several international organisations and is party to the 
multilateral agreements that these organisations administer; including the WTO and 
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FAO.  These agreements that influence how New Zealand manages its Biosecurity 
and the organisations that administer them are described below. 
 
4.2.1  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Currently at the centre of international trade is the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
The WTO and its agreements were created by the Uruguay Round Negotiations 
(1986-94) and put into force in January 1995.  The WTO has 147 members (April 
2004)49, who represent the vast majority of the world’s trading nations.  The WTO is 
essentially a forum in which governments can hold trade negotiations50 and succeeded 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) as an international 
organisation.  However, the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s over arching 
agreement for the trade in goods, but was updated as a result of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
 
The WTO is governed by the representatives of its member nations’ governments.  
All major decisions are reached through consensus by the membership as a whole.  
Decisions are made through various councils and committees, which consist of 
representatives of all WTO members.  The highest council within the WTO is the 
Ministerial Conference (held every two years), which consists of the ministers of all 
member nations.  In between the Ministerial Conferences the day-to-day operations of 
the WTO are conducted by three bodies, the General Council, the Disputes Settlement 
Body and the Trade Policy Review Body.  However, the agreement establishing the 
WTO states that all three bodies are in fact the General Council, although they meet 
under different terms of reference.  The General Council acts on behalf of the 
Ministerial Conference on all WTO matters and meets as the Dispute Settlement Body 
and the Trade policy Review Body to oversee procedures for settling disputes 
between members and to analyse members’ trade policy.  The next level of councils 
consists of another three councils: the Council for Trade in goods (Goods Council), 
the Council for Trade in Services (Service Council) and the Council for Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPPS Council).  All report to the General 
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Council.  They have subsidiary committees, which deal with all the different aspects 
of each council. There are also further six bodies, which report to the General 
Council, but since their scopes are smaller they are considered committees. 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
GATT 1994 is the general trade agreement of the WTO and sets out international 
guidelines and rules for trade and tariffs but does not specifically refer to any 
guidelines for biosecurity measures.  Since 1994 there have been two GATT 
agreements, the first and original agreement is known as GATT 1947 and the second 
as GATT 1994.  GATT 1994 is legally distinct from GATT 194751 in that it lays 
down the main rules specific for the trade of goods between the WTO members.  
Unlike GATT 1947, GATT 1994’s scope and coverage has been fully specified, 
detailed and is one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements attached to the WTO 
Agreement, accepted by participating governments and ratified by national 
parliaments, giving GATT 1994 a firm legal basis. 
 
GATT 1994 consists of four parts. The content of each Part and its Articles is briefly 
given below.   
 
Part 1 is consists of two Articles. Article I, the ‘Most Favoured Nation Clause’, sets 
out the concept of non-discrimination.  Article II states the obligations associated with 
the Schedules of Concessions of each WTO Member.  
 
Part II covers Articles III through XXIII of the General Agreement.  Article III deals 
with the concept of National Treatment.  Articles XIV to XIX cover a wide variety of 
subjects, which can all broadly be regarded as non-tariff measures.  Provisions in this 
group concern unfair trade practises such as dumping and export subsidies, 
quantitative restrictions, restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons (and related 
cooperation with the International Money Fund), stat-trading enterprises, government 
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assistance to economic development and emergency safeguard measures (screen 
quotes for cinema films, freedom of transit, customs valuation, fees and formalities, 
mark of origin and transparency of trade regulations).  General and national security 
exceptions are provided for in Articles XX and XXI, respectively.  Provisions on 
consultations and dispute settlements in Articles XXII and XXIII are elaborated in the 
WTO dispute settlement rules.   
 
Part III comprises Articles XXIV through XXXV.  Article XXIV deals with customs 
unions and free trade areas, as well as with territorial application, frontier traffic, and 
the responsibility of members for actions by their regional and local governments.  
Article XXVIII covers the negotiations and renegotiations of Tariffs.  Article XXIX 
outlines the relationships between GATT 1994 and the Havana Charter.  Article 
XXXIV makes the annexes an integral part of the 1994 Agreement. 
 
Part IV of the agreement deals with Trade and Development in Articles XXXVI and 
XXXVII, providing rules and benefits for developing countries.  Article XXXVI deals 
with the Principles and Objectives on Trade and development in the GATT 1947 
agreement.  Article XXXVII outlines the three main commitments of developing 
country members.  
 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement 1995) 
The WTO members negotiated the agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (which came into force January 1995) in order to achieve a 
balance between members’ rights to protect their biological resources from risks and 
their freedom of trade.  The SPS Agreement established principles that members are 
committed to uphold when trading in animals, plants and their products 
internationally while at the same time facilitating trade.  This agreement therefore 
applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which may, directly or indirectly, 
affect international trade.  This agreement works in conjunction with other 
international trade agreements including the Codex Alimentarius 1961 (Codex), 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), International Plant Protection 
Convention 1952 (IPPC) and Technical Barriers to Trade 1973-79 (TBT).  The SPS 
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agreement also protects members from discrimination by ensuring that trade 
restrictions imposed by members are no-discriminatory, transparent and scientifically 
justified52. 
 
The SPS Agreement (1995) allows member countries to develop their own import 
health standards, providing they are based on science.  However, member countries 
are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations, where 
they exist and are applicable, to allow for the increase in harmonization of 
international trade.  All standards should only be applied, if they are necessary to 
protect human, animal and plant health, and only to the extent required. Standards 
should not be arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where similar 
conditions prevail. 
 
The SPS Agreement comprises of 14 Articles, whose content will be given here in 
brief.   
 
Articles 1 and 2 specify the General Provisions and Basic Rights and Obligations 
(respectively) of the members.  Article 3 refers to the need of harmonization of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures where possible, although Paragraph 3 allows 
members to introduce and maintain measures that are more stringent than 
international standards, if there is scientific justification or if they are in accordance 
with Article 5 Paragraphs 1 through 8.  Article 4 addresses equivalence by outlining 
how member nations are expected to accept the measures of other member nations as 
equivalent.  Article 5 refers to the ‘Assessment of Risk and Determination of the 
Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection’ by setting up guidelines 
for the risk assessment and the development of appropriate measures for achieving 
compliance in accordance with international standards and scientific evidence.  
Article 6 addresses Adaptation to Regional Conditions, including Pest-or disease-free 
Areas and Areas of low Pest or Disease Prevalence.  This is to ensure that members 
establish measures adapted to the characteristics of any given area (at any scale) from 
which the trade product originated.  Article 7 refers to the Transparency of any 
measures or changes in measures.  Members are expected to provide information on 
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their measures in accordance with Annex B.  Article 8 addresses Control, Inspection 
and Approval procedures.  Members are expected to observe the provisions of Annex 
C when operating control, inspection and approval procedures.  Article 9 provides 
provisions for Technical Assistance amongst members especially for developing 
country members.  Article 10 refers to Special and Differential Treatment.  Members 
are expected to take into account the special needs of developing country members, in 
particular the least developed country members.  Article 11 refers Consultations and 
Dispute Settlement, where Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 apply to this 
agreement.  Articles 12, 13 and 14 provide for this agreement’s Administration, 
Implementation and Final Provisions respectively. 
 
4.2.2  The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
The FAO was established in 1943 when forty-four governments committed 
themselves to funding a permanent organisation for food and agriculture.  During the 
organisation’s inaugural session in 1945, the FAO was established as a specialised 
agency of the United Nations.  The FAO is governed by the Conference of Member 
Nations, which meet every two years.  The Conference elects both a council of 49 
Member Nations to act as an interim governing body, which serves in three-year 
rotating terms and the Director-General, who serves a six-year term.  The FAO 
comprises of eight departments: Administration and Finance, Agriculture, Economic 
and Social, Fisheries, Forestry, General Affairs and Information, Sustainable 
development and Technical Cooperation. 
 
Similar to the WTO, the FAO is a neutral forum in which all member nations meet to 
negotiate agreements and policies (both domestic and international) relating to food 
and agriculture.  Article XIV of the FAO constitution allows the conference to 
improve and submit conventions and agreements between member nations that 
concern food and agriculture53.  The conference has passed many agreements, 
standards and conventions, which are legally binding for all member nations.  The 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) (detailed below) is the FAO 
agreement establishing international standards and guidelines for plant protection and 
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the prevention, control, and where possible, the eradication of plant pests and 
diseases.  Another important function of the FAO is working in helping developing 
countries and countries in transition to modernise and improve their agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries practises and to ensure good nutrition for all.54 
 
The FAO’s mandate is “…to raise levels of nutrition, improve agricultural 
productivity, better the lives of rural populations and contribution to the growth of the 
world economy.” 
 
International standards for Phytosanitary measures the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty adopted 
by FAO in 1951 and came into force 1952.  The IPPC currently has 122 participants, 
with five levels of commitment; signature (36 members), ratification (34 members), 
adherence (85 members), definitive signature (1 member) and succession (1 member).  
Although the Convention is limited to cultivated plants, protection is not limited to 
direct damage from pests.  Thus, the scope of the Convention extends to the 
protection of both cultivated and natural flora from both direct and indirect damage by 
pests. 
 
The purpose of the Convention is “… international cooperation in controlling pests of 
plants and plant products and in preventing their international spread, and especially 
their interdiction into endangered areas.” 
 
The convention has been amended twice, once in 1973 and again in 1997.  The most 
recent revision was made to reflect the role of the IPPC in relation to the GATT 
Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly the SPS Agreement.  The SPS Agreement 
names the IPPC as the organisation providing international standards to help ensure 
that measures implemented by governments to protect plant health (phytosanitary 
measures) are harmonised and not used as unjustified barriers to trade.  While the SPS 
and IPPC agreements are distinct in their scope, purpose and membership, they are 
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complementary in areas of overlap i.e. the SPS Agreement makes provisions for plant 
protection in a trade agreement and the IPPC makes provisions for trade in a plant 
protection agreement; thereby, neither agreement supplements the other. 
 
The IPPC comprises of 23 Articles.  Articles I through to III provide the purpose and 
responsibility, the use of terms and the relationship with other international 
agreements.  Article IV encompasses general provisions relating to the organisational 
arrangements for national plant protection.  Article V refers to phytosanitary 
certification, while Article VI deals with the measures to regulate pests.  Article VII 
gives members the sovereign right to regulate the entry of plant and plant products 
and other regulated articles in accordance with applicable international agreements. 
However, under Paragraph 2 of Article VIII members are contracted to minimize the 
interference on trade of any regulations established under Paragraph 1.  Article VIII 
ensures that members cooperate with one another to the fullest practicable extent in 
order to achieve the aims of this convention.  Article IX deals with the establishment 
and function of regional plant protection organisations.  Article X refers to the 
development of standards, outlining that regional standards should be consistent with 
the principles of the convention.  Article XI establishes the Commission on 
Phytosanitary Measures within the framework of the FAO, with Article XII outlining 
the appointment and function of the Commission’s Secretariat.  Article XIII provides 
the guidelines for the settlement of disputes.  Articles XIV through XVI refer to the 
development of agreements; including the substitution of prior agreements, territorial 
agreements and supplementary agreements.  Article XVII provides the legal basis of 
the convention through the ratification and adherence of the convention by members.  
Article XVIII encourages members of the FAO who are not party to the IPPC 
convention to accept the convention and any non-contracting party to the IPPC to 
adhere to the conventions principles and international standards.  Articles XIX 
through XXIV refer to Languages, Technical Assistance, Amendments, Entry into 
Force and Denunciation respectively.  
 
As well as being an active observer in the SPS Committee, the IPPC routinely 
interacts with other standard setting organisations, especially the Codex Alimentarius 
for food safety (Codex) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) for animal 
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health.  The IPPC, the Codex, and the OIE have a close relationship under the SPS 
Agreement. 
 
4.2.3  Codex Alimentarius Commission 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission was officially established in 1963 by the FAO 
and World Health Organisation (WHO).  The commission was charged with 
developing food standards, guidelines, and related texts to protect the health of 
consumers and to ensure the fair trade of food commodities; with the FAO and the 
WHO passing resolutions to adopt the Statutes and Rules of Procedure set by the 
Commission.  The Statutes provide the commission’s legal basis, and the Rules of 
Procedure formalise its working procedures of the commission.  The commission is an 
international body with membership open to all of the FAO’s and WHO’s Member 
and Associated Member Nations.  The commission meets twice yearly in what is 
known as Plenary Sessions which are chaired by a chairperson from one of the eleven 
contracting nations and a vice-chairperson drawn from a pool 22 member countries.  .  
The sessions are attended by up to 500 people, which are either representatives or 
delegates of each member nation, i.e. senior officials appointed by their governments, 
which can include non-governmental representatives. 
 
Codex 
Since its establishment in 1963, the Codex has become the single most important 
international reference point for the developments associated with food standards.  
The Codex comprises of the following standards and guidelines: 
• Food standards for commodities (237) 
• Codes of hygienic or technological practice (41) 
• Pesticides evaluated (185) 
• Limits for pesticide residues (3274) 
• Guidelines for contaminants (25) 
• Food additives evaluated (1005) 
• Veterinary drugs evaluated (54) 
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4.2.4  Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 
The negotiations for the international agreement to create the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE), sanctioned by the League of Nations, were concluded on 25 January 
1924.  The agreement was ratified by 24 of the 28 negotiating countries by 1927, and 
the first session of the committee was held on 28 March 1927.  The OIE is an 
international governmental organisation and has 166 member countries (as of March 
2004).  It provides international standards on animal disease and zoonosis situations.  
The highest authority in the in OIE is the International Committee, which comprises 
of all the delegates and meets at least once a year.  The committee elects the 
governing bodies of the OIE (President, Vice-president, President Committee, 
Members of the Administration Commission, Regional and Specialist Commissions) 
and appoints the Director General of the OIE.  The next lower level within the 
organisation is the Administrative Committee and below that, both, the Specialist and 
Regional Committees report to the Administrative Committee. 
 
International Animal and Aquatic Animal Health codes  
The International Animal Health Code and the International Aquatic Animal Health 
Code were established by the Office International des Epizooties and are referred to in 
respective sections of the SPS Agreement that apply to animal health.  The purpose of 
these two codes is essentially the same; they both aim to ensure the sanitary safety of 
international trade in animals and animal products (all mammals, birds, bees and 
aquatic species) and to avoid the transfer of disease-agents that are pathogenic for 
animals and/or humans. 
 
The text in both codes being relatively similar, both codes deal with the obligations of 
the exporting and importing countries with regard to importing and exporting 
procedures, risk analysis of animals and animal products and the procedures of 
contamination notification.  Each code contains a detailed list of all the diseases 
associated with the respective animals and animal products, applicable sanitary 
measures and a list of commodities, which have been known to transmit the disease. 
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4.3  Bi-lateral trade Agreements or Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) 
Under normal conditions setting up a customs union or a free trade area between two 
trading nations violates the WTO’s principle of equal treatment for all trading 
partners55. However, the WTO, under GATT (1995) Article 24, Paragraphs 4-10, the 
Enabling Clause, and Article 5 of General Agreement on Trade in Services (2000) 
(GATS 2000), permits Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Closer Economic 
Integrations (ECIs), provided that these agreements meet the strict criteria set out in 
GATT/GATS56.  The WTO recognises that, although such arrangements may benefit 
the member states involved, under certain circumstances they have the potential of 
negatively impacting on the trade interests of those member states not party to the 
agreements.  Despite the potential negative impact, the WTO sanctions RTAs, as they 
permit member states to negotiate rules and commitments that exceed what was 
possible at the time multilaterally57.  Some of the rules within these RTAs or ECIs 
have also been utilised in the development of agreements within the WTO58. 
 
There has been a steep increase in the number of RTAs since the early 1990s; with the 
majority of WTO members being signatories to one or more RTAs (Figure 4.1.).  
There were 250 RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO by December 2002, of which 130 
were notified after 1995.  Over 170 RTAs are currently in force and an additional 70 
are operational, although not officially notified with the WTO.  It is estimated that 
there will be approximately 300 RTAs in force by 2005, if the RTAs currently 
planned or under negotiation are concluded59. 
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Figure 4.1.  The number of Regional Trade Agreements by date of entry into force.  Data sourced from 
the WTO. 
 
The  WTO’s General Council established the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA) in 1996 with the principal duties of examining individual 
regional agreements and to investigate the systematic  implications regional trade 
agreements may have for the multilateral trading system and the relationship between 
them60.  The CRTA also has the mandate to develop procedures to facilitate and 
improve the examination process and to ensure that the reporting on the operation of 
the regional agreements is adequately carried out by the parties to the agreements.  
The GATT/WTO rules state that regional trade agreements have to meet certain 
criteria, the interpretation of their wording, however, has become controversial and is 
the central work of the CRTA61. 
 
The RTAs that New Zealand is party to are referred to as Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreements (CEPs), also known as preferential or free trade agreements.  
Generally CEPs involve the removal of tariffs on goods, the liberalisation of services 
trade and provisions to encourage investment within the free trade area.  As trade flow 
is also affected by domestic administration and regulations in the form of tariffs and 
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quotas, CEPs provide means of facilitating trade through cooperation and 
development of standards, conformance and customs procedures.  Thus, well 
developed and instigated CEPs need to be comprehensive and consistent with WTO 
provisions, Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) goals and principles as well 
as open to other economies62.   
 
4.3.1 Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (CER) 
New Zealand’s first CEP is the treaty with Australia, which came into force on 1 
January 1983.  The CER succeeded the existing agreement, the New Zealand 
Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had been in force since 1 January 
1966.  The objectives of the 1983 Agreement are63: 
 “to Strengthen the broader relations between Australia and New Zealand; 
 to develop closer economic relations between the Member states through a 
mutually beneficial expansion of free trade between New Zealand and 
Australia; 
 to eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a 
gradual and progressive manner under an agreed timetable and with a 
minimum of disruption and; 
 to develop trade between New Zealand and Australia under conditions of fair 
competition”. 
 
The agreement consists of 26 Articles covering all aspects of trade relations between 
New Zealand and Australia.  Article 1 outlines the Objectives of the Agreement.  The 
Free Trade Area, Rules of Origin, Tariffs are addressed in Articles 2 through 4.  
Article 5 refers to the Quantitative Import Restrictions and Tariff Quotas.  The 
Modified Applications of this Agreement are dealt with in Article 6.  Article 7 
outlines Revenue Duties.  Articles 8 and 9 cover Quantitative Export Restrictions and 
Export Subsides and Incentives respectively.  Agriculture Stabilisation and Support is 
covered in Article 10, while Government Purchasing is covered in Article 11.  
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Articles 12 through 14 refer to Other Trade Distorting Factors, Rationalisation of 
Industry and Intermediate Goods.  Article 15 addresses Anti-dumping Actions and 
Article 16 Countervailing Action.  Safeguard Measures during the Transition Period 
are dealt with in Article 17.  Article 18 outlines the Exceptions for the Agreement.  
The Termination of earlier Agreements and Transitional Measures relating to earlier 
Agreements are outlined in Articles 19 and 20.  Article 21 refers to the Harmonisation 
of Customs between to the two contracting parties.  Articles 22 through 24 refer to 
Consultation and Review, Territorial Application, and Association with the 
Agreement respectively.  Article 25 outlines the Status of the Annexes associated with 
the Agreement.  Article 16 deals with the Agreements Entry into Force. 
 
4.3.2  Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer 
Economic Partnership 
New Zealand’s second bilateral CEP is its Agreement with Singapore, the Agreement 
between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership (ANZSCEP).  
This agreement was entered into force on 1 January 2001, and its aim is to further 
enhance the pre-existing bilateral agreement between the two contracting parties, 
covering the trade in both goods and services.  This agreement was designed to 
promote the economic growth of the contracting parties whilst also promoting greater 
international and regional trade liberalisation. 
 
The agreement consists of four Parts.  Part 1 outlines the agreement’s Objectives and 
General Definitions in Articles 1 and 2.  Part 2 addresses Competition in Article 3.  
Part 3 refers to Trade in Goods.  Articles 4 through 9 deal with Tariffs, Rules of 
Origin, Non-Tariff Measures, Subsidies, Safeguard Measures, and Anti-dumping 
respectively.  Part 4 refers to custom prodecdures required for clearance of goods 
traded.  Articles 10 and 11 allow customs procedures to be in accordance with the 
contracting parties’ national laws, rules and regulations, although they are encouraged 
where possible to conform to international standards.  Article 12 refers the implication 
of the APEC Blueprint for Action on Electronic Commerce.  Article 13 addresses risk 
management and the limits on total custom transactions. 
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4.3.3  New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China Free Trade 
Agreement 
The agreement between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China, signed in 
May 2004, sets out the guidelines and the timeframe for the negotiations for the actual 
trade agreement.  This agreement formalises the commitment that both Governments 
have made to further develop trade and investment. 
 
The agreement consists of 12 paragraphs and 2 annexes.  Paragraphs 1 through 3 
outline the agreements objectives and scope.  Paragraphs 4 and 5 establish the Joint 
Ministerial Commission, which is jointly chaired, to further enhance communication 
on all relevant aspects.  Paragraph 6 addresses the need for further facilitation of 
mutual business travel and linkages between all relevant associations of the member 
nations.  Paragraphs 7 through 9 facilitate consultations at both bilateral and 
multilateral levels.  Paragraphs 10 through 12 outline the framework for the 
negotiation process. 
 
Trans -Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEPA or P4) 
among Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore 
 
On 3 June 2005 Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore successfully negotiated 
the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEPA or P4).  This 
agreement included a successful end to negotiations on a binding Environment 
Cooperation Agreement and a binding Labour Cooperation Memorandum of 
Understanding.  The agreements were ratified in April 2005 and officially came into 
force on 28 May 2006.   
 
This agreement consists of 20 Chapters and 4 Annexes and aims to further liberalise 
trade and investment by establishing clear rules governing their trade, build on their 
rights, obligations and undertakings under the WTO; while preserving the rights of 
each of the four governments to regulate in order to meet national policy objectives 
and to safeguard public welfare.  Chapters 1 and 2 outline the general scope, 
definitions and the establishment of the free trade area.  Chapter 3 provides the 
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definitions, scope and other provisions for the trade of goods.  The rules of Origin and 
Customs Procedures are outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  Chapters 6 
through 9 outline each government’s obligations under WTO and other international 
agreements such as SPS measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  Intellectual 
property, government procurement and trade in services are provided for under 
Chapter 10 through 12.  The transparency rules, dispute settlement and strategic 
partnership are outlined in Chapter 14 through 16.  Chapters 17 through 20 provide 
the administrative and institutional provisions, general provisions, general exceptions 
and final provisions.  The Annexes to the agreement outline tariff schedules, specific 
rules of origin and Service schedule. 
 
4.3.4  CEP under negotiation 
Currently New Zealand is in the process of negotiating a further five CEPs with 
countries or established trading blocks and associations: Hong Kong, Mexico, and 
Malaysia. A brief description is given below: 
 
Hong Kong/New Zealand CEP 
In April 2001, New Zealand and Hong Kong announced intentions to negotiate a 
CEP; since then five rounds of negotiations have taken place.  The negotiations have 
reached their final stages with agreements on most matters. Some outstanding issues 
relate to services and the rules of origin that determine whether or not imports qualify 
for duty free entry. 
 
Mexico 
New Zealand and Mexico announced intentions of conducting studies into the 
possibility of a bilateral CEP in October 2002.  Although progress has been made on 
the studies, there have been no formal commitments to further the process. 
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Malaysia 
On 31 March 2005 New Zealand and Malaysia announced that they had agreed to 
negotiate and Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  Although progress has been made during 
the sixth round of negotiations there is still no formal agreement. 
 
AFTA/CEP 
New Zealand is currently in the process of discussing the possibility of a trade 
agreement with Australia and the ten members of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).  The intentions are for these discussions to further the trade 
already existing between these nations and to enhance trade liberalisation within the 
region. 
 
4.4  Synopsis 
Given that the trade of any commodity poses or increases the risk to any trading 
nation’s biosecurity, international trade agreements and international trade policies 
have direct and indirect implications on a nation’s trade and biosecurity legislation 
and measures.  Being at the centre of international trade, the WTO and its agreements, 
although not always directly nevertheless strongly influence all aspects of trade 
including its associated biosecurity risks.  The WTO/GATT (1995) agreement 
essentially aims to establish an international free trade environment effectively 
increasing cross border trade and activities and thus the potential of biosecurity risks.  
Articles XX and XXI (General and National Security Exceptions, respectively) and 
XXIV (Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas) are the Articles within GATT, which 
have the most relevance for the development of domestic biosecurity legislation. 
 
The WTO/SPS Agreement (1995) was established in order to achieve a balance 
between protection of biological resources from risks on one hand and freedom of 
trade on the other; and therefore it directly influences the development of domestic 
biosecurity legislation.  The WTO/SPS Agreement (1995) enables member countries 
to develop their own import health standards. However, member countries are 
encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations, where 
they exist and are applicable.  Articles 3 (Harmonization of Sanitary and 
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Phytosanitary Measures), especially Paragraph 3 (allows members to introduce and 
maintain measures that are higher than international standards), and Article 5 
(Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or 
Phytosanitary Protection) have the most relevance for the development of domestic 
guidelines for risk assessment and appropriate measures. 
 
The FAO/IPPC (1997) is at the centre of international agreements and policies 
relating to food and agriculture, with the scope of the Convention being the protection 
of both cultivated and natural flora including both direct and indirect damage by pests.  
However, Article VII (Requirements in Relation to Imports), Article IX (Regional 
Plant Protection Organisations) and Article XV (Territorial Application) are the 
Articles through which this agreement has the most relevance to the development and 
implications of domestic biosecurity legislation and protection measures. 
 
The Codex and the OIE are responsible for the development of international standards 
for food and animal diseases, respectively.  These organisations require the 
notification and regulation (according to international standards) of trading country’s 
procedures for risk analysis and contamination notification.  Although these 
organisations develop international standards, which are legally binding, they have no 
direct control in the development of domestic border control legislation and measures.  
However, as their standards are aimed at lowering the risks of contamination of 
commodities traded, they indirectly influence the biosecurity risk associated with 
traded commodities. 
 
As with the WTO/GATT (1995) agreement, the CEPs that New Zealand is party to 
have generally an indirect influence on New Zealand’s Biosecurity legislation and 
measures.  For example, New Zealand’s CEP with Singapore only indirectly refers to 
biosecurity measures in its Articles 10 and 11 allowing customs procedures to be in 
accordance with the contracting parties’ national laws, rules and regulations,  but 
encourages domestic standards to conform with international standards, where 
possible.  Similarly, New Zealand’s CEP with Australia only indirectly refers to 
customs procedures: 
1. Article 18 outlines the exceptions to the agreement whereby “…provided that 
such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
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discrimination or as a disguised restriction on trade in the area, nothing in 
this agreement shall preclude the adoption by either Member State of 
measures necessary: 
  to protect its essential security interests; 
 to protect human, animal or plant life or health, including the protection 
of indigenous or endangered animal or plant life; 
 to protect intellectual property rights or to prevent unfair, deceptive, or 
misleading practises; 
 to protect national treasures. 
 
2. Article 21…“ Member states recognise that the objectives of this agreement 
may be promoted by the harmonisation of customs policies and procedures in 
particular cases.  Accordingly the member states shall consult at the written 
request of either to determine any harmonisation which may be appropriate”. 
 
In New Zealand biosecurity is defined by the Biosecurity Strategy Development 
Team, as “…the protection of New Zealand’s economy, environment and people’s 
health from the risks posed by pests and diseases” (Anon. 2001c). Therefore all 
international trade agreements or international trade policies, which are related to any 
aspect of import or export health measures or regulations, have possible implications 
for New Zealand’s biosecurity management system. 
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Chapter 5  
Domestic Legislation and Administrative 
Bodies 
 
5.1  Introduction 
To coincide with the international trade agreements that New Zealand is party to (see 
Chapter 4); New Zealand’s domestic legislation is designed to further protect New 
Zealand from the biosecurity risks associated with the international movement of 
commodities and people.  This is achieved through a series of separate pieces of 
legislation managed by five major government agencies.  This chapter provides a 
summary of the three key pieces of legislation, which manage New Zealand’s 
biosecurity risks at the border level and the government agencies that administer 
them. 
 
5.2  New Zealand’s  Biosecurity Legislation 
There are a total of 44 separate pieces of legislation (both public and private Acts), 
which combined regulate New Zealand’s biosecurity and border management.  
However, the majority of the management is covered by three Acts, namely the 
Biosecurity Act 1993 (BSA 1993), the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms 
Act 1996 (HSNO 1996) and the Customs and Excise Act 1996.  The contents of these 
three Acts are summarised below. 
 
5.2.1  Biosecurity Act 1993 (BSA 1993) 
The Biosecurity Act 1993 enables the New Zealand Government to manage and 
minimise the risks associated with the international movement of commodities and 
people and internal management of pre-existing pests through exclusion, eradication 
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or control of unwanted organisms.  The Act came into effect on 26 August 1993 with 
the intent to: 
 
“…restate and reform the law relating to the exclusion, eradication and effective 
management of pests and unwanted organisms”. 
 
The BSA 1993 comprises of 10 parts: 
 
Part 1 - Preliminary  
This opening part defines the terms used throughout the Act (Section 2) and provides 
the application for measures on the effects of uncertain origin (Section 3).  The BSA’s 
(1993) relationships with other enactments are outlined in Section 7 to ensure that the 
BSA’s (1993) functions, duties and powers affecting or derogating other legislation 
provisions or vice versa.  Section 7a, however, provides the means to create 
regulations that contravene Part III of the Resource Management Act (1991), meaning 
biosecurity measures may be in direct conflict with the Resource Management Act 
(1991) restrictions. 
 
Part 2 - Functions, Powers and Duties 
This part regulates the functions of offices their powers and their duties. 
Ministers 
Section 8 outlines the duties of the responsible Minister (currently the Minister 
Agriculture and Forestry); which include providing for the implementation of this 
Act, recording and co-ordinating reports of suspected new organisms and managing 
appropriate responses to such reports.  Section 9 specifies the powers of the Minister 
with regard to the function of the Act and the development of regulations. It defines to 
whom the Minister is responsible and identifies the responsibilities, which the 
Minister is not permitted to delegate.  Under section 11 any government Minister has 
the responsibility and the power to take actions in relation to biosecurity emergencies.  
Section 12 allows the responsible Minister to acquire any information relevant to any 
function, power or duty under this Act or under any pest management strategy.  
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Local Authorities 
Sections 13 through 15 clarify the powers of regional authorities to fulfil their 
biosecurity responsibilities within their region.  This includes the monitoring, 
gathering of information on pest agents and unwanted organisms within their region 
and the management of all pests through pest management strategies. Section 15 
outlines the conditions under which a local authority may transfer powers for pest 
management to another local authority. 
 
Part 3 – Importation of Risk Goods 
This part is specifically for the importation of risk goods, with the purpose of 
“...providing for the effective management of risk associated with the importation of 
risk goods”.  Risk goods are defined under Section 2 of the BSA (1993) as any 
organisms, organic materials or other things and substances that (by reason of their 
nature, origin, or other relevant factors) are reasonable to suspect constituting, 
harbouring or containing an organism that may:  
 
• Cause unwanted harm to natural and physical resources or human health in 
New Zealand; or 
• Interfere with the diagnosis, management, or treatment, in New Zealand, of 
pests and unwanted organisms. 
 
Arrival of Craft 
Sections 17 through 19 outline the protocols and procedure for the arrival of any craft 
into New Zealand territories.  Prior to arrival, approximate arrival time and 
destination notification is required. Failing that, authorities must be notified 
immediately upon arrival, and any risk goods are prohibited from being removed until 
clearance is given.  Section 19 allows for the inspection of any person and their 
baggage upon disembarking from the craft in New Zealand. 
 
Import Health Standards  
Section 22 outlines the issuing and use of Import Health Standards (IHS).  IHS are 
standards that specify the required condition and treatment of commodities prior and 
upon arrival in New Zealand. 
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Clearance of Risk Goods 
The procedures associated with the transport, inspection, unloading and possible 
seizure of uncleared goods are outlined under Sections 25 through 29 of the BSA 
1993.  All goods imported into New Zealand must be given a biosecurity clearance by 
an inspector (a Customs authorised personal), who must be satisfied that the goods are 
either not risk goods or, if they are, that they comply with the requirements specified 
by the IHS and are accompanied by appropriate documentation.  If the risk good is an 
organism, the inspector must be satisfied that it does not display any signs or 
symptoms of harbouring unwanted organisms.  Restrictions on issuing clearances may 
occur, if the risk goods are a new organism64, a prohibited organism65 or an organism 
that is intended for a containment facility. 
 
Inspection and Declaration 
Sections 30 through 41 outline the inspection and declaration of imported goods and 
facilities required for the clearance of risk goods and persons arriving in New 
Zealand.  These sections legislate for the inspection of uncleared goods, both 
accompanied and unaccompanied, the boarding of crafts, the procedures to deal with 
risk goods on a craft, the disembarkation of risk goods or persons of a craft.  The 
duties relating to the people in biosecurity areas are also outlined, as is the movement 
of risk goods at a port approved as the place of first arrival and arrival at a port not 
approved as a place of first arrival.  Sections 39 through 41 legislate the approval of 
transitional facilities and containment areas, the approval of facility operators and the 
designation of quarantine areas. 
Part 4 – Surveillance and Prevention 
This part provides for the continuous monitoring of New Zealand’s status in regard to 
pests and unwanted organisms: 
• “… to facilitate the provision of assurance and certificates in relation to 
exports of organisms and their products; and 
                                                 
64
 The BSA 1993 is not concerned with the purpose of the legal importation of new organisms; these 
importations are governed by the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996. 
65
 As specified in Schedule 2 of HSNO Act 1996 
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• As a basis for the proper administration of this Act, including the institution of 
precautionary actions, emergency and exigency arrangements, and pest 
management strategies; and  
• To monitor the effect of pest management strategies; and 
• Otherwise to enable any of New Zealand’s international reporting obligations 
and trading requirements to be met…” 
 
Sections 43 through to 53 outline surveillance and prevention.  These sections 
legislate for the duties, which provide the Ministry with information and inform the 
Ministry of suspicions, develop and improve identification systems and 
responsibilities of owners of organisms to prevent the spread, sale or exhibit of 
organisms. 
 
Part 5 Pest Management  
“The purpose of this part of the Act is to provide for the effective management or 
eradication of pests and unwanted organisms.” 
 
National Pest Management Strategies 
Sections 56 through 70 outline the duties of the responsible Minister and the 
procedures for developing National Pest Management Strategies (NPMS).  Any 
person may propose a NPMS with Section 57 outlining the criteria, which must be 
met before the Minister may notify a proposal.  Despite the request, the Minister is 
under no obligation to notify a proposal; the criteria for not notifying are given in 
Section 59.  Section 60 outlines the preparation and contents of a proposal for a 
NPMS.  The funding information required is outlined in Section 61.  Section 62 
outlines the criteria and the process for the public notification of the proposed NPMS, 
including the process and criteria for public submissions.  Should a proposed NPMS 
be notified, Section 63 allows the Minister to establish a board of inquiry to inquire 
into and report on every proposal for a NPSM.  Under Section 68, should a proposed 
NPMS be approved, an Order of Council allows the Governor General to make a 
NPMS on the recommendation of the Minister.  Section 69A outlines the content 
criteria of every NPMS and Section 69B the NPMS rules. 
 
Chapter 5: Domestic Legislation and Administrative Bodies 91 
Regional Pest Management Strategies 
Sections 71 through 84 outline the process by which Regional Pest Management 
Strategies (RPMS) are created and the duties of the responsible Regional Councils. 
There are a number of similarities in the creation process between National and 
Regional Pest Management Strategies.  As with the NPMS, any person can propose an 
RPMS.  The procedures by which the responsible Regional Council consults and 
notifies or may refuse to notify the proposed RPMS are outlined in Sections 72 
through 75.  The preparation and contents for RPMS are outlined in Section 76, with 
funding criteria in Section 77.  The notification process is legislated in Section 78.  
Regional Councils may appoint a hearings commissioner to inquire into and report on 
the proposed RPMS under Section 79.  The hearing process, public submissions and 
the notification of findings are outlined in Sections 79A through 79F.  The contents of 
the RPMS are specified under Section 80A. Strategy rules and exemption powers are 
legislated for under Sections 80B through 80D.  The implementation of RPMS, 
powers of delegation and the ability for councils to act jointly are outlined in Sections 
81 through 83. 
 
National and Regional Pest Management Strategies 
Sections 84 through 89 legislate for the issues that apply to both National and 
Regional pest management strategies, including the agency that will undertake the 
management.  The agencies are required to prepare the operational plan, annually 
review and provide public access to the operational plan that implements the strategy. 
Compensation will be made available to any persons adversely affected by the PMS 
under Section 86.  Section 88 outlines the duration of the PMS as well as the 
declaration of success, partition and notification of an extension for the strategy and 
the review of the procedures for the strategy.  Section 88A allows for minor changes 
to the strategy and Section 89 allows for the strategy to apply to more than one pest. 
 
Funding of Strategies 
The funding for PMS is covered in Sections 90 through 100A.  Funding for strategies 
may be obtained through the implementation of a levy by the Governor General under 
Section 90.  Section 97 legislates the use of rates to fund RPMS with Section 99B 
outlining the limitation of expenditure.  Section 100 allows the regional councils to 
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undertake small-scale pest management of unwanted organisms without a pest 
management strategy provided pest management meets the listed criteria. 
 
Part 6 Administrative Provisions 
Appointments and delegations 
The Chief Executive, Chief Technical Officer (CTO) and Deputy Chief Technical 
Officers are appointed by the Director-General, while inspectors, authorised persons 
and accredited persons are appointed by a chief technical officer under Sections 101 
through 105. 
 
Administrative powers 
When necessary, the CTO, the inspectors and authorised persons may employ any 
person or request any person to assist in order to conduct the provisions of this act.  
Inspectors are also given the power to search areas and crafts, search and detain 
people and their baggage in order to ascertain the presence of risk goods, and they 
may seize and dispose of unauthorised goods under Sections 107 through 120.  The 
power of the inspector to inspect organism is given in Section 120, with the powers to 
test for unwanted organisms, to vaccinate or destroy an organism given in Sections 
121B through 124.  Under Sections 125 through 129 the CTO or authorised inspectors 
are given the power to inspect a transitional facility and intervene when necessary and 
even to destroy organisms contained within the facilities. 
 
Place and area controls 
Under Sections 130 through 134 the CTO or inspectors may declare areas restricted or 
controlled and create road blocks, cordons and check-points for a stipulated period 
and are given the power to enforce all restrictions and controls. 
 
Recovery of costs 
Sections 135 and 136 outline the recovery of costs associated with administrating this 
Act (but not appropriated by Parliament), including the criteria for cost recovery, 
allocation and collection, along with the penalties for payment failure.  Sections 137 
through 142 enable the Minister to develop levies including the processes by which 
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disputes are settled. The processes for auditing levy collection and information 
storage are also specified. 
 
Part 7 Exigency Actions 
“The purpose of this part of the act is to provide for the efficient prevention, 
management or eradication of unwanted organisms if emergencies or other exigency 
occur” 
 
Sections 143 through 153 define the conditions and rules for a Governor-General to 
declare a biosecurity emergency, if the criteria set out in Section 144 are met.  Section 
145 provides the Minister with the powers to undertake measures for the purpose of 
managing or eradicating the unwanted organism for which the emergency has been 
declared in the prescribed area(s).  The duration of the emergency is 4 months unless 
revoked or extended by the House of Representatives.  The House of Representatives 
has to be informed of the emergency declaration as soon a possible, the House also 
has the power to revoke a biosecurity declaration under Section 148. 
 
Under Section 150, the Governor–General has the power to develop regulations for 
the management or eradication of the organism for which the emergency has been 
declared, with section 151 outlying the confirmation of the regulations.  The Minister 
may, under Section 152, develop provisional control programmes to prevent the 
spread of an unwanted organism that is suspected to be in New Zealand. 
 
Part 8 Enforcement, Offences and Penalties 
Offences enforceable under this Act are outlined in Section 154; this includes any 
threats against an official or intentionally hindering an official from conducting her or 
his duties, as well as other offences such as impersonating an official or undertaking 
any actions in relation to an unauthorised good that is in direct conflict with any 
provision of this Act.  Persons proven to have committed any offence under Section 
154 are liable unless it can be proven that they acted with the permission of an 
authorised person.  Section 157 outlines the penalties associated with any conviction 
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under Section 154, including fines and imprisonment.  Fines are payable to the 
agency, which is administering or implementing the action under the BSA (1993). 
 
Part 9 Miscellaneous Provisions 
Section 162 outlines the circumstances under which compensation is payable and to 
whom and the criteria for establishing the amount that is to be paid.  An official acting 
in accordance with any provision under this Act is protected under Section 163 
removing any liability from the official, unless the action was not conducted in good 
faith or with reasonable cause.  The liability of any person for loss or damage of any 
goods is outlined in Section 164.  Section 165 outlines the different purposes for 
which the Governor-General can make regulations, while Section 166 outlines the 
general provisions for the regulations made under Section 165.  Sections 167 and 168 
outline the repealing, revoking and amendments of enactments respectively. 
 
Part 10 Savings and Transitional Provisions 
Sections 169 through 185 cover the Acts, Regulations, Order of Council and Notices 
that are retained under this legislation.  This was done in order to enable a smooth 
transition between legislation i.e. to keep relevant preceding legislation in place until 
structures and standards can be formed under the BSA 1993 to replace it. 
 
5.2.2  Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO) 1996 
The HSNO Act was passed in June 1996 under the Ministry for the Environment.  
The Act is in two major parts, one relating to new organisms (came into effect in July 
1998) and the other relating to hazardous substances (came into effect July 2001).  
The Act consists of 15 parts (Part 16 has expired as of 29 July 2001): 
 
Part 1 – Preliminary  
This part of the Act defines the terms used throughout the Act and provides the 
meaning of a ‘new organism’ in Section 2A, as an organism belonging to a “species 
that was not present in New Zealand immediately before 29 July 1998.” 
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Part 2 – Purpose of Act  
Section 4 states the purpose of this Act, which is to: 
 
“…protect the environment, and health and safety of people and communities, by 
preventing or managing the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new 
organisms66.” 
 
Sections 5 through 9 outline the principles and matters relevant to the purpose of the 
Act and the Treaty of Waitangi.  These Sections also provide provisions for the 
methodology to be used for the purposes of the Act. 
 
Part 3 - Powers, Functions, and Duties  
Sections 10, through 12 outline the powers of the Minister, the Authority and 
enforcement officers to carry out any powers, functions or duties in accordance with 
this Act.  Section 13 outlines the responsibility of any person that imports, possesses, 
or uses a hazardous substance or new organism to ensure that there are no adverse 
effects caused by any aspect of the importation or by their use. 
 
Part 4 - Environmental Risk Management Authority 
The Environment Risk Management Authority (ERMA) was established under 
Section 14.  The overall purpose of the Authority is to assess and decide on 
applications for the introduction of hazardous substances or new organisms into New 
Zealand, including generic medication of all living things within New Zealand.  
Sections 15 through 24 outline the members of the Authority, delegation and power of 
the Authority.  Section 24A outlines the establishment of Nga Kaihautu Tikanga 
Taiao and its function in advising and assisting the Authority from the Maori 
perspective. 
 
                                                 
66
 Hazardous Substance and New Organism Act 1996 
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Part 5 - Assessment of Hazardous Substances and New Organisms 
These sections limit the importation, development, manufacture, use and release of 
both hazardous substances and new organisms.  This involves the assessment and 
types of approval (if given) of all applications for the importation and use or releases 
of hazardous substances and new organisms.  Approval is subject to the conditions 
outlined in Sections 25 through 67.  This includes importation, containment, and 
conditional release as well as exemptions from provisions of this Act for small-scale 
research.  Section 50 provides the provisions for the listing of prohibited organisms 
and Schedule 2 the specifics for prohibited organisms. 
 
Part 6 – Controls 
The provisions for a hazard classification system are provided for under Sections 74 
and 75 by prescribing a number of degrees or types of hazard for each intrinsic 
hazardous substance property and a degree of hazard under which a substance is no 
longer considered a hazard.  Section 76 enables the development of regulations 
regarding the requirements for the containers, identification, disposal, emergencies 
and tracking of any substance with a hazardous classification.  Controls on hazardous 
substances and the Authority’s power to impose and vary controls are outlined in 
Sections 77 and 77A.  The development of Codes of Practise for hazardous 
substances, their approval, the availability and proof of codes are dealt with in 
Sections 78 through 81.  Provisions for the application for test certificates, for 
becoming a test certifier and the register of test certifiers are provided for in Sections 
82 through 85.  The processes for complaining to the Authority are outlined in Section 
86.  The provisions for the transferring of permits are outlined in Sections 88 through 
95, with the establishment of the Transferable Permit Scheme given in Section 87.  
This includes the actual transfer and modification of permits.  Sections 95A and 95B 
refer to the provisions under which permissions and licenses for substances are 
granted. The provisions for environmental user charges are outlined in Section 96. 
 
Part 7 - Inspections, Enforcement, and Ancillary Powers 
Section 97 outlines which agencies are responsible for the enforcement of this Act and 
under which circumstances; with special emphasis given to new organisms under 
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Section 97A.  Inspection is co-ordinated between the agencies that are responsible for 
the enforcement, with the provisions for inspectors, their functions, powers, duties and 
protection are outlined in Sections 98 and 98A.  The provisions for inspections are 
outlined in Sections 99 through 103; this includes the procedures associated with the 
powers of entry for inspection.  Sections 104 to 108 outline the provisions associated 
with the compliance, form and content, service and cancellation of compliance orders.  
Section 109 outlines the offences enforceable under this Act, with infringement 
offences outlined in Section 110.  Penalties associated with the offences are outlined 
in Section 114, and the liabilities of employees and principles, directors and offices of 
cooperate bodies are outlined in Sections 115 and 116 respectively.  Fines are payable 
to the agency instituting the prosecution in accordance with Section 118.  The 
provisions for search warrants and for the handling of seized goods are outlined in 
Sections 119 and 120.  Section 124 defines the responsibilities of the owner or carrier 
of any craft arriving in New Zealand.  Sections 24A through 24F refer to the 
provisions relating to pecuniary penalties and associated criminal actions.  Liabilities 
are outlined in Sections 24G to 24I, with the defences against liability listed in Section 
24H. 
 
Part 8 – Appeals 
Any person may appeal a decision made by the Authority. These appeals can be 
lodged with the Authority directly, the district court or the high court, as outlined in 
Sections 125 and 126.  The procedures associated with appeals and the right to an 
appeal are specified in Sections 127 through 134.  This includes notices of appeal, the 
right to appear and the appeal hearing procedures. 
 
Part 9 – Emergencies 
Section 139 outlines under what circumstances an emergency maybe declared and 
who can declare an emergency; with the powers of an authorised person in an 
emergency outlined in Section 137.  Section 138 contains provision for compensation 
in relation to property that was destroyed as a result of a person conducting his or her 
duties under an emergency.  Authorised persons are also provided with protection 
from action or proceedings under Section 139. 
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Part 10 - Miscellaneous Provisions 
Section 140 allows for the development of regulations by the Governor-General for 
the purposes listed in the Section.  The Governor-General has also been given 
provisions to amend schedules under Sections 140A and 140B.  The relationship 
between this Act and other enactments is described in Section 142. Exemptions to this 
Act are outlined in Section 142A.  The procedures relating to injuries and the 
reporting of serious injuries resulting from hazardous substances or damage to the 
environment are provided for in Sections 143 and 144. 
 
Parts 11 through to Part 16 Transitional Provisions 
These parts provided transitional provisions for pesticides, toxic substances, 
dangerous goods, explosives, new organisms and also general provisions.  These Parts 
have however expired and are therefore no longer in force. 
 
Schedule 1 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is outlined here, with the 
purpose of the convention being to protect human health and the environment from 
persistent organic pollutants.  This includes the reduction in the production, release, 
import and export of chemicals that listed in Annex A, B and C. 
 
Schedule 2 
This provides the list of all the new organisms and persistent organic pollutants 
(Schedule 2A) that are not permitted into New Zealand. 
 
Schedule 3 
Schedule 3 consists of 3 Parts, with Part 1 referring to matters to be addresses by 
containments for [importing, developing or field testing] of generically modified 
organisms, Part 2 the containment controls for new organisms excluding those 
genetically modified and Part 3 the containment controls for contained hazardous 
substances.  Each Part provides for containment control procedures and the 
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procedures to be followed in the event of an accidental release or escape of the 
organism or substance. 
 
5.2.3  The Customs and Excise Act 1996 
The purpose of this Act is to: 
• “… Reform the law relating to customs, excise and other duties; and  
• Provide for the administration and enforcement of Customs controls at the 
border; and 
• Repeal the Customs Act 1966; and 
• Provide for related matters…67” 
 
Part 1 - Administration 
This part of the Act covers a) the renaming of the Customs Department to the New 
Zealand Customs Service, b) the authorisation of a person who is not a Customs 
officer for carrying out any function or power that may be performed by a Customs 
officer and c) the requirement of authorised personal to carry identification when 
conducting duties under this Act. 
 
Part 2 - Customs Places 
Customs places 
Customs places are any port or airport that the Chief Executive designates as Customs 
port or Customs airports for the purposes of this Act. 
 
Customs Controlled Areas 
No area is allowed to be involved in any activities relating to across border movement 
unless the area is a licensed Customs controlled area.  Such licenses are obtained, 
maintained, extended or revoked through the processes outlined in Sections 11 
through 15.  The closure of customs controlled areas is subject to Section 16 and all 
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liabilities are as per Section 17.  Customs controlled areas are to provide Customs 
facilities for Customs officers to use as they see fit under Section 18. 
 
Customs approved areas of storing exports (CASEs) 
The purpose of CASEs is to enable Customs officers to have access to all goods that 
are to be exported.  Sections 19B through 19H outline the areas that may be deemed 
CASEs, the license application process, the actual licenses, the access of Customs 
officers to licensed areas and the power of authorised personal to examine and detain 
goods and the vehicles that are to export the goods. 
 
Part 3 - The arrival and departure of goods, persons and craft 
Goods that are subject to Customs control are outlined in Section 20. Any goods 
within Customs controlled areas, whether they are deemed for international transport 
or not, are subject to customs control until they are lawfully removed for consumption 
or removed from New Zealand territory.  
 
The arrival of craft into New Zealand 
Before entering New Zealand territory, any craft must notify Customs of its 
impending arrival, crew, voyage, passengers, its cargo for discharge, not for discharge 
and the Customs place of arrival.  Everyone on inbound and outbound crafts is 
required to answer questions asked by a Customs officer relating to the craft, crew, 
voyage, and passengers and cargo that are or have been carried by the craft.  Masters 
of the crafts are also required to bring their ships to when requested to by a Customs 
officer in a clearly marked and identifiable craft and, within reason, facilitate the 
boarding of the craft by the Customs officer.  Upon arriving in New Zealand territory, 
the craft may only land, anchor or otherwise arrive in a Customs place, unless under 
the mitigating circumstances outlined in Section 25 and provide Customs with an 
inbound report under Section 26. 
 
Arrival of persons 
Unless required by other provisions of this Act, any person arriving in New Zealand 
must upon arrival report to a Customs officer or to Police at a Customs place until the 
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Customs officer has conducted his or her duties.  Any person upon disembarking a 
craft either from an origin outside of New Zealand or domestic origin must comply 
with Customs directions regarding disembarking and go through a Customs area until 
the Customs officer has conducted his or her duties as outlined in Section 28.  
Personal baggage, under Section 29, must be accompanied by owners and made 
available to Customs officer for examination and comply with customs regulations 
regarding the movement of baggage. 
 
Departure of Persons 
All persons boarding a craft for departure and the actual departure must be conducted 
from a customs area in accordance with the directions given by a Customs officer.  As 
with arriving baggage, all outbound baggage must be made available for examination 
by a Customs officer and must comply with Customs regulation regarding outbound 
baggage, and baggage must be loaded onto a craft in a customs area. 
 
Departure of craft 
No craft is to depart from any Customs area for a destination outside of New Zealand 
territories without a certificate of clearance, nor is any craft that arrived from a point 
outside of New Zealand to depart from the place of first arrival or any subsequent 
place of call within New Zealand until approved by Customs.  The criteria of gaining 
a certificate of clearance are set out in Section 34, with the fees and charges outlined 
in Section 34A.  All craft departing from a Customs area, whether or not the initial 
destination is outside of New Zealand territories, are to facilitate the boarding of the 
craft by Customs officer, and the master of the craft must on request produce the 
certificate of clearance and answer any question that the Customs officer asks in 
relation to the craft, its passengers, crew, cargo, stores and its intended voyage or 
journey.  No craft is permitted to depart New Zealand from any area other than a 
Customs place, unless subject to exemptions that may be prescribed or by prior 
permission from the Chief Executive, under Section 37. 
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Part 3A - Customs access to and use of information about crossing goods, person 
and craft 
Preliminary provisions 
This addresses the interpretation of terms used with the Sections under this Part, as 
well as outlining the purpose of these Sections. 
 
Who must give Customs access to information? 
This relates to persons to whom Sections 38D through 38E apply to, namely persons 
that are concerned with the movement of goods, persons or craft and have been 
required by the Chief Executive to comply. 
 
Information to which access must be given 
Persons to whom this Section applies must give Customs access to information in 
relation to the craft, cargo, passengers and crew numbers and provide individual 
details such as seating arrangements and baggage store.  Persons crossing New 
Zealand borders are also required to supply Customs with information set out in 
Section 38E, however, under 38F, no person is obliged to provide Customs with 
information on employees unless the information is of the kind that the person would 
generally have on their person. 
 
Use of information to which access must be given 
This outlines the criteria, which control Customs use of the information it has access 
to under the previous sections. 
 
Searching and viewing of information about border-crossing 
persons 
The below Sections give Customs officers the rights for searching and viewing 
information relating to travel within a 28 day period without a warrant.  The criteria 
for searching and viewing information relating to other travel are set out in Section 
38I.  The issuing of search and viewing warrants is outlined in 38J, though 
information searching and viewing may be done in emergencies without a warrant 
under circumstances specified in section 38K.  If information is viewed without 
authorisation in an emergency and subsequently a warrant was not issued, Customs 
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must under section 38L, destroy the information.  The security for the application of 
warrants is outlined in section 38M. 
 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
The methods or criteria for the disposal of information collected by Customs are 
outlined in Section 38O.  No official person fulfilling his or her duties under this Act 
is liable unless the person did not act in good faith or without reasonable care. 
 
Part 4 - Entry and accounting for goods 
Importation of goods 
All imports that are to be imported by an importer into New Zealand are subject to the 
regulations in this Act.  Persons entering any goods into the country must answer all 
questions that a Customs officer asks in relation to the goods, make the goods 
available for inspection and pay any duty on the goods subject to import duty.  The 
regulations relating to the importation of the goods are outlined in Section 40.  
Provisions for developing regulations for fees and charges relating to the importation 
of goods are outlined in Section 40A.  No goods that are subject to the control of 
Customs are to be unloaded in New Zealand without permits or other authorisation 
from the Chief Executive unless the craft or the goods within the craft are under threat 
of collision, fire, weather or other severe conditions described under Section 43. 
 
Transportation of imported goods 
Once goods have been permitted entry under Section 39(1) only then may the goods 
be transported from a Customs controlled area by a craft.  The removal of goods from 
a Customs controlled area is only permitted after goods have been cleared to the 
satisfaction of a Customs officer.  The temporary removal of goods from a Customs 
controlled area without the payment of duty is subject to approval of the Chief 
Executive.  All such goods remain subject to the control of Customs and are still 
considered to be within the Customs controlled area from which they have been 
removed, and all provisions of this Act continue to apply to them. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Domestic Legislation and Administrative Bodies 104 
Exportation of goods 
As with the importation of goods, goods that are to exported are subject to the 
regulations of this Act.  All goods that are to be exported much be entered by an 
exporter and must comply with prescribed conditions.  The exporter must allow a 
Customs officer to inspect all goods for export and answer any questions asked of 
them by the Customs officer in relation to the export goods.  Exports under drawbacks 
are deemed to be an entry for drawback under Section 49(3).  Section 50 offers the 
provisions the Governor-General requires to make regulations regarding the entry of 
goods for export, including regulations regarding the fees and charges under Section 
50A.  Any goods entered to be exported must be dealt with in accordance to the entry 
regulations and thus are to be exported outside of New Zealand in accordance with the 
entry made.  Any failure to export the goods within the conditions of the entry must 
be notified to Customs immediately and any further entry or export will be reviewed.  
No goods are to be exported and landed in a point outside New Zealand without the 
permission of Customs. 
 
Customs seals 
Customs officers have the ability to apply Customs seals to packages of goods to be 
exported as well as setting the conditions of seal application, seal alteration, removal, 
damage, disposal and other interference.  The seals that are applied to goods that are 
not to be exported under the Customs approved secure exports scheme are to have a 
warning attached explaining the terms of approval, which are listed in Section 53B. 
 
Customs-approved secure exports schemes 
Any person involved in the carriage, handling, transportation or exportation of goods 
for export can apply for Customs approved secure exports schemes.  The purpose of 
these schemes is to help ensure that exported goods are packaged securely, 
transported securely and without interference to the place of shipment and then 
shipped.  The specifications of the scheme are outlined in Sections 53E.  All goods 
exported under the scheme are still under the control of Customs and therefore all 
provisions of this Act still apply to the goods and the persons involved.  Customs 
seals may still be applied to the packaging of goods to be exported under the scheme.  
Exporters may be involved in more than one scheme and can still export goods 
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outside of any scheme.  Once approved, export operations under a scheme are subject 
to reviews by the Chief Executive. 
 
Part 5 - Prohibited imports and prohibited exports 
It is illegal to either import into New Zealand any goods specified in Schedule 1 of 
this Act or export out of New Zealand any goods prohibited by the Governor-General 
under Sections 54 and 56 respectively.  The duration of both, prohibition on imports 
and exports, are subject to the Order in Council, with the duration being generally 3 
years. 
 
Part 6 - Duties 
Valuation of goods 
Every person making an entry of goods imported or to be imported must specify a 
Customs value for the goods in accordance with Schedule 2 of this Act.  In addition, 
all importers are required to maintain complete records of all documents, records and 
information with respect to any importation of goods, and these records are to be 
made available for inspection by a Customs officer.  If the evaluation assessment of 
the imported goods is inconsistent with Schedule 2 or is incorrect for any other 
reason, the Chief Executive may amend the assessment.  Where the amount payable 
under any provision of this Act is not in New Zealand currency, the equivalent 
amount in foreign currency is to be paid at a fair rate of exchange determined by the 
Chief Executive.  To protect the Crown’s revenue, imported goods, which are 
evaluated at entry are deemed to be under the control of Customs and can therefore be 
acquired by the Crown by means of a warrant.  After acquisition the Crown is obliged 
to sell the goods, the conditions associated with the sale are outlined in Section 63. 
 
Origin and Preferential provisions 
The origin of fish and any other produce from the sea or goods produced or 
manufactured wholly or partly at sea by or on board a ship belonging to a country 
other than New Zealand is deemed, for the purpose of this Act and the Tariff Act 
1988, to have been done in that country and therefore any such produce or products if 
brought directly to New Zealand are deemed to be imported from that country.  The 
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origin of all other goods is determined by the Governor-General under Section 65.  
Goods entering New Zealand under preferential rates of duty are required to produce 
adequate verification of the claim at the time of entry or at any subsequent time.  If 
claims cannot be substantiated to the Chief Executives satisfaction, all goods entering 
New Zealand will be subject to the rates of duty set out in the Normal Tariff. 
 
Part 7 - Excise and Excise-equivalent Duties 
All excisable goods are to be manufactured in licensed areas; these goods include 
compressed natural gas.  The conditions for the entry of excisable goods are outlined 
in Section 70, with the provisions for the development of regulations regarding the 
entry of excisable goods provided under Section 71.  All excisable goods deemed for 
home consumption can be removed from the Customs controlled areas once 
conditions under Section 72 are met.  All goods manufactured in licensed areas, 
unlicensed areas or imported are also subject to duties.  Section 76 provides the 
Crown with provisions to collect outstanding duties through the seizure of the goods, 
with the licensee of the area, manufacturer or person(s) who own(s) the goods being 
liable.  The Governor-General, under Section 77, has the power to change the rates of 
excise duty or excise-equivalent duty, though these changes must not exceed the rates 
specified under Schedule 3.  However, Section 79 allows the Governor-General to 
amend Schedule 3 and impose duty rates that the Governor-General sees fit, though 
these new rates cannot exceed the rate calculated by the given formula.  The 
Governor-General can provide exemptions under specific circumstances outlined in 
Section 81. 
 
Miscellaneous duty Provisions 
Duty is still payable on any and all excisable goods consumed on licensed areas 
before removal, with the exception of excisable goods used in the manufacturing 
process of excisable goods, except spirits and other alcohols.  If the situation warrants, 
duties may be paid in advance and where payment exceeds actually duties a credit is 
claimed by the licensee towards other duties.  
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Part 8 - Assessment and Recovery of Duty 
The duties of imported goods are due and payable on importation, the debt is owned 
by the importer(s) and payable to the Crown.  Debts are recoverable by the Chief 
Executive on behalf of the Crown even after the goods cease to be under the control 
of Customs.  Deference of duties payable is subject to the discretion of the Chief 
Executive.  Any debts that remain outstanding are subject to additional duties, and 
deference of these additional duties is also subject to the discretion of the Chief 
Executive.  The assessment of the duty on imported goods is conducted by the 
importer or licensee, though these assessments are subject to review and amendment 
by the Chief Executive.  The payments of duties are due, subject to other sections of 
this Act, 20 working days after the written notice of the assessment or amended 
assessment. Every assessment made by the Chief Executive is deemed to be correct 
unless an appeal is lodged and a different amount is determined.  The obligation to 
pay duties cannot be suspended by an appeal; however, should an appeal be 
successful any amount paid in excess of the new amount shall be refunded with 
interest as outlined in Section 93.  Every importer or licensee is to keep records 
regarding duties for a period of no longer than 7 years and these records are to be 
made available to Customs.  The duty on any goods is considered a charge on those 
goods until fully paid; the purchaser of the goods with charge still owing is not liable, 
the liability remains with the importer or licensee.  Provisions for the recovery of duty 
from an individual that is bankrupt or a company that is in liquidation are outlined in 
Sections 98 through 101.  No one can remove any goods under controls of Customs 
until the duty is paid in full, the licensee of the Customs controlled area is liable for 
the duty of any goods illegally removed or missing.  Similarly, the owner(s) of craft 
are liable for the duty of any goods illegally removed from the craft within New 
Zealand.  If there are any changes made to the law regarding duty rates, the rates at 
the time of importation or removal from a Customs area are applied.  Re-importation 
of exported goods, may at the discretion of the Chief Executive be re-imported free of 
duty. 
Refunds, remissions, and drawbacks of duty 
Claims for refunds and payment of refund can only be made within 4 years of the 
importation, unless otherwise determined by the Chief Executive.  If duties have been 
paid on goods before the Minister of Commerce approves lower tariff or exempts the 
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goods from duty, the excess duty is to be fully refunded.  Other reasons for the refund 
of duty are outlined in Section 113.  The Chief Executive has the power to apply the 
refund of duties towards the payment of duties on other duties payable to that person.  
Any refund made in error or obtained through fraud may be re-obtained by the Chief 
Executive on behalf of the Crown within four years of the payment.  For goods that 
are imported for a temporary period a sum equal to the duties is acquired as security, 
and the goods can be removed form the Customs area free of duty. Once these goods 
have been exported, packed or shipped for export or destroyed to the satisfaction of 
the Chief Executive the security can be refunded within 12 months of the initial 
importation.  Conditions for the application of drawbacks are outlined in Section 117.  
Section 118 specifies the provisions for the development of regulations regarding the 
minimum duty collectable or refundable and the minimum drawback allowable. 
 
Part 9 - Customs Rulings 
The conditions for the application to the Chief Executive for a Customs ruling are 
outlined in Section 119 and the procedures for Customs rulings are outlined in Section 
120.  Notification of the Customs ruling, the effects of the rulings and the 
confirmation of the basis for the ruling are prescribed in Sections 121 though 123.  
The Chief Executive may make amendments to Customs rulings to correct any error 
that may have occurred. Any amendments are to be given in writing to the applicant.  
Should a ruling alter the duty of imported goods by increasing or decreasing the duty 
payable, the conditions for payments and refunds are outlined in Section 124.  The 
conditions under which the Customs ruling cease are outlined in Section 125.  
Applicants are able to appeal the outcome of the Customs ruling within twenty 
working days of the decision; the appeal is to be placed with the Customs Appeal 
Authority.  An applicant is not liable for payment of duties and no penalties are to be 
placed on unpaid duties nor shall goods be seized, if the applicant is in the process of 
obtaining a Customs ruling under Section 127. 
 
Part 10 - Administrative Penalties 
Penalties are imposed on goods entered, if there has been an error or omission in the 
information lodged with Customs, resulting in the correct amount of duty not being 
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paid, or if the entry is otherwise materially incorrect, unless payment is made in full 
within twenty working days.  If payment is not made in full within the twenty 
working days, the penalties imposed are outlined in detail in Section 128.  This 
Section also defines the meaning of ‘materially incorrect’.  Obligation to pay penalties 
can not be suspended by lodging an appeal or by other legal proceedings.  Penalties 
are not imposed, if the error or omission has been voluntarily disclosed to Customs 
prior to Customs notifying the liable person of the error or omission, and the Chief 
executive is satisfied with the reasons for the error or omission, e.g. if the error or 
omission was made without the liable person’s knowledge. Penalties are also not 
imposed if the total correct duty is less than $1000 or if the time between the 
lodgement of the entry and the first detection of the error exceeds four years. 
 
Part 11 - Customs computerised Entry Processing System 
Only authorised persons are permitted to access and remove any information stored 
within a Customs computerised entry system.  Details for the application to gain 
access to such a system are outlined in Section 132.  Each authorised person will be 
allocated a unique user identifier; the use of the unique identifier and conditions 
which can be imposed of information access and the cancellation of registration, along 
with the provision for Customs to keep record of transaction within the system are 
outlined in Sections 133 through 136. 
 
Part 12 - Powers of Customs Officers 
The provisions for Customs officers and other authorised personal assisting a Customs 
officer to patrol and survey the foreshore and shore of lakes, lagoons, rivers and 
adjacent land, Customs places or controlled areas; the landing and mooring of craft 
anywhere in New Zealand; to board, search and detain craft, secure goods on a craft 
and, where necessary, fire upon a ship to compel it to bring-to, are outlined in 
Sections 137 through 143.  The conditions for the searching of any vehicles are 
prescribed in Section 144.  The questioning of persons regarding goods and duty; 
personal information (identity, address, etc.); and the questioning of employees and 
owners or operators of companies associated with any aspect under this Act is made 
possible under Sections 145 and 146.  Persons travelling through New Zealand’s 
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Customs controlled areas are expected to carry on their person proof of their identity 
and entitlement to travel as well as provide Customs with the information on demand.  
The conditions for the detention of persons and the searching of persons are outlined 
in Sections 148 and 149.  The provisions for Customs officers to enter any Customs 
controlled area or place at any time to examine any goods under Customs control and 
goods no longer under Customs control are prescribed in Sections 150 through 152.  
Licensees of Customs areas are expected to be able to provide an accurate account of 
all goods in their storage, verification of entries and produce the goods on demand.  
Any communication (oral or written) between legal practitioners and their clients and 
other legal practitioners are exempt from disclosure under Section 162.  The 
conditions for Customs officers to audit or examine records, the requesting of all 
related documents, copying and retaining documents and goods obtained from a 
search are outlined in Sections 159 through 166.  The conditions for obtaining and 
executing search warrants and arresting offenders are outline in Sections 167 through 
174.  Section 175 provides for the protection of any person acting under the authority 
of this act. 
 
Part 13 - Offences and Penalties 
Offences in relation to Customs 
The penalties for threatening, resisting, obstructing or interfering with or 
impersonating a Customs officer are outlined in Sections 176 through 178.  
Counterfeiting any official Customs seals or marks or any closely resembling of any 
seal, stamp or mark used by Customs is an offence under Section 179.  Every person 
entering or departing New Zealand who does not comply with any of the requirements 
set out by Customs is committing an offence and is liable.  Any unauthorised person 
in a Customs controlled area or accessing or misusing or interfering with the Customs 
computerised system is committing an offence under Sections 181 through 184.  
Failure to answer questions, produce evidence of identity or goods, to remain at a 
place when requested or to comply with any other request made by a Customs officer 
or the Chief Executive is an offence and penalties are outlined in Sections 185 
through 189. 
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Offences in relation to Customs controlled areas 
The offences and penalties in relation to Customs controlled area licensees, arrival 
and departure of crafts, import or export reports, the adaptation of craft for smuggling 
and interference with Customs seals and cargo, unloading of authorised cargo and 
goods are outlined in Sections 198 through 201.  Although, the penalties for offences 
in relation to the manufacture, movement and storage of goods are provided for under 
Section 200.  Any failure to make an entry or submitting an incorrect entry, 
submitting any documents or other forms for declaration that are in any manner 
incorrect or not genuine, failing to keep the required records or to give Customs 
access to requested information is committing an offence, the penalties for which are 
laid out in Section 203 through 205.  The disclosure of any information relating to 
Customs matters is limited under Section 205B.  It is an offence to be in possession of 
incomplete or incorrect documents, if the document is marked or certified as 
authentic. The use of imported goods for other purposes than they have been entered 
or failing to comply with the conditions imposed in respect to the entry of the goods is 
an offence.  Every person who imports into or exports from New Zealand any goods 
which are prohibited by any provisions of this Act is committing an offence. The 
penalties for these offences are outlined in Sections 209 and 210.  Any person evading 
or enabling other persons to evade any form of payment of duty or in any other form 
defrauding Customs of revenue is committing an offence.  Any person in possession 
of, purchasing, selling or exchanging goods that are prohibited or uncustomed or 
concealed are under Sections 212 through 214 committing an offence.  The offences 
and associated penalties in relation to the Customs Appeal Authority are outlined in 
Section 216. 
 
Miscellaneous provisions relating to offences 
If a corporation commits an offence against any provision of this Act, the director, 
manager, secretary, officer, or agent of the corporation or any other person purporting 
under the act is liable for the offence, whether in New Zealand or not, under Sections 
217 and 218.  Any attempt to commit an offence against this Act is an offence and 
punishable under Section 219.  The provisions for the laying of information, court 
orders in respect to duty payments and for the power of Chief executives to settle 
petty offences are given in Sections 221 through 223. 
Chapter 5: Domestic Legislation and Administrative Bodies 112 
Part 14 - Forfeiture and Seizure 
The conditions of the forfeiture, the process of seizure and post seizure procedures are 
outlined in Sections 225 through 230. 
 
Appeals against seizure 
Section 231 provides the means by which a person may appeal a seizure within 20 
working days after the notice given.  The court may disallow seizures under certain 
conditions, with seizures being disallowed where no notice was received.  If there is 
no application for an appeal within the 20 working days, then the goods are 
condemned.  A person may apply to have the forfeiture waivered by the Minister 
under the conditions laid out in Section 235. 
 
General provisions as to forfeiture 
Forfeited goods are to be condemned once the person(s) liable for the goods is(are) 
convicted, after which the forfeited goods are disposed of either under the conditions 
outlined in Section 229 or sold, used, destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the Chief 
Executive sees fit.   
 
Part 15 - Evidence 
The conditions for using evidence for court proceedings under this Act against any 
person on behalf of the Crown are outlined in Sections 239 through 243. 
 
Part 16 - Customs Appeal Authority 
Sections 244 through 253 establish the Customs Appeal Authority, with Sections 254 
through 274 dealing with the actual proceedings of the Authority.  This includes the 
nature of appeals, the hearing proceedings, the Authorities powers, the evidence 
required, the powers to investigate and summon witnesses, the Authorities’ decisions 
and appeals to the High Court. 
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Part 17 - Miscellaneous Provisions 
This part contains sections that are relevant to most parts of this Act.  This includes 
provisions for the application of the Act to postal items, the conditions and limitations 
of information exchange between Customs, other national departments and 
international agencies and clarification as to what is meant by ‘giving notice’.  The 
limitations as to the regulations that the Governor-General, by Order in Council, can 
make are outlined in Sections 286 and 287.  The provision for the reporting of the use 
of reasonable force is provided for in Section 288A.  Sections 294 through 306 
provide transitional provisions and their applications.  This includes; terminology, 
areas deemed transitional Customs controlled area, examination places, staff 
accommodation, and conditions relating to appointment or licenses. 
 
 
5.3 Administrative and Advisory Bodies Associated with New 
Zealand’s Biosecurity. 
The three pieces of legislation summarised above are administered by three 
government agencies: The BSA 1993 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF), the HSNO 1996 by the Environment Risk Management Authority (ERMA) 
and the Custom and Excise Act 1996 by the New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS).  
The mandate and organisational structure of the three agencies responsible for the 
administration of the legislation are summarised below. 
 
4.4.1  Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was formed in 1998 from the merging of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Forestry.  MAF’s mission is to “enhance 
New Zealand’s natural advantage.”  With a vision “ to see and contribute to a future 
where New Zealanders celebrate dynamic, scientifically sophisticated and prosperous 
agricultural, horticultural, food and forestry sectors leading growth and innovation in 
the economy and underpinning our ability to achieve the economy, environment and 
society to which New Zealanders aspire68.” 
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The Director General of MAF answers directly to both the Minister of Agriculture and 
the Minister of Forestry.  MAF consists of 10 business groups: MAF Policy, New 
Zealand Food Safety Authority, Biosecurity New Zealand; MAF Quarantine Services, 
Crown Forestry Group, Biosecurity Strategic Unit, Strategy and Performance Group, 
Maori Strategy Unit, Corporate Assurance and Risk and Corporate Services Group. 
 
MAF Policy provides the Ministers with policy advice aimed at advancing New 
Zealand’s agricultural, horticultural, forestry and food sectors, as well as with 
statistical data and other relevant information and services.  Within MAF Policy there 
are six groups: International Policy; Food, Biosecurity and Science Policy; Sector 
Performance Policy; Sustainable Resource Use Policy; Policy Information and 
Regions and Business Services.  
 
The New Zealand Food Safety Authority is a semi-autonomous branch of MAF.  Its 
major function is to provide New Zealand consumers with safe food and food 
products.  This is done through protecting and promoting public health and safety 
whilst facilitating in the international trade of food and food products. 
 
The Crown Forestry Group manages the Crown’s forestry interests over a number of 
commercial forests and forestry.  The day-to-day management of the forests is 
contracted out, with the Crown Forestry Group conducting audits, providing strategic 
plans and general administration from Wellington and Rotorua. 
 
The Corporate Service Groups provides support for the entire Ministry, this includes: 
Strategy and Performance, Corporate Human Resources; Corporate Information–
Management and Technology; Corporate Finance; and Corporate Service 
incorporating Accountability Documents and Ministerial Service, Accommodation 
and Services, Corporate Communications, Corporate Assurance and Risk and Legal 
Services.  This also includes the Maori Strategy Unit, whose primary role is to 
implement the MAF Maori responsiveness strategy promoting Maori issues within 
MAF and to increase MAF’s understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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Biosecurity New Zealand (MAF) 
Biosecurity New Zealand is a division of MAF and was established in November 
2004, replacing the former MAF Biosecurity and Protect New Zealand.  Biosecurity 
New Zealand’s role is to protect New Zealand’s biosecurity. This includes our 
economy, health and environment. 
 
The Biosecurity New Zealand Director-General reports directly to the Minister of 
Biosecurity.  Biosecurity New Zealand consists of six operational units: Business and 
Planning; Pre-Clearance; Post-Clearance; Policy; Animal Welfare; Compliance and 
Enforcement; and Investigation and Diagnostic Centres.  The Directors of these six 
units report to the Assistant Director-General, who answers to the Director-General. 
 
Business and Planning 
This unit provides Biosecurity New Zealand with cost effective solutions for staff to 
meet their strategic and operational requirements. 
 
Pre-Clearance 
This unit manages all biosecurity risks until the risks actually receive biosecurity i.e. 
New Zealand is free of biosecurity risks.  This is achieved by four functional groups: 
Risk Analysis; Biosecurity Standards; Monitoring and Exports.  The Risk Analysis 
team analyses the risks associated with the importation of goods and develops risk 
assessment processes.  The Biosecurity Standards team is responsible for the 
development of Import Health Standards, operational standards and associated 
mechanisms (border inspections and accreditation/audit of provides and facilities) as 
well as working to provide robust processes in cooperation with ERMA for the 
management of new organism related issues.  The Monitoring team monitors the 
activities at New Zealand’s border (sea and air ports) and analyses the data collected 
in relation to volume moved across borders and related risk exposure.  New Zealand’s 
participation with the SPS agreement and Zoosanitary negotiations as well as the 
development and management of the export certification programmes in association 
with NZFSA is the responsibility of the Exports team. 
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Post-Clearance 
This team manages the of risks once they have reached New Zealand’s border, i.e. 
risks that have not been excluded through pre-clearance procedures or that are already 
present in New Zealand.  This team consist of two groups, Surveillance and Incursion 
Response group and Pest Management group.  The Surveillance and Incursion 
Response group is responsible for the management of the development, prioritisation 
and implementation of surveillance operations in order to determine the presence or 
absence of incursions and for the monitoring of current pest populations as well as for 
developing all aspects of the incursion response activities from development of policy 
to the implementation of the strategies.  The Pest management group is also 
responsible for the coordination of pest management activities conducted by 
Biosecurity New Zealand. 
 
Policy 
This unit provides Biosecurity New Zealand with policies, information, coordination 
and management processes to ensure the most appropriate and successful outcomes 
are achieved for the maintenance of New Zealand’s biosecurity.  The unit consist of 
five functional teams: Biosecurity Strategic Unit, Policy Group; Strategic Science; 
International Coordination Group; Maori Responsiveness; and Business Development 
Group.  The Policy Group’s function is to develop policy and regulation advice for all 
the aspects of the biosecurity system for operational groups.  The Strategic Science 
group provides expert advice and coordinates science activities for Biosecurity New 
Zealand.  The International Coordination Group supports international functions of 
Biosecurity New Zealand including coordinating advice policies and processes.  The 
Maori Responsiveness team provides advice on meeting Maori expectations and 
facilitating relationships with Maori in relation to all biosecurity matters.  Business 
functions such as financial budgeting and reporting, business analysis, information 
management and communication are provided by the Business Development Group. 
 
Animal Welfare 
The Animal Welfare unit works closely with the National Animal Welfare Advisory 
Committee and the National Ethics Advisory Committee to provide policies and 
standards, which promote humane treatment of animals and contribute to market 
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success for New Zealand’s animals and animal products.  This group is responsible 
for the resolution of national animal welfare problems, identifying research needs as 
well as for cooperating with other national and international agencies associated with 
animal welfare to ensure that all complaints against animal cruelty are dealt with in 
accordance with the Animal Welfare Act 1999.  Animal Welfare also has a supportive 
role in domestic policy development and facilitating international trade. 
 
Compliance and Enforcement 
This group consists of experienced auditors and law enforcement officers.  They 
conduct audits and investigate the responses to breaches of the laws and regulations 
administered by MAF.  In cases where criminal liability has been ascertained, the 
group will pursue prosecution. 
 
Investigation and Diagnostic Centres  
This team consists of the three laboratories, which investigate and respond to 
incursions: The National Plant Pest Reference Laboratory; The National Centre for 
Disease Investigation; and The Exotic Disease Response Centre.  The National Plant 
Pest Reference Laboratories (Auckland and Lincoln) are responsible for the 
surveillance of plant pests and manage the investigations into incursions of pests and 
diseases affecting New Zealand’s horticulture and forestry sectors.  The National 
Centre for Disease Investigation (Upper Hutt), which incorporates the New Zealand 
Animal Health Reference Laboratory, is responsible for the diagnoses of animal 
diseases.  The Exotic Disease Response Centre prepares Biosecurity New Zealand for 
the response to an animal disease or vertebrate pest incursion. 
 
MAF Quarantine Service 
The MAF Quarantine Service is the operational branch of MAF Biosecurity New 
Zealand.  This unit operates and contributes to the management of the biosecurity 
risks associated with the importation of goods, crafts and people at every New 
Zealand point of entry i.e. all sea and airports.  This is achieved by providing 
biosecurity import management services, technical inspection and the surveillance of 
goods, crafts and people.  The inspectors of MAF Quarantine Service are responsible 
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for assessing the risks involved with the importation of goods and crafts, inspecting 
the imported goods and craft and for issuing biosecurity clearance certificates.  
 
4.4.2  Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) 
ERMA was created under Section 14 of the HSNO Act in 1997 to administer the Act 
and to fulfil its purpose:  “…to protect the environment and the health and safety of 
people and community by preventing or managing the adverse effects, if hazardous 
substances and new organisms...” 
 
To achieve this a panel of eight experts was assembled, balancing knowledge and 
experience, to assess applications under Part V of the HSNO Act 1996 for the 
importation, development, and field-tests or release a hazardous substances or new 
organisms.  The panel evaluates the risks and costs and benefits associated with each 
application and then either approves the application with possible conditions on any 
of these activities or declines it.  Under Sections 35 and 42 of the HSNO Act 1996 the 
powers to rapidly assess consents for importation of new organisms may be delegated 
to border protections services (either Customs Services or MAF officers). 
 
Under Section 17 the powers, duties and functions of ERMA under Part V of the Act 
(Assessment of Hazardous Substances and New Organisms) cannot be changed or 
influenced by the policy of a Government.  This includes the procedure to assess new 
organisms for import, manufacture, development, field-testing or release.  However, 
ERMA must acknowledge government policy on the control of new organisms as is 
stated in the HSNO Act 1996:  
“…the Authority shall have regard to the policy of the Government in relation to the 
control of hazardous substances and new organisms, and shall comply with any 
general directions relating to that policy determination of a new organism...” 
 
To avoid the ERMA consent process in the importation of an organism, it is necessary 
to show that the organism is already found in New Zealand.  However, this is often 
difficult to prove, as there are many organisms in New Zealand, indigenous and 
exotic, which have yet to be discovered or described. 
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In addition to its decision making role ERMA also fulfils an advisory role, 
counselling the Minister for the Environment on the HSNO Act (1996) and other 
related issues, providing advice to applicants preparing their consent applications and 
promoting public awareness of risks associated with new organisms. 
 
ERMA monitors approved activities, ensuring that imposed conditions and the HSNO 
Act 1996 are complied with.  Powers are also given to ERMA for investigating 
accidents or emergencies involving new organisms. 
 
4.4.3  Biosecurity Council 
Established in 1997, the Biosecurity Council (BC) meets to discuss broad policy 
issues related to biosecurity.  Although not a government agency administering 
legislation, the council provides co-ordinated advice to the Minister for Biosecurity on 
these matters.  The BC comprises of the chief executives of the MAF, Department of 
Conservation, Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Health, ERMA, MAF Biosecurity 
Authority and representatives from regional councils and industry groups. 
 
The Councils main role is to consider the key issues, which impact on all departments 
that manage New Zealand’s biosecurity. This includes the development of several 
policies and the purchase of services and research for the Biosecurity Minister, the 
setting of appropriate levels for New Zealand’s biosecurity protection and appropriate 
responses to biosecurity situations.  The BC is also responsible for the development of 
the Biosecurity Strategy released in 2003 and any future strategy amendments.   
 
It is intended that the BC will enable the co-ordination of biosecurity activities of 
various government departments with biosecurity responsibilities.  To realise this, the 
BC proposes the harmonisation of the decision-making processes used by the different 
departments to achieve a more consistent approach to biosecurity situations. 
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4.4.4  New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS) 
New Zealand’s borders have been managed by a Government Department in some 
form since 1840. The then Customs Department and later the New Zealand Customs 
Department has been independent of the United Kingdom since 1850 and has 
undergone many changes since.  The introduction of the Customs and Excise Act 
1996 saw the current naming of the department to the New Zealand Customs Service 
(NZCS).  The NZCS’ main focus is to protect and enhance the interests of New 
Zealand by: 
• minimising the risks to the country arising from international trade and travel; 
• facilitating legitimate movement of people and goods across borders; and 
• collecting Customs and excise revenue. 
 
The Comptroller or Chief Executive is responsible for the overall management of the 
NZCS and answers only to the Minister of Customs.  The NZCS consists of four 
operational units; Air and Marine, Goods Management, Intelligence and 
Investigations.  Corporate and legal support for all four units is provided by separate 
corporate units, which consist of the Audit and Business Risk Office, Business Policy 
and Planning Office, Chief Executive’s Office, Finance Office, Human Resources 
Office and the Legal Office. 
 
Air and Marine 
This operational unit deals with all people and crafts (aircraft, ships and small vessels) 
that cross New Zealand’s borders.  At New Zealand’s airports Customs officers 
enforce aspects the Customs and Excise Act 1996, which regulate the movement of 
goods and people including passport control, baggage searching for prohibited goods, 
collection of any duty relating to baggage and the searching of the aircrafts 
themselves.  Similarly at New Zealand’s many sea ports, Customs officers enforce the 
relevant parts of the Customs and Excise Act 1996 by ensuring that all vessels (ships, 
yachts and other sea-going craft) fulfil the required arriving and departing reporting, 
search selected vessels for any illegal goods or persons.  The Customs patrol boat 
(Hawk) is used to patrol and monitor New Zealand’s coastline for any sea going craft 
that has not reported its arrival or departure or is suspected of any illegal activity.  In 
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conjunction with Customs officer’s activities, the NZCS welcomes the public to 
report any activity they deem to be suspicious through the Coastwatch program.   
 
Goods Management  
This operation unit is responsible for the monitoring of all cargo movement across 
New Zealand’s borders.  It involves collecting and processing the required 
information from importers and exporters regarding cargo movement, which enable 
Customs to assess appropriate duties and manage the movement of prohibited goods.  
This section of Customs also examines cargo and mail by manual inspection, dogs 
and where possible x-ray machines.  There is a 100% inspection of all mail using dogs 
and x-ray machines; however, it is not feasible to inspect all the cargo, which crosses 
New Zealand’s borders.  The Frontline program is a partnership program between 
NZCS and New Zealand businesses associated with any aspect of goods movement.  
The aim of this program is to facilitate trade while trying to maintain New Zealand’s 
border management priorities.  As with the Coastwatch program, the NZCS welcomes 
the Frontline businesses to report any activity that they deem to be suspicious or 
illegal. 
 
Intelligence  
This operational unit comprises of a team of analysts which assesses information 
collected from a diverse range of sources in order to enable Customs officers to better 
identify and intercept risk persons, goods and craft.  Intelligence and risk management 
strategies derived from the intelligence is made available to every unit of the NZCS.  
 
Investigations 
This operation unit is responsible for the investigation and prosecution (where 
appropriate) of any individual or organisation, which has been or is involved in 
international trade of illicit commodities and in the evasion of duties and tariffs.  
Offences against the Customs and Excise Act 1996, the Misuse of Drugs Act and any 
other legislation covering the movement of goods or persons across New Zealand’s 
borders are investigated by this unit.  The unit consists of four functional investigation 
groups: Drugs, Fraud, Wildlife Enforcement Group and Prohibited Goods.  The Drugs 
group works closely with the Police in its investigations of drug smuggling.  The 
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group is also actively involved in investigating national and international organised 
crime networks with international agencies.  The Fraud group investigates importers 
and exporters, which are suspected of deliberately evading any duties and/or the 
General Services Tax (GST).  The Wildlife Enforcement group is a joint initiative of 
NZCS, the Department of Conservation (DOC) and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAF) to detect and prevent the trade of endangered species.  The group’s 
main priority is to prevent the trade of native fauna and flora including imports, 
exports and any domestic related activities.  The prohibited goods group monitors and 
investigates the import and export of prohibited or controlled goods and also provides 
consumer and environmental protection for New Zealand.  This involves the 
investigation and prevention of trade of illegal intellectual property rights, 
objectionable publications, firearms and other weapons and import and export 
prohibitions. 
 
The Corporate Units 
The Audit and Business Risk team provides the Chief Executive with an independent 
assessment of the accuracy of all Customs operational group’s systems, procedures 
and controls.  In addition the group provides all business units with methods of 
improving their current operations.  The business and planning unit provides the 
Minister of Customs, other government and senior Customs management with policy 
advice and is responsible for planning and performance reporting.  The Chief 
Executive’s office supports the Chief Executive and the National Management Team, 
which involves providing advice on communication, international relations and 
governance, strategic analysis, Ministerial and executive support services.  The 
Finance team is responsible for the collection of the Crown’s and Agency’s revenues 
as well as for Customs financial management, reporting and IT management?.  The 
human resources team is responsible for personal development and the working 
culture within the department.  The Legal team is responsible for all legal support and 
other legal services for the department, with the Customs Department utilising a 
combination of 57 different pieces of legalisation and Acts to adequately manage New 
Zealand’s borders. 
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5.4  Synopsis 
Given that New Zealand is an island nation, biosecurity risks associated with the 
international movement of commodities and people are generally restricted to its 
seaports and airports.  MAF is the government agency that has the overall 
responsibility for managing New Zealand’s biosecurity management system, 
including overseeing the management of New Zealand’s borders.  This is achieved 
through the implementation of the BSA (1993), which is administered by Biosecurity 
New Zealand, MAF’s operational unit responsible for biosecurity and by MAF 
Quarantine Service, a section of the service delivery part of MAF Operations working 
directly at New Zealand’s borders.  Part 3 of the BSA (1993) (importation of risk 
goods) contains the sections that have the most relevance to managing New Zealand’s 
borders in relation to the movement of international commodities and people. 
 
The ERMA is the agency responsible for the administration of the HSNO Act (1996), 
which restricts the importation, manufacture, containment, use and release of 
hazardous substances and new organisms in New Zealand.  The HSNO Act (1996) 
works in conjunction with both the BSA (1996) and the Customs and Excise Act 
(1996) through the assessment of any hazardous substance or new organisms for 
which an application to import, manufacture, use or release has been made.  By either 
approving or denying entry, manufacture, use or release (Part 5) ERMA provides 
Customs and MAF officials the ability to perform their duties at the border by 
preventing entry of any prohibited and restricted hazardous substances or new 
organisms and seize any intercepted risk at the border and detain the persons 
responsible (Part 7). 
 
The NZCS is directly responsible for the protection of New Zealand’s border from 
illegal activities and biosecurity risks and for revenue collection for the Crown.  This 
agency administers the Customs and Excise Act (1996), which is the key piece of 
legislation for managing the biosecurity risks at the border level.  Its objectives are 
achieved through undertaking the provisions outlined in Parts 2 (of the Customs and 
Excise Act 1996) through 14, which provide the NZCS with the ability to restrict the 
arrival of any goods, crafts or people, inspect and detain any goods, crafts or people 
being imported or exported. 
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In order protect its borders, New Zealand has developed domestic legislation, which 
both compliments its commitments to international trade agreements and provides 
New Zealand with the means to develop the most effective biosecurity management 
system.  All domestic legislation associated with the management of New Zealand’s 
biosecurity is developed to achieve the best possible balance between biosecurity 
protection and facilitating international trade. 
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Chapter 6: 
New Zealand’s Borders and Biosecurity 
Management 
 
“Our lines of defence are becoming more sophisticated but are not providing the level 
of protection needed to match the nature and extent of the invasion – in operational 
and policy terms” (Anon. 2000). 
6.1  Introduction 
As humans colonised the world, land masses were divided into several areas of 
different cultural and later political entities; these separated areas are known as 
countries or nations and are bounded by borders.  The oxford dictionary defines a 
border as “a frontier district of a country or territory” and “a frontier line which 
separates one country from another”. 
 
Modern borders, in comparison to historical borders, are clearly defined as 
geographical boundaries between political entities or legal jurisdictions such as 
governments, states or sub-national administrative divisions.  There are three types of 
borders, natural geographical borders, geometric borders and cultural borders.  
Natural geographical borders consist of land areas that are divided by the topography 
of the landscape such as mountain ranges, rivers, estuaries and oceans, for example 
the border between USA and Mexico along the Rio Grande69 and island nations such 
as New Zealand.  Geometric borders are borders that are formed by drawing a line on 
geographical or nautical maps, these lines are either straight lines or they follow the 
curves of latitude, for example the borders of African nations, the Middle East and 
North American.  Cultural borders follow the boundaries between the homelands of 
different ethnicities, language groups or other culturally different communities: the 
border between Hungry and Romania are examples of modern cultural borders70. 
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As borders are a human concept, the natural movement of species does not generally 
adhere to national borders. This natural movement is known as migration.  Natural 
migration occurs as individuals of a species move from one habitat to another and 
back again; this may only occur once or can be done repeatedly throughout their life.  
The time scales of these migrations vary greatly between species. Some do it hourly 
or daily while others do it weekly, monthly or seasonally and others even do it every 
few years.  The reasons for these movements are species dependent with species 
moving in order to maintain a specific habitat type or to maintain limited resources. 
Different activities of species can be conducted in different habitats (Begon et al. 
1996). 
 
The natural distribution of a species that does not migrate is dependent on natural 
factors such as ocean and wind currents, geographical barriers (oceans, mountain 
ranges and rivers), habitat suitability (nutrient availability and climate), the natural 
range of any species that may act as a disperser (such as seed eaters), the species 
natural ability to compete for resources, and the species reproductive requirements 
(such as the need for both a male and female of the species in order to reproduce or 
the presence of pollinators in the case of plant species).  Such natural distributions and 
the natural colonisation of new habitats by individuals of species can occur across 
established human defined borders (Begon et al. 1996). 
 
Despite the natural movement of some species into new habitats, the rate and method 
of movements has been altered by human colonisation (Anon. 2001d).  Even the 
earliest of such human colonisations have largely been dependent on the deliberate 
introduction and spread of plant and animal species as a means to supply basic human 
needs (Mack and Lonsdale 2001).  The introduction of alien species into new 
ecosystems has been instrumental in the very successful expansion of the human race, 
however, these introductions have also had negative impacts on the ecosystems into 
which they have been introduced (Pimentel et al. 2000, Campbell 2001, Pimentel et 
al. 2005).  Although some of the introduced species appear to have had a benign 
impact on the environment (Anon. 2001d), a proportion of introduced species 
(invasive species) have had a very serve negative impact on the environment (Green 
2000, Pimentel et al.  2000, Anon. 2001d, Pimentel et al. 2005).   
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Levine and D’Antontio (2003) highlighted that the relationship between international 
trade and the introduction of new species can not be linear as each imported container 
does not bring with it a new species, instead it brings samples of species from a region 
that have already been sampled by other ships.  Despite Levine and D’Antontio’s 
findings, with the rapid advancement in global trade, transport and travel, the rate at 
which invasive species are spreading (through intentional and un-intentional means) is 
also increasing at an alarming rate (Anon. 2001d, Campbell 2001, Lodge et al. 2006, 
Meyerson and Mooney 2007).  The biosecurity risk posed by the shipment of any 
commodity as a result of international trade can be seen as threefold.  There is the 
possible contamination of the vessel itself (ballast water and haul) (Lockett and 
Gomon 2001, Hewitt et al. 2004), the packaging in which the commodity is 
transported (the sea container and the packaging material used within the container) 
(Bulman 1992, Gadgil et al. 2000, Stanaway et al. 2001), or the commodity itself 
(Anon. 2002b, c, d, e, f, Stephenson 2003, Watson 2004).    
 
Given that the majority of invasive species are spread through international trade, 
there is a trade off between free trade and nations need to tighten quarantine and 
border procedures in order to protect against invasive species.  This trade off has been 
the centre of many international agreements and organisations (Chapter 4) leading to 
the development of international trade procedures which are aimed at facilitating trade 
whilst reducing the spreading of invasive species.  New Zealand, being a member of 
the WTO and other international organisations, has developed both legislation 
(Chapter 5) and importation restrictions aimed at protecting its environmental and 
economic health, whilst having a limited impact on international trade.  New 
Zealand’s borders or points of entry and how they are protected are the main focus of 
this chapter.  By outlining what a border is and how species cross these borders, this 
chapter aims to highlight the biosecurity risks involved in managing all of New 
Zealand’s points of entry associated with the sea container pathway.  With the specific 
aim of: 
1. Defining a point of entry;  
2. Mapping the distribution of New Zealand’s sea and air ports; 
3. Mapping the distribution of Transitional Facilities; and 
4. Outlining how New Zealand manages the biosecurity risks associated with the 
sea importation pathway. 
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PART 1: New Zealand’s Points of Entry 
6.2  Airports and Seaports 
Traditionally, points of entry have been the areas where incoming vessels, 
commodities and people enter a nation, which have generally been seaports and 
airports.  New Zealand has approximately 39 airports or aerodromes (Figure 6.1 and 
Table 6.1), of which three major airports are international (Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch) and a further two airports have flights between New Zealand and 
Australia (Dunedin and Queenstown).  In addition, New Zealand has approximately 
19 seaports (Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1), with the majority of international trade 
arriving and departing from six major ports (Auckland, Tauranga, Wellington, 
Lyttelton, Timaru and Dunedin). New Zealand Customs Service has offices at 16 
ports around New Zealand.71 
 
Table 6.1  The number or airports and sea ports per region. (* represents international airports and sea 
ports where customs allows international vessels to dock) 
Region Airports Sea ports Total 
Auckland 4* 1* 5 
Bay of Plenty 4 1* 5 
Canterbury 6* 2* 8 
East Cape 2 1* 3 
Hawkes Bay 2 1* 3 
Kapiti Coast - 1 1 
Manawatu 3 - 3 
Marlborough 1 1* 2 
Nelson 1 1* 2 
Northland 2 2* 4 
Otago 5* 2* 7 
Southland 2* 1* 3 
Taranaki 1 1* 2 
Thames - - 0 
Waikato 1 - 1 
Wairarapa 1 - 1 
Wanganui 1 1* 2 
Wellington 1* 1* 2 
West Coast 2 2 4 
Total 39 19 58 
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Figure 6.1  The distribution of New Zealand’s airports and seaports 
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Demands on New Zealand’s seaports and airports from increasing international trade 
have exceeded the infrastructures at traditional points of entry (both seaports and 
airports), therefore creating the demand for alterative unloading areas know as 
transitional facilities (Budd 2000). 
 
6.3  Transitional Facilities 
Section 39 of the Biosecurity Act 1993 (BSA 1993) allows for the development of an 
area for the purpose of inspection, storage, treatment, quarantine, holding and 
destruction of uncleared goods; known as transitional facilities.  Any person can apply 
for any place to become a transitional facility, as long as the person(s) and area meet 
the requirements of Section 39 of the BSA (1993) and relevant standards.  Approved 
transitional facilities are only suitable for the inspection, storing or treating the goods 
that the facility is approved for.  The owner of the facility is responsible for all aspects 
of the facility, including all costs incurred for the approval process and monitoring the 
compliance of the facility.  Also, the transport to the facility from either an airport or 
seaport must be along the most direct practical route within an approved sealed, leak-
proof container or vehicle (Anon. 1998).  Each facility must have appropriate systems 
in place, such as security of the site, hygiene requirements and up to date records.  If 
any of the requirements are not met, MAF can remove the transitional facility’s 
approval (Anon. 1998).  Approval for each facility is also based on a specific 
timeframe, after which each facility must reapply for approval.  Given this, the 
number and distribution of transitional facilities varies from year to year. 
 
Since the development of transitional facilities, the number of points of entry in New 
Zealand has drastically increased and alters annually; in April 2003 the number of 
points of entry exceeded 7000 (Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2  The distributions of Transitional facilities through New Zealand (As on April 2003) 
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Table 6.2  The number of Transitional facilities (TF) per region. (As on April 2003) 
Region Number of TF % of total TF 
Auckland 3974 55.11 
Bay of Plenty 260 3.61 
Canterbury 1100 15.25 
East Cape 19 0.26 
Hawkes Bay 191 2.65 
Kapiti Coast 42 0.58 
Manawatu 138 1.91 
Marlborough 46 0.64 
Nelson 92 1.28 
Northland 75 1.04 
Otago 187 2.59 
Southland 81 1.12 
Taranaki 99 1.37 
Thames 16 0.22 
Waikato 324 4.49 
Wairarapa 32 0.44 
Wanganui 39 0.54 
Wellington 489 6.78 
West Coast 5 0.07 
   
Unknown- Classified 2 0.03 
   
Total 7211  
 
 
As each facility is approved to inspect, hold and treat a specific uncleared risk good, 
standards have been developed for specific goods, such as sea containers, mail, 
vehicles, seeds and animal products.  The standard for the transitional facility for sea 
containers was implemented in September 2003 (Anon. 2003h).  Under this standard, 
facilities must have a sealed (concrete, asphalt or similar) area on which all containers 
must be placed prior to external inspection and to be thereafter unloaded and stored to 
prevent recontamination.  This sealed area must be kept clean and free of vegetation at 
all times.  The sealed area must extend three meters around the container; this area too 
must be kept free of vegetation, rubbish and debris.  Any equipment used to inspect 
and clean containers must be clearly labelled as belonging to the facility and not to be 
used for any other purpose.  The facility must be manned by either the facility’s 
registered owner or accredited persons; inspections are to be conducted by a MAF 
accredited person only. 
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PART TWO: New Zealand’s Management of the Sea Importation 
Pathway 
Part 3 of the Biosecurity Act (1993) (BSA 1993) provides MAF with the means to 
regulate the importation of goods into New Zealand (see Chapter 5).  This includes 
pre-border, border and post border procedures.  The main procedure in regulating the 
importation of sea containers into New Zealand is compliance with Import Health 
Standards (IHS) (under Section 22 of the BSA 1993).  IHS are documents that 
prescribe the requirements that must be met before a commodity can be imported into 
New Zealand Currently there are approximately over 400 operational IHS72.   
 
In order to import a sea container and its contents into New Zealand, the importer 
must comply with import regulations and IHS for both the container and what (if 
anything) is in the container. These processes are set in place to prevent the smuggling 
of contraband and the introduction of unwanted species and organisms.  The processes 
for importing a container (Figure 6.3) from any country are described in detail below. 
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Exporter 
Arrival at a NZ port of entry
MAF documentation 
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Re-inspection
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Clearance
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Released to importer
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External inspection
Internal inspection
No Clearance
Clearance
Clearance
Clearance
Clearance
Clearance
 
Figure 6.3  The importation process for the importation of sea containers 
 
 
6.4  Requirements for the Importation of Sea Containers 
In accordance with Part 3 Section 22 of the BSA 1993, MAF has developed IHS for 
all forms of commodities and transport, which specifies the required conditions and 
treatment prior and upon arrival of sea containers in New Zealand.  The IHS for Sea 
Containers from all Countries was implemented 27 August 2003 and outlines the 
management of biosecurity risks associated with Sea Containers and associated 
packaging of containerised cargo into New Zealand.  This IHS is summarised below: 
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Import Health Standard for Sea Containers from All Countries 
(BMG-STD-SEACO) 
Sections 1 through 3 outline the implementation dates, future review processes, and 
define terminology used through the document.  
 
Information Required Prior to Arrival. 
Section 4 provides for the documentation required for each container and any loaded 
cargo; documents include quarantine declarations, cargo manifest, cleaning certificate 
and details on the containers chain of custody.  This section also states that no 
container is to be removed from the port of entry until MAF has received all the 
required documents and the containers have been given clearance.  All non-complying 
containers will be considered high risk and will be dealt with accordingly. 
 
Requirements for Discharge and Holding of Containers 
Under section 5 any container not for immediate delivery from the port is to be held 
on a hard sealed surface free of soil, weeds and vegetation. 
 
Requirements for Inspection 
In terms of biosecurity risk, the inspections covered by this standard are based on four 
major components: the exterior surfaces, interior surfaces, packing and packaging 
within the container, and the cargo within the container.  However, packaging 
material and the cargo may be subject to specific IHS in conjunction with this 
standard. 
 
Exterior Surfaces of Containers 
Section 6.1.1 outlines the treatments required for external contamination of all 
containers arriving that have been identified as high risk by MAF.  The requirements 
for all other containers are outlined in section 6.2.  This includes the inspection 
process and the decontamination procedure should a contaminant be present plus the 
MAF notification process.  Again no container is to be removed from the port of entry 
unless authorised by MAF. 
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Internal Surfaces of Containers 
Section 6.2 specifies that all containers with manifest containing risk goods or those 
with incomplete documentation will be unpacked in a transitional facility (approved 
for both the unpacking and any risk goods specified) by a MAF accredited person.  
All risk goods (except wood packaging) will be inspected by a MAF inspector.  
Containers containing non risk manifested cargo are to be unpacked at a transitional 
facility under the supervision of an accredited person.  The process for inspecting and 
unpacking a container loaded with personal effects is outlined in section 6.2.3, while 
section 6.2.4 outlines the inspection of empty containers.  The procedures for the 
notification and management of contaminated cargo, packaging, or the presence of 
unmanifested cargo, non-compliant wood or prohibited packaging material are 
outlined in Sections 6.2.5 through 6.2.8. 
 
Container and Cargo Packaging 
Any untreated wood packaging must be inspected and if the wood is not new and 
clean, or not free of bark, live organisms, insect damage and decay, the inspector must 
be notified under section 6.3. 
 
Containerised Cargo 
All containers containing uncleared biosecurity risk cargo are to be unpacked at 
specifically approved transitional facilities.  All other containers can be unpacked at 
transitional facilities under the supervision of an accredited person. 
 
Requirements for Transitional Facilities and Operations 
Section 7 outlines the minimum requirements for transitional facilities, its operations 
and accredited persons.  Although for specific technical detail for operations it refers 
the Requirements for Transitional Facilities for Sea Containers standard. 
 
Use of Approved Equivalent Systems 
This section allows for the development and implementation of individual systems 
provided that they can be proven to provide an equivalent standard of biosecurity as 
efficient as the existing system.  This includes systems set in place internationally for 
the inspection of containers prior to shipping. 
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Audit of Container Clearance Procedures 
Section 9 provides the provisions for the auditing of all clearance systems and 
facilities as well as providing MAF with the ability to suspend or revoke approval of 
non complying systems and facilities, and where necessary investigate and prosecute 
any false declaration or intent to conceal a quarantine breach under the BSA 1993. 
 
Costs 
Under section 10 there will be no specific charge by MAF for containers checked by a 
accredited person, however, any inspection, approvals and other functions undertaken 
by MAF will accrue a charge as set out in the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2005. 
 
Biosecurity Clearance 
This section allows for the unpacking of containers that have been found to be free of 
contaminants. 
 
6.5 Procedures for Cleaning Containers at a Container Depot 
(Anonymous New Zealand Container Depot) 
This section aims to show how the procedures of the above mentioned IHS are 
implemented at container depots.  
 
In 2005 three container depots within New Zealand were visited and procedures 
recorded.  The visit included inspecting the facilities (inspection pad, washing pad and 
storage area) and where possible observing the processing of a container (the arrival 
of the container on site, the inspection and logging of the inspection into the 
database). The survey consisted of the depot manager or operations manager 
explaining the procedures of their particular depot from the moment the container 
arrived at the port to the time it was released to a client.  These surveys of the depots 
were specifically unstructured to enable the depot manager or operations manager to 
explain the procedures at their depots in an unbiased manner. 
 
Upon consulting with staff at the undisclosed depots, it became apparent that IHS 
procedures are implemented differently between different depots and that MAF’s 
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enforcement of the regulations is inconsistent throughout New Zealand. This has also 
been highlighted in a 2006 report by the Auditor General (see Chapter 2).  The 
procedures at an undisclosed depot are summarised below.  
 
On receiving advice from the shipping company that empty containers are arriving at 
the port for delivery to a depot, acceptance is to be logged into the depot system 
specifying a MAF survey in the comments field.  This will draw to the attention of all 
staff that the container must be inspected by a MAF accredited person on arrival to the 
depot, in accordance with the BSA 1993. 
 
Upon arriving at the depot with the containers, the delivery driver reports to the 
container control station with the container’s details.  The container controller will 
then turn the container over to the depot and it is entered into the depot’s system.  If a 
MAF inspection is required, they will immediately see ‘MAF’ appear in the 
comments field. 
 
The container controller will advise the unloading fort-hoist by R/T that the container 
on the specific truck requires a MAF check.  On receipt of this information the fort-
hoist driver will up lift the container from the truck and place it on the designated 
inspection area which comprises of asphalt or concrete construction.  The fork-hoist 
driver must ensure the container is MAF-inspected prior to block stacking.  At no time 
must these containers be placed in unsealed areas prior to MAF inspection. 
 
The MAF accredited surveyor is to inspect the containers in accordance with the BS 
standard BMG-STD-SEACO paragraph 6 and to record the inspection in his handheld 
software system.  Once cleared, the surveyor will complete his survey as required. 
 
Should a contaminated container be found then: 
• Surveyor is to immediately shut the doors and secure with temporary seal. 
• The container is to remain on the sealed surface; 
• Surveyor to notify the container controller that the given container has 
possible contamination.  If significant, controller will notify the MAF hot line 
of the contamination, and obtain instructions on what MAF wishes to do; 
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• If instructed to await MAF officer’s inspection, the container is to remain 
sealed and kept aside; 
• If instructed to carry out a decontamination wash, the wash is to be carried out 
in accordance with the MAF procedure already in place; and 
• After compliance by MAF officer or MAF accredited surveyor the ICL 
acceptance survey can be completed. 
 
Survey sheets containing inspection details are to be filed in the main office after 
completion for data entry into the system.  The MAF accredited surveyor is 
responsible for ensuring that correct procedures are adhered to.  If the MAF 
accredited person finds any contamination, the controller will ensure appropriate 
documentation required to complete a MAF wash is adhered to.  The container 
controller is to inform the shipping company responsible for the container of the 
contamination and corrective measures used.  It is the responsibility of the surveyor to 
ensure that this contamination is recorded in the ‘Incident Diary’. 
 
MAF Decontamination Procedure: 
Upon recognition of a unit requiring MAF decontamination, the unit remains closed 
until placed in the appropriate area for cleaning to commence. 
 
The procedure for decontamination is as listed below: 
1. Ensure the designated cleaning area (including drains) is clean. 
2. Place MAF signage around the cleaning area. 
3. Place a sieve in the drain. 
4. Wear appropriate clothing (i.e. jacket, pants, gloves, gumboots) as required. 
5. Apply appropriate chemical to contaminated area(s). 
6. Clean appropriate area until decontaminated. 
7. Remove/place unit for re-inspection by qualified personnel. 
8. Wash and disinfect designated area ensuring residue sluiced into drain with the 
MAF sieve. 
9. Collect residue from sieve and place in MAF bin. 
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10. Ensure all equipment (clothes, sieve, etc) are cleaned prior to replacing them 
in the MAF shed. 
11. Remove all MAF signage and place into MAF shed. 
12. Advise office upon completion with appropriate paperwork. 
 
Time Taken: 
The total time taken to comply with the IHS requirements is on average 15-20 
minutes for a clean empty container and 40-45 minutes for a contaminated empty 
container.  These times can be broken down as follows: 
• 15 minutes of paper work to get the container into NZ with Biosecurity 
clearance – done by both the exporter and the importer. 
• Drivers/transporters are expected to conduct external inspection as they load 
the containers onto the trucks at the port. 
• 2-3 minutes of inspection once the container reaches the depot. (internal 
inspection… as the external surfaces have been inspected by transporters) 
• If the container is contaminated, another 30 minutes for the decontamination 
(including equipment preparation, washing, site cleaning after wash, and 
cleaning and replacement of all equipment). 
 
In addition to the costs of implementing the above procedures, the depot spends $200 
a month on fortnightly audits of their systems by a MAF inspector.  The enforcing of 
this auditing system too, varies between depots and cities (pers com. MAF public 
consultation meeting 2005). 
 
6.5  Biosecurity Costs 
The Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006 were developed for the purpose of 
formalising the costs associated with the biosecurity clearance of goods and crafts 
which MAF accrues in its fulfilment of the BSA 1993.  Some of those costs MAF 
passes on to the importer in order to meet its responsibly within the departments 
budget. 
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Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006 
Sections 1 through 3 give the Regulation its title and commencement date and define 
the terms used throughout the Regulation. 
 
General provisions 
All cost required to be paid to MAF are to be paid to the Director General under 
section 4.  All costs to be paid include GST.  The hour cost rates are calculated in 
section 6. 
 
Calculations of Costs 
The provisions for the costs relating to the inspection of hourly rates, travel time, 
waiting time and call-out costs are provided for under sections 7 through 9. 
 
Other Provisions 
Section 11 provides for the discretion of the general inspector to decide whether 
goods imported are for the personal use of the importer or for commercial purposes.  
The Waiver of the costs at the discretion of the Director-General is provided for under 
Section 12 
 
Section 13 Revokes the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2003. 
 
Schedule: Costs payable for activities 
This schedule lists the costs payable as specific amounts (for details see Appendix V). 
 
 
6.6  Synopsis 
In order to cope with the ever increasing volume of international trade, MAF has 
developed transitional facilities to provide over 7000 (as of April 2003) areas where 
sea containers can be unloaded whilst managing the associated biosecurity risks.  
Given the development of these transitional facilities, the definition of point of entry 
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has changed from the traditional sea and air ports to include transitional facilities.  
This inclusion of transitional facilities alters the distribution of New Zealand’s points 
of entry to areas within New Zealand that are not in the close vicinity of any seaport 
or airport.  The costs associated with approval and maintenance of transitional 
facilities and MAF activities relating to the inspection of sea containers and their 
contents are payable by the importer under the Biosecurity (Costs) regulations 2006.   
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Chapter 7  
Slippage along Three Importation Pathways 
“From an economic perspective the optimal level of biosecurity may not be that 
which seeks to exclude all incursions or preserve indigenous biodiversity at all costs” 
(Smith and Clough 2000). 
7.1  Introduction 
Given the scale of risks associated with the importation of goods into New Zealand 
via sea containers, intentional or unintentional, it is inevitable that unwanted pests and 
organisms are introduced into New Zealand (Anon. 2006d).  In accordance with New 
Zealand’s international obligations (see Chapters 4 and 5), regulations and standards 
are based on scientific evidence and are aimed at reducing all the risks associated with 
the goods imported (commodities) and the means by which the commodities are 
transported (craft and containers).  The biosecurity clearance procedures for used 
vehicles, sea containers, woodpackaging (WP) and bark being imported into New 
Zealand are outlined in the Import Health Standard (IHS) for Sea Containers from All 
Countries (September 2003), IHS for Used Buses, Cars, Motor Cycles, Trucks, Utility 
Vehicles and Vans from Any Country (2001), IHS for Treated Used Vehicles 
Imported into New Zealand (2003), IHS for Woodpackaging Material from All 
Countries (2003) and IHS Bark from All Countries (2003). 
 
7.1.1  Slippage - Actual contamination 
Despite the relevant IHS and current border management procedures, some used 
vehicles, sea containers and their contents still enter New Zealand and other importing 
nations with some form of contamination (Bulman 1992, Bulman 1998, Stanaway et 
al. 2001, Anon. 2003i, Maynard 2004, Brockerhoff et al. 2006, Haack 2006).  It is the 
contamination that manages to ‘slip’ through pre-border and border management 
procedures undetected that has the most potential to allow invasive species to enter 
and establish within new regions.  For the purposes of this study, slippage is the 
contamination that is not detected or treated at the pre-border and border inspections 
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and treatments required by importation procedures.  As such, slippage represents the 
actual contamination of used vehicles, sea containers and their contents and packaging 
that enters New Zealand.  Slippage is the means by which potentially invasive species 
enter a new region unintentionally and potentially establish unmonitored.  In a recent 
audit of the 12,000 containers entering New Zealand, approximately only 80% of 
contamination was identified at initial border inspections (Anon. 2003i), highlighting 
the potential slippage rate entering New Zealand and the potential rate of invasive 
species entering New Zealand.   
 
Previous studies have shown that the proportion of sea containers that are actually 
contaminated varied, with 9.2% of Less than a Container Load (LCL) containers 
packed with contaminated WP (Bulman 1992), while only 1.6% of  Full Container 
Load (FCL) containers packed with contaminated WP (Bulman 1998).  Between 45% 
and 50% of containers contain some form of WP (Bulman 1998, Anon. 2003i), with 
approximately 11.6% of the containers packed with WP contaminated with bark 
(Anon. 2003i). 
7.1.2  Objectives 
As the majority (circa 90%) of all commodities are transported via the sea, the 
associated importation pathways, more specifically, used vehicles, the sea containers 
themselves and woodpackaging used within containers have been strongly linked with 
the spread of unwanted organisms throughout the world.  Therefore, mathematical 
models were developed for the three pathways (sea containers, used vehicles, 
woodpackaging) in order to gain a better understanding of the actual biosecurity risks 
(slippage).  Although woodpackaging is a subset of the sea container pathway, MAF 
has issued a separate IHS for woodpackaging.  Therefore for the purposes of this 
study woodpackaging was treated as an individual pathway.  Despite bark being a 
subset of the woodpackaging model, bark was also modelled to highlight the risk that 
it poses as a contaminant.  The pertinent importation procedures, regulations, and 
risks for the four models developed are given in detail with the specific objective of 
each model. 
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7.1.2.1  Used Vehicles 
New Zealand imports approximately 200,000 used vehicles every year (Figure 7.1), 
with the majority coming from Japan (Anon. 2006a).  Because of the large volume of 
imports and the high risk associated with this commodity (i.e. the Gypsy Moth 
(Lymantria dispar) incursion in 2002 that was directly linked to imported used 
vehicles (Ross 2004)), importers of used vehicles are considered risk exacerbators 
(see Chapter 8) and are therefore expected to pay for the cost of complying with 
biosecurity requirements for the importation of this commodity (Anon. 2001b, 2005). 
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Figure 7.1  The number of used cars registered every year from 1936 – 2005.  (A) is the total number 
of used cars registered 1936-2005 and (B) is the percentage of all cars registered that are used cars for 
1936-200573.   
 
The main objective of the used vehicle importation pathway model was to model the 
procedures involved in the importation of used vehicle into New Zealand.  This model 
encapsulates all used vehicles entering into New Zealand, including cars, trucks, 
buses, and vans, and excludes new cars as they are not considered to pose a 
biosecurity risk.  The specific aim of this model was to: 
 
• Determine the true number/proportion of contaminated used vehicles entering 
New Zealand per year (slippage); and 
• Assess through a sensitivity analysis which aspect of this pathway has the 
most influence on the slippage rate. 
                                                 
73
 http://www.landtransport.govt.nz/statistics/motor-vehicle-registration/2005/ 07 July 2006 
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7.1.2.2  Sea Containers 
Given the increasing number of sea containers entering New Zealand (c. 500,000 per 
year) and the increasing number of ports of origin (see Chapter 3), it is crucial that 
New Zealand is protected from contaminated containers in the most efficient manner 
(Anon. 2006d). To reduce the risks associated with the international movement of 
containers, MAF has developed an IHS for sea container from any country (Anon. 
2003b), in which the procedures required for containers to gain biosecurity clearance 
and entry into New Zealand are outlined (see Chapters 1 and 5). 
 
The main objective of the sea container model was to model the procedures involved 
in importation of sea containers into New Zealand.  This model encapsulates all 
containers entering New Zealand, including FCL, LCL and empty containers.  The 
specific aims were to: 
 
• Determine the true number/proportion of contaminated Sea Containers 
entering New Zealand per year; and  
• Conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess which aspect of this pathway has the 
most influence on the true contamination rate. 
 
 
7.1.2.3  Woodpackaging (WP) and Bark 
New Zealand imports c.260,000 (Anon. 2003i) loaded containers per year, 50% of 
which contains some form of woodpackaging material (Bulman 1998, Anon. 2003i).  
Woodpackaging material includes all wood used in the packing of container 
excluding highly processed wood such as plywood and particleboard (Anon. 2003i, 
e).  With the increase in international trade there has been an increase in the volume 
of woodpackaging used and thus the associated pest potential.  Approximately 15% of 
all containers entering New Zealand containing woodpackaging material need 
biosecurity action, namely fumigation or incineration (Anon. 2003i), with 
contaminates consisting of bark- and wood-boring insects and fungi.  In the United 
States (U.S.) 25 new species of exotic bark- and wood-boring insects (genera: 
Coleoptera) were found between 1958 and 2005 (Haack 2006).  Although not all of 
these insects were directly linked to woodpackaging, the study highlights that 
Chapter 7: Slippage along Three Importation Pathways 147 
woodpackaging is a major contributor to the introduction of unwanted insects into the 
U.S., with beetles from the Coleoptera genus commonly associated with 
woodpackaging (c.85%). 
 
In order to reduce the biosecurity risks associated with woodpackaging, the FAO as 
well as individual nations have developed or are developing standards under which 
woodpackaging can be imported or exported to minimise the spread of these 
unwanted pests.  The FAO International Standard 15 for Phytosanitary Measures: The 
Guidelines for Regulating Woodpackaging Material in International Trade (2002) 
(ISPM 15) has been adopted by New Zealand and several of its major trading nations 
including the U.S. and Australia.  In addition to adapting the FAO standard, New 
Zealand has also developed an IHS specifically for woodpackaging from all countries. 
 
The objective in modelling the woodpackaging pathway was to develop a model that 
encapsulates all woodpackaging which enters New Zealand including highly 
processed wood, with the specific aim to: 
 
• Determine the true number/proportion of contaminated woodpackaging 
entering New Zealand per year (slippage); and 
• Conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess which aspect of this pathway has the 
most influence on the true contamination rate. 
 
Bark (the outer layers of cork cambium and phloem tissues of woody plant species) is 
imported either as a commodity or as a contaminant of imported wood products and 
woodpackaging material.  The bark that is imported as a commodity is subject to 
regulations under the IHS Bark from All Countries (2003).  Although the importation 
of bark as a commodity has risks associated with it (Work et al. 2005), this section is 
only concerned with the importation of bark as a contaminant of woodpackaging.  
Bark has been identified as a major risk associated with woodpackaging (Bulman 
1992, Bulman 1998, Anon. 2003i, Haack 2006, Zahid 2008, Haack and Petrice 2009, 
Vinzzini 2009).  A large survey of over 10,000 randomly selected containers entering 
New Zealand (Anon. 2003i) showed that 11.6% of all woodpackaging material is 
contaminated with bark. 
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As bark in this section is the bark associated with importation of woodpackaging 
material, all the international standards and national import health standards that are 
for woodpackaging apply to bark.  The objective was to model the importation 
pathway of bark as a contaminant of woodpackaging.  This model is an extension of 
the woodpackaging model, with the specific aim of: 
 
• Determining the true number/proportion of containers entering New Zealand 
with WP contaminated with bark; and 
• Conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess which aspect of the pathway has the 
most influence on the true contamination rate 
 
7.2  Methodology 
All commodities that enter New Zealand follow a similar general pathway (Figure 
7.2).  The approach used to estimate slippage along three major importation pathways 
(sea containers, used vehicles, woodpackaging, as well as bark as a subset of 
woodpackaging) into New Zealand is described in this section.  A range of variables 
were simulated for each of the three pathways to assess their effect on total slippage. 
 
Imports
Passed: Uncontaminated
Failed: contaminated Treatment
Actually Clean
Actually contaminated
Actually Clean
Actually contaminated
Policy
Policy
 
Figure 7.2  Diagrammatic representation of a general pathway model.  Policy refers to the sections in 
the pathway where policy and management decisions are made. 
 
In order to estimate total slippage along each of the three pathways, models for each 
pathway were developed based on data collected from several sources.   
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7.2.1  Decision Tree Models. 
A decision tree model is a model where each decision has a given number of 
outcomes which in turn can trigger more decisions or is the final outcome, creating a 
branching effect.  The resulting model yields a likelihood measure or outcome as a 
direct result of a series of decisions.  Decision tree models have been used to assess 
the outcomes of decisions in many sectors, including financial decisions and cost 
effectiveness of medical treatments (Gambhir et al. 1996).  
 
Decision tree models were construction for each of the three pathways, used vehicles, 
sea containers, woodpackaging and a model was also constructed for Bark as a subset 
of the woodpackaging model.  The models were constructed to assess the likelihood 
of slippage along each importation pathway resulting from a series of policy 
decisions.  The explicit probably of each outcome (slippage) within the model was 
obtained from a series of various sources, each of which differ for each pathway: 
these sources are listed in the subsequent detailed description of each model. 
 
7.2.2  The sensitivity analysis: 
Since the impact of each policy decision on slippage is not know, a sensitivity 
analysis was performed on each decision tree.  This involved varying each of the 
policy decisions for each of the models and assessing the impact of each variation on 
overall slippage along each pathway. 
 
The sensitivity analyses were carried out by modifying the main policy decisions 
associated with each of the three models:  
• Used Vehicles: 
o The proportion of used vehicles inspected and treated pre-shipment 
o The proportion of used vehicles inspected upon arriving in New 
Zealand 
o The accuracy of inspections 
o The success rate of treatments 
 
• Sea Containers 
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o The proportion of containers entering New Zealand given an external 
inspection 
o The proportion of containers entering New Zealand treated for external 
contamination 
o The proportion of containers entering New Zealand given a full 
internal inspection 
o The proportion of containers entering New Zealand treated for internal 
contamination 
o The accuracy of inspections 
o The success rate of treatments 
 
• Woodpackaging (WP) and Bark: 
o The proportion of containers with WP identified at first inspection 
o The proportion of containers with WP that have been marked with the 
ISPM 15 stamp 
o The proportion of containers with known WP inspected 
o The proportion of containers with known WP treated 
o The accuracy of inspections 
o The success rate of treatment 
 
7.2.3  Weaknesses of the models 
The main purpose of these models was to establish a framework to analyse the impact 
of different aspects of the importation pathway on the total slippage that enters New 
Zealand.  Several assumptions had to be made in order to construct the models, 
mainly due to a lack or the unavailability of concise information, constituting 
weaknesses of the models developed: 
 
• Inspection efficiency:  The accuracy of the inspection of sea containers and 
their contents or vehicles is very difficult to measure. Data from several 
sources indicate that currently MAF tolerate a minimum of 97% accuracy 
from MAF inspectors, therefore current inspection efficiency is assumed to be 
97%. 
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• Treatment efficiency:  The effectiveness of the treatment of vehicles, sea 
containers and their contents is also difficult to measure.  Treatments are based 
on the life biology of known contaminants.  Data from several sources gave 
ambiguous estimates of actual treatment efficiencies, often referred to as in the 
‘high 90% range’.  Given this information, treatment efficiency was assumed 
to be 98% for the models developed. 
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7.3   Results 
Total slippage along the three pathways measured (sea container, vehicles, WP and 
bark) was simulated with the three models developed as described in sections 7.3.1 
through 7.3.3 respectively. 
 
7.3.1   Used Vehicles  
7.3.1.1  The model 
This model was developed in order to estimate the number of used vehicles that had 
entered New Zealand which were actually contaminated (slippage) although they 
were given biosecurity clearance (Figure 7.3).  The model in its simple form 
incorporated all the aspects of the importation pathway which had a direct impact on 
the used vehicles, including the possibility of consignments entering New Zealand 
without undergoing any biosecurity management procedures.  The model estimated 
the total number of used vehicles that were actually contaminated but entered New 
Zealand undetected (total slippage) (see Appendix IV for the equations used). 
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Table 7.1  The legend for Figure 7.3. The decisions for the vehicle importation pathway model 
Symbol Decision Current Values (%) Data source 
A1 The rate of pre-shipment inspection 51 {Anon., 2005 #71} 
a1 The rate of border inspection for vehicles that had no pre-shipment inspection 100 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
a2 The rate of border inspection for vehicles that had  pre-shipment inspection but had no treatment 10 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
a3 The rate of border inspection for vehicles that had pre-
shipment inspection and treatment 10 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
B1 The rate of pre-shipment treatment 53 {Anon., 2005 #71} 
b1 The rate of border treatment for vehicles that had no pre-shipment inspection 99 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
b2 The rate of border treatment for vehicles that had  pre-
shipment inspection but had no treatment 1 {Anon., 2005 #71} 
b3 The rate of border treatment for vehicles that had pre-
shipment inspection and treatment 1 {Anon., 2005 #71} 
d The level of inspection efficiency 97 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
e The level of treatment efficiency 98 Anon. Source 3, 2006 
T Total number of imported used vehicles  {Anon., 2005 #71} 
 
 
Decision: Status quo  
Based on regulations in place on 01 January 2006 and data from (Anon. 2005), 
approximately 51% of all used vehicles that are imported into New Zealand from 
Japan were inspected prior to packing for shipment.  Of those that were inspected, 
51% were found to be contaminated in some form.  Under current regulations, 100% 
of used vehicles imported into New Zealand without pre-shipment inspections are to 
be inspected upon arrival, while only 10% of those that have had pre-shipment 
inspection are to be inspected upon arrival (Anon. 2005).  In a recent study, close to 
100% of the used vehicles imported without prior inspection and treatment were 
found to be contaminated upon arrival and are treated as required.  In contrast, only 
approximately 1% of used vehicles that had been inspected prior to shipment were 
found to be contaminated in some form (Anon. 2005). 
 
However, according to the model developed in this research used vehicles imported 
that had no inspection or treatment prior to shipping had the lowest rate of actual 
contamination (slippage) (0.04% or 79 vehicles) (Table 7.2), while vehicles which 
were inspected and treated when required had a slippage rate of 1.59% (2890 
vehicles).  The overall slippage rate was 1.63% (2969 vehicles). 
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Table 7.2 The slippage rates of used vehicles imported into New Zealand under current regulations. 
Pre-shipment inspection decision Number of used 
vehicles Total Clean % Clean Total Slippage % Slippage 
None 85453 85374 46.957 79 0.0434 
Inspection: 96362 93472 51.411 2890 1.5895 
                  - deemed clean 47217 45801 25.191 1416 0.7788 
                  - deemed contaminated 49145 47671 26.219 1474 0.8106 
Total 181815 178846 98.367 2969 1.63 
 
 
The model further predicted that total slippage of vehicles per year under current 
regulations altered with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  There was a 
5.44% (9891 vehicles) decrease in slippage, if inspection efficiency alone was 
increased from 90% to 100%, while increasing treatment efficiency decreased total 
slippage by 0.15% (272 vehicles) per year (Figure 7.4).  This indicates that inspection 
efficiency has a stronger influence on total slippage (decreasing slippage by 0.5% or 
circa 900 vehicles per percent of efficiency increased) than treatment efficiency, 
which decreased slippage by no more than 0.024% or 44 vehicles per year per percent 
increased (Table 7.3). 
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Figure 7.4  The change in total slippage with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies per annum.  
The current efficiency rates are represented by empty squares. 
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Table 7.3 Decision Status quo with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  Displayed are the 
highest, middle and lowest treatment efficiencies per inspection efficiency.  Bold is the status quo. 
Inspection 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Total slippage % slippage Total clean % clean 
100 100 0 0.000 181815 100.000 
100 98 2 0.001 181813 99.999 
100 95 5 0.003 181810 99.997 
99 100 972 0.535 180843 99.465 
99 98 991 0.545 180824 99.455 
99 95 1019 0.561 180796 99.439 
98 100 1944 1.069 179871 98.931 
98 98 1980 1.089 179835 98.911 
98 95 2033 1.118 179782 98.882 
97 100 2916 1.604 178899 98.396 
97 98 2969 1.633 178846 98.367 
97 95 3048 1.676 178767 98.324 
96 100 3888 2.139 177927 97.861 
96 98 3958 2.177 177857 97.823 
96 95 4062 2.234 177753 97.766 
95 100 4860 2.673 176955 97.327 
95 98 4947 2.721 176868 97.279 
95 95 5076 2.792 176739 97.208 
 
 
Decision: Compulsory border inspection and treatment  
In order to reduce the risks associated with the importation of used vehicles, the 
model assessed the effect of compulsory inspection and treatment of all used vehicles 
entering New Zealand, irrespective of the vehicle’s origin and pre-shipment 
management.  Varying the proportion of vehicles inspected upon arrival had little 
effect on total slippage, only decreasing slippage by 0.0424% (77 vehicles) as 
inspection increases from 0% to 100% (Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6).  In contrast, the 
proportion of vehicles treated upon arrival irrespective of pre-shipment management 
or border inspection decreased slippage by 9.57% (17400 vehicles) per year when 
increasing proportion treated from 0% to 100%.  This difference influence on total 
slippage between inspection and treatment efficiencies can be attributed to the fact 
that once treated, used vehicles were not re-inspected. 
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Figure 7.5 Change in total slippage as a result of varying border inspection (A) and treatment rates 
separately(B). (□ represents current rates)   
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Figure 7.6  The change in total slippage at two inspection rates and varying proportion of vehicles 
treated upon arrival in New Zealand.  (● represents current border inspection rate and ○ represents 
compulsory border inspection rates) 
 
As all used vehicles are treated upon arrival, the proportion of vehicles inspected 
(inspection rate) and inspection efficiency had a limited effect on total slippage 
(Figure 7.7), decreasing slippage by less than 0.03% (48 vehicles) per year per percent 
inspection efficiency increased.  In contrast, treatment efficiency had a stronger 
influence on total slippage, decreasing slippage by c. 0.55% (1007 vehicles) per year 
per percent increased (Table 7.4). 
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Figure 7.7  The effect that varying inspection and treatment efficiencies have on slippage when all 
used vehicles are inspected and treated upon arriving in New Zealand   (□ represents the current 
efficiencies) 
 
Table 7.4  Decision: Status quo pre-entry and compulsory border inspections.  A comparison between 
compulsory and current treatment with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  Displayed are the 
highest, middle and lowest treatment efficiencies per inspection efficiency.  Data in the form of total 
slippage and % of total 
1% Treatment 100% treatment Inspection 
efficiency 
Treatment 
efficiency Total % Total % 
100 100 0 0.00 0 0.00 
100 98 19 0.01 1927 1.06 
100 95 48 0.03 4818 2.65 
99 100 963 0.53 0 0.00 
99 98 1000 0.55 1944 1.07 
99 95 1054 0.58 4861 2.67 
98 100 1927 1.06 0 0.00 
98 98 1980 1.09 1961 1.08 
98 95 2059 1.13 4904 2.70 
97 100 2890 1.59 0 0.00 
97 98 2960 1.63 1979 1.09 
97 95 3065 1.69 4946 2.72 
96 100 3854 2.12 0 0.00 
96 98 3940 2.17 1996 1.10 
96 95 4071 2.24 4989 2.74 
95 100 4817 2.65 0 0.00 
95 98 4921 2.71 2013 1.11 
95 95 5076 2.79 5032 2.77 
 
 
The interaction between inspection and treatment rates and efficiencies showed that 
increasing the proportion of vehicles inspected upon arrival had minimal influence on 
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slippage when treatment proportions remain at 1% (current proportions i.e. only 
vehicles without pre-shipment inspection or treatments) (Figure 7.8).  However, when 
all vehicles required compulsory inspection and treatment, the increase in inspection 
and treatment efficiencies decreases total slippage (Figures 7.8 B and C).  This 
highlights that reducing the proportion of vehicles inspected and treated at the border 
based on the pre-shipment procedures negatively impacts on total slippage. 
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Figure 7.8  Change in total slippage for (A) 95% Treatment Efficiency, (B) 98% Treatment efficiency 
and (C) 100% Treatment efficiency with three inspection efficiencies (95%, 97% and 100%). In the 
legend the 1st number represents the treatment rate in % and the 2nd number the inspection efficiency in 
%.  
 
Decision: Compulsory pre-shipment inspection and treatment 
In order to reduce the potential risks that are associated with importing used vehicles 
while limiting the down time of the vehicles upon arriving in New Zealand, pre-
shipment inspection and treatment (where necessary) have been recommended by 
MAF.  All used vehicles that have undergone pre-shipment management that meet 
MAF’s requirements are treated in a different manner to those that have not 
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undergone any pre-shipment management (Anon. 2003c) resulting in shorter 
processing times upon arrival. 
 
With compulsory pre-shipment inspection, there was no difference in total slippage 
between current proportion of vehicles getting treated and all vehicles being treated 
prior to shipment (Table 7.5).  However, varying both inspection and treatment 
efficiencies did affect total slippage rates.  Inspection efficiency, when increased from 
95% to 100%, had a stronger influence on slippage, decreasing overall slippage by c. 
1.02% (1801 vehicles) per year, while treatment efficiency decreased slippage by no 
more than 0.01% (18 vehicles) per year. 
 
Table 7.5  Comparison between pre-shipment treatment with 100% pre-shipment inspection rate and 
status quo border activities with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  Data in the form of total 
slippage and % of total slippage. 
51% Treatment 100% Treatment  Inspection 
Efficiency 
Treatment 
efficiency Total  %  Total  %  
100 1.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
100 0.98 36 0.02 36 0.02 
100 0.95 89 0.05 89 0.05 
99 1.00 1800 0.99 1800 0.99 
99 0.98 1836 1.01 1836 1.01 
99 0.95 1889 1.04 1889 1.04 
98 1.00 3601 1.98 3601 1.98 
98 0.98 3636 2.00 3636 2.00 
98 0.95 3690 2.03 3690 2.03 
97 1.00 5401 2.97 5401 2.97 
97 0.98 5437 2.99 5437 2.99 
97 0.95 5490 3.02 5490 3.02 
96 1.00 7201 3.96 7201 3.96 
96 0.98 7237 3.98 7237 3.98 
96 0.95 7290 4.01 7290 4.01 
95 1.00 9002 4.95 9002 4.95 
95 0.98 9037 4.97 9037 4.97 
95 0.95 9091 5.00 9091 5.00 
 
 
Decision: Compulsory pre-shipment inspection and compulsory border 
inspection and treatment 
Although compulsory inspection did not affect the overall slippage rates (Table 7.6), 
to further reduce the possibility of slippage and to identify the types of contaminates, 
contamination origin and overall contamination rates, pre-shipment inspection was 
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still used as a variable (in conjunction with border management) in order to obtain 
data that could be of use in the future management reviews of the used vehicle 
importation pathway.  With compulsory pre-shipment and border inspection and 
treatment of all (100%) vehicles imported, inspection efficiency had no effect on 
overall slippage (Figure 7.9).  In contrast, treatment efficiency strongly affected total 
slippage, decreasing slippage by 10% (18182 vehicles) per year when the efficiency 
was increased from 0% to 100%.  Therefore as the inspection and treatment 
efficiencies interact, slippage decreased by 1% (1818 vehicles) per year per percent 
increase of treatment efficiency (Table 7.6).  Again this difference in influence 
between inspection and treatment efficiencies can be attributed to the lack of re-
inspection of used vehicles once they have been treated at the border. 
 
Table 7.6  The effects that interacting inspection and treatment efficiencies had on total slippage when 
all vehicles were subject to compulsory inspection and treatment both pre-shipment and upon arriving 
in New Zealand.  Shown in bold are the current inspection and treatment efficiencies. 
Inspection 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Total slippage % slippage Total clean % clean 
100 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
100 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
100 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
99 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
99 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
99 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
98 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
98 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
98 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
97 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
97 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
97 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
96 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
96 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
96 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
95 100 0 0.00 181815 100 
95 98 3636 2.00 178179 98 
95 95 9091 5.00 172724 95 
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Figure 7.9  The effects that varying inspection and treatment efficiencies had on slippage when all 
used vehicles were inspected and treated pre-shipment and upon arriving in New Zealand  (□ represents 
the current efficiencies) 
 
As varying pre-shipment management had no effect on total slippage, the proportion 
of vehicles inspected and treated upon arrival with all vehicles being subject to 
compulsory pre-shipment management was assessed.  The interaction between the 
number of vehicles inspected and the number of vehicles treated upon arrival showed 
that increasing the proportion of vehicles inspected upon arriving in New Zealand had 
no effect on total slippage when 1% of vehicles are treated (current treatment rates) at 
all inspection and treatment efficiencies (Figure 7.10).  However, slippage did 
decrease with increasing the proportion of vehicles treated to 100% for all inspection 
efficiencies less than 100% and all treatment efficiencies greater than 95%. 
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Figure 7.10  The effect that compulsory pre-shipment inspection and treatment and varying the 
proportion of vehicles subject to inspection and treatment upon arriving in New Zealand for different 
inspection and treatment efficiencies has on total slippage.  (A) 95% Treatment Efficiency, (B) 98% 
Treatment efficiency and (C) 100% Treatment efficiency.  In the legend the 1 and 100 refers to the 
proportion of vehicles treated and the 95, 97 and 100 refer to the inspection efficiency. 
 
7.3.2  The Sea Container Model 
Sea containers are the means by which the majority of commodities of international 
trade are transported.  The importation of containers, whether empty, full container 
load (FCL) or less than full container load (LCL), are subject to the MAF IHS for Sea 
Containers from All Countries (09 2003).  Under these conditions, the sea container 
pathway (Figure7.11) was modelled (Figure 7.12 and Table 7.7) in order to estimate 
the number of sea containers that entered New Zealand that were actually 
contaminated although they were given biosecurity clearance (for the equations used 
in this model see Appendix IV).  However, it is important to note that cargo (whether 
commodities or packaging material) may be subject to specific import health 
standards separate from the IHS of the sea containers themselves, which were not 
included in this model. 
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Figure 7.11  Diagrammatic representation of the importation of Sea Containers 
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Table 7.7  The legend for Figure 7.12. The decisions for the Sea container importation pathway model 
Symbol Decision Current values (%) Data source 
A The external inspection rate 100 Anon. 2003b 
B The proportion of containers contaminated (external) 4.2 Anon. 2003i 
C The proportion of contaminated containers that are treated (external) 99.9 Anon. Source 3, 2005 
D The level inspection efficiency (external) 97 Anon. 2003c 
E The treatment efficiency (external) 98 Anon. Source 3, 2006 
a The internal inspection rate 100 Anon. 2003b 
b The proportion of containers contaminated (internal) 20.7 Anon. 2003i 
c 
The proportion of contaminated containers that are 
treated (internal) 99.9 Anon. Source 3, 2005 
d The level of inspection efficiency (internal) 97 Anon. 2003c 
e The level of treatment efficiency (internal) 98 Anon. Source 3, 2006 
T Total number of imported sea containers  Anon. 2003i 
 
 
Decision: Status quo 
Based on the regulation in place in 2003 (Anon. 2003b), and on data from several 
other sources (Table 7.7) approximately 4.4% of containers entering New Zealand 
have some form of external contamination and 17.7% have some form of internal 
contamination (excluding contamination of commodities within containers) (Anon. 
2003i).  Under current regulations, 100% of sea containers entering New Zealand are 
inspected upon arrival and unloading at MAF approved facilities either on-wharf or 
off-wharf, irrespective of pre-shipment biosecurity management procedures (Anon. 
2003b). 
 
The model, under current procedures, estimated that 5.75% of containers (20759 
containers) gained biosecurity clearance although they were actually contaminated 
(slippage) (Table 7.8).  2.96% (10686 containers) of all containers had some form of 
external contamination and 2.79% or 10072 containers had some form of internal 
contamination. 
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Table 7.8  Total slippage of containers under current regulations predicted by the model. 
 Total Total Clean % Clean Total Slippage % Slippage 
External inspection 361000 350306  10678  
      
          - clean 345835 335463 92.93 10375 2.87 
      
          - contaminated 15162 14843 4.11 303 0.09 
      
Internal inspection 361000 350844  10081  
      
          - clean 286273 277685 76.92 8588 2.38 
      
          - contaminated 74727 73159 20.27 1493 0.41 
      
Total 361000   20759 5.75 
 
 
Total slippage of containers per year under current conditions altered with varying 
inspection and treatment efficiencies (Figure 7.13).  There was a decrease in slippage 
of 17.5% (63175 containers) if inspection efficiency is increased from 90% to 100%, 
in contrast, treatment efficiency only decreased slippage by 2.49% or 8988 containers 
per year.  Inspection efficiency had a stronger influence on slippage, decreasing 
slippage by 1.75% (6318 containers) per year per percent increased (Table 7.9), 
whereas treatment efficiency only decreased slippage by less than 0.248% (895 
containers) per year per percent increased. 
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Figure 7.13  The effect that inspection (A) and treatment (B) efficiencies have separately on total 
slippage (□ represents the current efficiencies). 
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Table 7.9  The effect of inspection and treatment efficiencies on total slippage under current 
regulations. Current efficiencies are in bold. 
Inspection 
efficiency  
(%) 
Treatment 
efficiency 
 (%) 
Total slippage % Slippage Total clean % Clean 
100 100 0 0.00 361000 100.00 
100 98 1796 0.50 359204 99.50 
100 95 4490 1.24 356510 98.76 
99 100 6321 1.75 354679 98.25 
99 98 8117 2.25 352883 97.75 
99 95 10811 2.99 350189 97.01 
98 100 12642 3.50 348358 96.50 
98 98 14438 4.00 346562 96.00 
98 95 17132 4.75 343868 95.25 
97 100 18963 5.25 342037 94.75 
97 98 20759 5.75 340241 94.25 
97 95 23453 6.50 337547 93.50 
96 100 25284 7.00 335716 93.00 
96 98 27080 7.50 333920 92.50 
96 95 29774 8.25 331226 91.75 
95 100 31606 8.76 329394 91.25 
95 98 33402 9.25 327598 90.75 
95 95 36096 10.00 324904 90.00 
 
 
Decision: Random inspection 
Prior to 2003 approximately 10% of each consignment of sea containers entering New 
Zealand were inspected upon arrival (Anon. 2003i).  Although this procedure has 
since been replaced with a 100% inspection regulation (Anon. 2003b), the effect of 
random 10% inspection per consignment was modelled.  The model was used to 
assess the effect that inspection of containers upon arriving in New Zealand had on 
total slippage.  Varying the proportion of containers that are inspected upon arrival 
had a strong effect of total slippage, with slippage decreasing by 18.25% (65,881 
containers) from 24% to 5.75% when the proportion of containers inspected increased 
from 0 to 100% (Figure 7.14).  Altering the inspection efficiency alone reduced 
slippage by 1.75% (6317 containers) when efficiency was increased from 90% to 
100% (Figure 7.15), while increasing treatment efficiency decreased slippage by 
0.25% (903 containers).  Inspection efficiency had a stronger influence on slippage, 
decreasing slippage by 0.12% (433 containers) per year per percent increased (Table 
7.10), while treatment efficiency only decreased slippage by 0.024% (87 containers) 
per year per percent increased. 
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Figure 7.14  The effect of the proportion of containers inspected (inspection rate) on total slippage . (□ 
represents the current proportion) 
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Figure 7.15  The effect that inspection (A) and treatment (B) efficiencies have on total slippage when 
containers are randomly selected for inspection. (□ represents the current efficiencies) 
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Table 7.10  The effect inspection and treatment efficiency have on total slippage when containers are 
inspected randomly.  Current efficiency rates are in bold. 
Inspection 
Efficiency (%) 
Treatment 
efficiency (%) Total slippage % Slippage Total clean % Clean 
100 100 77976 21.60 283024 78.40 
100 98 78156 21.65 282844 78.35 
100 95 78425 21.72 282575 78.28 
99 100 78608 21.78 282392 78.22 
99 98 78788 21.82 282212 78.18 
99 95 79057 21.90 281943 78.10 
98 100 79240 21.95 281760 78.05 
98 98 79420 22.00 281580 78.00 
98 95 79689 22.07 281311 77.93 
97 100 79872 22.13 281128 77.87 
97 98 80052 22.18 280948 77.82 
97 95 80321 22.25 280679 77.75 
96 100 80504 22.30 280496 77.70 
96 98 80684 22.35 280316 77.65 
96 95 80953 22.42 280047 77.58 
95 100 81137 22.48 279863 77.52 
95 98 81316 22.53 279684 77.47 
95 95 81586 22.60 279414 77.40 
 
 
 
7.3.3  Woodpackaging and Bark 
The model for simulating the woodpackaging pathway was developed in order to 
estimate the number of containers entering New Zealand which contain contaminated 
WP (Figure 7.16).  The model incorporates all aspects of the importation which have 
a direct impact on the containers and their contents, including the possibility of 
consignments entering New Zealand without undergoing any biosecurity management 
procedures.  The total numbers of containers entering New Zealand with 
contaminated WP were calculated by a series of equations (Appendix IV), with the 
associated policy and management decisions described in Table 7.11. 
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Table 7.11  Legend for Figure 7.16.  The decisions for the woodpackaging pathway model. 
Symbol Decision Current values (%) Data source 
T Total number of container entering New Zealand  {Anon., 2003 #20} 
A The proportion of total containers with woodpackaging 48 {Anon., 2003 #20} 
B The rate of detecting the presence of woodpackaging at inspection 53 {Anon., 2003 #20} 
a1 The proportion of woodpackaging that is unprocessed and detected 
at inspection  
Anon. Source 
1 and 2, 2005 
a2 The proportion of woodpackaging that is unprocessed not detected 
at inspection  
Anon. Source 
1 and 2, 2005 
b The rate of treated wooded  {Anon., 2005 #71} 
c1 The rate of treatment of unprocessed woodpackaging  Anon. Source 1 and 2, 2005 
c2 The rate of treatment of processed woodpackaging 97 Anon. Source 1 and 2, 2005 
d The rate of inspection efficiency 98 {Anon., 2003 #99} 
e 
The rate of treatment efficiency for unprocessed treated 
woodpackaging 98 
Anon. Source 
3, 2006 
e2 The rate of treatment efficiency for unprocessed untreated 
woodpackaging  
Anon. Source 
3, 2006 
ep The rate of treatment efficiency of processed woodpackaging 99 Anon. Source 3, 2006 
C The proportion of woodpackaging that is contaminated and either disposed of or refused entry  
{Anon., 2005 
#71} Anon. 
Source 3, 2006 
f The proportion of containers with woodpackaging that are not inspected  
Anon Source 
3, 2006 
Bark The proportion of containers containing woodpackaging that are 
contaminated with Bark 11.8 
{Bulman, 
1998 #67} 
 
 
 
Decision: Status quo 
Approximately 49% of c. 500,000 containers entering New Zealand annually contain 
some form of woodpackaging (WP) (Anon. 2003i).  As of 16th April 2003, the 
regulations for the importation of containers containing WP are outlined in IHS 
Woodpackaging Material from All Countries (Anon. 2003e).  Currently it is strongly 
encouraged that WP be treated and come with certification prior to importation in 
accordance with international or New Zealand regulations (Anon. 2003e).  Shipments 
without certification are treated as untreated WP and are dealt with accordingly.  It is 
estimated that approximately 15.6% of all WP entering NZ requires biosecurity action 
of some description, more specifically, 11.6% of all containers with woodpackaging 
are contaminated with bark (Anon. 2003i). 
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The model estimated that under current conditions (Table 7.12) of the 175,697 sea 
containers that entered New Zealand in 2004 with WP, 2.20% (3873 containers) of 
those containers that passed border inspection were actually contaminated, with 
0.25% (447 containers) containing woodpackaging contaminated with bark.  Only 
1.92% (3373 containers) of containers that were found to have no WP at inspection 
did contain contaminated WP.  In contrast, only 0.24% (414 containers) of containers 
that were found to have contaminated WP which underwent biosecurity action 
remained contaminated, 0.03% (46 containers) of which were contaminated with 
bark.  Varying the incineration rate (IR) of WP that is contaminated had a limited 
effect on over all slippage (Figure 7.17), only decreasing slippage by 0.113% (407 
containers) per year and slippage associated with bark decreasing by 0.0131% (47 
containers). 
 
Table 7.12  Total slippage rates of containers containing Woodpackaging material (WP) and 
woodpackaging material contaminated with bark (bark) imported into New Zealand under current 
conditions (bold represents the sum of containers with WP found at border and not found at the 
border). 
 Total Total Clean % Clean Total 
slippage % Slippage Total Bark % Bark 
Not found at inspection 24965 21592 12.29 3373 1.92 391 0.22 
        
Found at inspection: 150719 146440 83.35 3873 2.20 447 0.25 
        
               - clean 130357 126898 72.23 3459 1.97 401 0.23 
        
               - contaminated 20362 19541 11.12 414 0.24 46 0.03 
        
Total 175684 168032 95.64 7246 4.12 839 0.477 
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Figure 7.17  The changes in slippage with changing the incineration rate of contaminated WP (●) and 
WP contaminated with bark (○) 
 
Total slippage along this pathway under current regulations altered with varying 
inspection and treatment efficiencies.  As inspection efficiency was increased from 
90% to 100% there was a 3.19% (11516 containers) decrease in total WP slippage and 
a 0.37% (1336 containers) increases in slippage of bark.  In contrast there was only a 
0.14% (505 containers) decrease in WP slippage when treatment efficiency was 
increased from 90% to 100% (Figure 7.18) and a 0.016% (59 containers) decrease in 
bark slippage, irrespective of IR.  However, with varying treatment efficiency, IR had 
a stronger though still limited effect; at 90% treatment efficiency increasing IR from 
50% to 100% decreased WP slippage by 0.28% (1011 containers) and bark slippage 
by 0.033% (118 containers).  The interaction between inspection and treatment 
efficiencies showed that inspection efficiency had an influence on total slippage, 
decreasing WP slippage by 0.32% (1155 containers) and bark slippage by 0.033% 
(118 containers) per year per percent efficiency increased, irrespective of IR (Table 
7.13).  Treatment efficiency only had an influence on slippage when IR was below 
100%, decreasing slippage by less than 0.028% (101 containers) per year per 
efficiency percent increased. 
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Figure 7.18  Changes in total slippage with changing inspection (A) and treatment (B) efficiencies. (□ 
represents the current efficiencies) (Solid symbols refers to WP and empty symbols refers to bark)  
 
Table 7.13  The changes in slippage with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies and varying IR.  
Current efficiencies are displayed in bold.  Bark slippage is in brackets. 
 
50% IR 75% IR 100% IR Inspection 
efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
efficiency 
(%) Total % Total % Total % 
100 100 3388 (391) 0.94 (0.108) 3388 (391) 0.94 (0.108) 3388 (391) 0.94 (0.108) 
100 98 3591 (415) 0.99 (0.115) 3490 (403) 1.02 (0.112) 3388 (391) 1.05 (0.108) 
100 95 3896 (450) 1.08 (0.125) 3642 (420) 1.15 (0.116) 3388 (391) 1.22 (0.108) 
99 100 4541 (525) 1.26 (0.145) 4541 (525) 1.26 (0.145) 4541 (525) 1.26 (0.145) 
99 98 4744 (548) 1.31 (0.152) 4643 (536) 1.34 (0.149) 4541 (525) 1.37 (0.145) 
99 95 5049 (584) 1.40 (0.1620) 4795 (554) 1.47 (0.154) 4541 (525) 1.54 (0.145) 
98 100 5694 (658) 1.58 (0.182) 5694 (658) 1.58 (0.182) 5694 (658) 1.58 (0.182) 
98 98 5897 (682) 1.63 (0.189) 5796 (670) 1.66 (0.186) 5694 (658) 1.69 (0.182) 
98 95 6202 (717) 1.72 (0.199) 5948 (688) 1.79 (0.191) 5694 (658) 1.86 (0.182) 
97 100 6847 (792) 1.90 (0.219) 6847 (792) 1.90 (0.219) 6847 (792) 1.90 (0.219) 
97 98 7050 (816) 1.95 (0.226) 6949 (804) 1.98 (0.223) 6847 (792) 2.01 (0.219) 
97 95 7355 (851) 2.04 (0.236) 7101 (822) 2.11 (0.228) 6847 (792) 2.18 (0.219) 
96 100 8000 (926) 2.22 (0.256) 8000 (926) 2.22 (0.256) 8000 (926) 2.22 (0.256) 
96 98 8203 (950) 2.27 (0.263) 8102 (938) 2.30 (0.260) 8000 (926) 2.33 (0.256) 
96 95 8509 (985) 2.36 (0.273) 8254 (955) 2.43 (0.265) 8000 (926) 2.50 (0.256) 
95 100 9153 (1060) 2.54 (0.294) 9153 (1060) 2.54 (0.294) 9153 (1060) 2.54 (0.294) 
95 98 9356 (1086) 2.59 (0.300) 9255 (1071) 2.62 (0.297) 9153 (1060) 2.65 (0.294) 
95 95 9662 (1119) 2.68 (0.310) 9407 (1089) 2.75 (0.302) 9153 (1060) 2.82 (0.294) 
 
 
Decision: Compulsory full inspection at border 
As only 85% of WP is detected at the initial inspection (usually a door inspection), in 
order to reduce the risks associated with WP, the model assessed the effect of 
compulsory full initial inspection of containers, which increases the likelihood of the 
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WP being detected to 100%.  This initial detection rate of WP is referred to as the 
border inspection rate.  Increasing the border inspection rate alone decreased total WP 
slippage by 1.27% (4585 containers) and bark slippage by 0.63% (2274 containers) 
per year as inspection rate increased from 0% to 100% (Figure 7.19).  The IR had a 
limited effect on total slippage, only reducing WP slippage by 0.13% (469 containers) 
and bark slippage by 0.015% (55 containers) per year when increased from 0% to 
100%. 
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Figure 7.19  The effect of varying the proportion of containers inspected at the border (A) and 
incineration rate (B) on total slippage for WP (closed symbols) and Bark (open symbols). 
 
Total slippage of containers containing contaminated WP per year altered with 
varying inspection and treatment efficiencies when all containers arriving undergo 
compulsory full initial inspection.  As inspection efficiency increases from 90% to 
100% there was a 3.72% (13429 containers) decrease in overall WP slippage per year 
and a 0.43% (1559 containers) decreased in bark slippage, irrespective of IR (Figure 
7.20).  In contrast, treatment efficiency reduced WP and bark slippage by less than 
0.23% (830 containers) and 0.038% (138 containers) per year (respectively) at an IR 
of 50%, while treatment efficiency had no effect on slippage with an IR of 100%.  
The interactions between inspection and treatment efficiencies showed that inspection 
efficiency had the stronger influence on total slippage, decreasing WP slippage by 
0.37% (1336 containers) per year and bark slippage by 0.043% (312 containers) per 
percent efficiency increased, irrespective of IR (Table 7.14).  In contrast, treatment 
decreased slippage by less than 0.033% (119 containers) per year per percent 
efficiency increase at 50% IR, reducing down to no influence at 100% IR. 
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Figure 7.20  Changes in slippage at compulsory border inspection with varying inspection and 
treatment efficiencies. (□ represents the current efficiencies). 
 
Table 7.14  Comparison of the changes in slippage between current and compulsory border inspection 
for varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  Bold represents the current efficiencies. Bark 
slippage rates are in Brackets 
85% inspection rate 100% inspection rate Inspection 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
efficiency 
(%) 50% IR (%) 
75% IR 
(%) 
100% IR 
(%) 
50% IR 
(%) 
75% IR 
(%) 
100% IR 
(%) 
100 100 0.94 (0.1080 0.94 (0.108) 0.94 (0.108) 0.005 (0.000) 0.005 (0.000) 0.005 (0.000) 
100 98 0.99 (0.115) 0.97 (0.112) 0.94 (0.108) 0.071 (0.008) 0.038 (0.004) 0.005 (0.000) 
100 95 1.08 (0.125) 1.01 (0.116) 0.94 (0.108) 0.169 (0.019) 0.087 (0.010) 0.005 (0.000) 
99 100 1.26 (0.145) 1.26 (0.145) 1.26 (0.145) 0.377 (0.043) 0.377 (0.043) 0.377 (0.043) 
99 98 1.31 (0.152) 1.29 (0.149) 1.26 (0.145) 0.443 (0.051) 0.410 (0.047) 0.377 (0.043) 
99 95 1.40 (0.162) 1.33 (0.154) 1.26 (0.145) 0.541 (0.062 0.459 (0.053) 0.377 (0.043) 
98 100 1.58 (0.182) 1.58 (0.182) 1.58 (0.182) 0.749 (0.086) 0.749 (0.086) 0.749 (0.086) 
98 98 1.63 (0.189) 1.61 (0.186) 1.58 (0.182) 0.815 (0.094) 0.782 (0.090) 0.749 (0.086) 
98 95 1.72 (0.199) 1.65 (0.191) 1.58 (0.182) 0.914 (0.105) 0.832 (0.096) 0.749 (0.086) 
97 100 1.90 (0.219) 1.90 (0.219) 1.90 (0.219) 1.122 (0.130) 1.122 (0.130) 1.122 (0.130) 
97 98 1.95 (0.226) 1.92 (0.223) 1.90 (0.219) 1.187 (0.137) 1.155 (0.133) 1.122 (0.130) 
97 95 2.04 (0.236) 1.97 (0.228) 1.90 (0.219) 1.286 (0.149) 1.204 (0.139) 1.122 (0.130) 
96 100 2.22 (0.256) 2.22 (0.256) 2.22 (0.256) 1.494 (0.173) 1.494 (0.173) 1.494 (0.173) 
96 98 2.27 (0.263) 2.24 (0.260) 2.22 (0.256) 1.560 (0.180) 1.527 (0.177) 1.494 (0.173) 
96 95 2.36 (0.273) 2.29 (0.265) 2.22 (0.256) 1.658 (0.192) 1.576 (0.182) 1.494 (0.173) 
95 100 2.54 (0.294) 2.54 (0.294) 2.54 (0.294) 1.866 (0.216) 1.866 (0.216) 1.866 (0.216) 
95 98 2.59 (0.300) 2.56 (0.297) 2.54 (0.294) 1.932 (0.224) 1.899 (0.220) 1.866 (0.216) 
95 95 2.68 (0.310) 2.61 (0.302) 2.54 (0.294) 2.031 (0.235) 1.948 (0.225) 1.866 (0.216) 
 
 
 
Decision: Random inspection of WP with ISO 15 stamp 
New Zealand has implemented the ISPM 15 standard for woodpackaging, thereby WP 
known to have ISPM 15 marked WP was considered to have a lower risk potential 
and underwent limited biosecurity management at the border.  In order to assess the 
effect that altering the importation procedures of containers with WP known to have 
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the ISOM 15 mark has on slippage, the proportion of containers containing known 
ISPM 15 WP was varied (Figure 7.21(A)).  As the proportion of containers inspected 
increased from 0% to 100% there was a 3.95% (14079 containers) decrease in total 
WP slippage and a 0.46% (1665 containers) decrease in bark slippage, irrespective of 
IR.  Increasing IR only decreased total WP slippage by 0.0265% (96 containers) and 
bark slippage by 0.0031% (11 containers) per year (Figure 7.21(B)). 
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Figure 7.21  Effects of varying the inspection rate of containers with known ISPM 15 WP (A) and 
varying IR (B) on total slippage. 
 
Total slippage when there is a random inspection of containers with known ISPM 15 
WP altered with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies (Figure 7.22).  As 
inspection alone increased from 90% to 100% there was a 0.75% (2708 containers) 
decrease in total WP slippage and a 0.087% (314 containers) decrease in bark 
slippage, irrespective of IR.  An increase in treatment efficiency only decreased total 
WP and bark slippage by 0.066% (238 containers) and 0.0077% (28 containers) 
(respectively) per year; again IR had a very limited effect on slippage.  This indicated 
that inspection efficiency has a stronger influence on slippage (decreasing WP and 
bark slippage by 0.075% (275 containers) and 0.01% (28 containers) respectively per 
year per percent increased) than treatment efficiency, which only decreased WP 
slippage by 0.0066% or 24 containers and bark slippage by 0.008% or 3 containers 
per year per percent increased at IR less that 100% (Table 7.15). 
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Figure 7.22  Changes in slippage with random inspection of containers with known WP with the ISO 
15 marked and varying inspection and treatment efficiencies. (□ represents the current efficiencies)  
(Solid symbols refers to WP and empty symbols refers to bark) 
 
Table 7.15  Changes in slippage with random inspection of containers with known ISO 15 marked and 
varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  (Bold represents the current efficiencies) Bark slippage 
is in brackets 
50% IR 75% IR 100% IR Inspection 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
efficiency 
(%) Total % Total % Total % 
100 100 18953 (2105) 5.250 (0.583) 18953 (2105) 5.250 (0.583) 18953 (2105) 5.250 (0.583) 
100 98 19001 (2111) 5.263 (0.585) 18977 (2108) 5.257 (0.584) 18953 (2105) 5.250 (0.583) 
100 95 19073 (2121) 5.283 (0.587) 19013 (2113) 5.267 (0.585) 18953 (2105) 5.250 (0.583) 
99 100 19224 (2141) 5.325 (0.593) 19224 (2141) 5.325 (0.593) 19224 (2141) 5.325 (0.593) 
99 98 19272 (2148) 5.339 (0.595) 19248 (2145) 5.332 (0.594) 19224 (2141) 5.325 (0.593) 
99 95 19344 (2157) 5.358 (0.598) 19284 (2149) 5.342 (0.595) 19224 (2141) 5.325 (0.593) 
98 100 19495 (2178) 5.400 (0.603) 19495 (2178) 5.400 (0.603) 19495 (2178) 5.400 (0.603) 
98 98 19543 (2184) 5.414 (0.605) 19519 (2181) 5.407 (0.604) 19495 (2178) 5.400 (0.603) 
98 95 19615 (2194) 5.433 (0.608) 19555 (2186) 5.417 (0.606) 19495 (2178) 5.400 (0.603) 
97 100 19766 (2215) 5.475 (0.613) 19766 (2215) 5.475 (0.613) 19766 (2215) 5.475 (0.613) 
97 98 19814 (2221) 5.489 (0.615) 19790 (2218) 5.482 (0.614) 19766 (2215) 5.475 (0.613) 
97 95 19886 (2231) 5.509 (0.618) 19826 (2223) 5.492 (0.616) 19766 (2215) 5.475 (0.613) 
96 100 20037 (2251) 5.550 (0.624) 20037 (2251) 5.550 (0.624) 20037 (2251) 5.550 (0.624) 
96 98 20085 (2258) 5.564 (0.625) 20061 (2254) 5.557 (0.625) 20037 (2251) 5.550 (0.624) 
96 95 20157 (2267) 5.584 (0.628) 20097 (2259) 5.567 (0.626) 20037 (2251) 5.550 (0.624) 
95 100 20308 (2288) 5.626 (0.634) 20308 (2288) 5.626 (0.634) 20308 (2288) 5.626 (0.634) 
95 98 20356 (2294) 5.639 (0.636) 20332 (2291) 5.632 (0.635) 20308 (2288) 5.626 (0.634) 
95 95 20428 (2304) 5.659 (0.638) 20368 (2296) 5.642 (0.636) 20308 (2288) 5.626 (0.634) 
 
 
Decision: Random inspection of containers with known WP with the ISPM 15 
mark and compulsory border inspection 
In order to further reduce the risk potential associated with the importation of WP, the 
model assessed the effect of compulsory full border inspection of containers and a 
further random inspection of containers with known ISPM 15 WP material on total 
slippage.  Increasing border inspection rate from 0% to 100% in conjunction with 
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random inspections of containers with known ISPM 15 WP decreased total WP 
slippage by 1.27% (4585 containers) and bark slippage by 0.15% (536 containers) per 
year (Figure 7.23), while increasing inspection rate of containers with known ISPM 
15 WP in conjunction with compulsory full border inspections decreased WP slippage 
by 4.61% (16642 containers) and bark slippage by 0.46% (1665 containers) per year.  
IR had a very limited effect on total slippage (Figure 7.24), decreasing WP slippage 
by only 0.03%  (112 containers) and bark slippage by 0.0035% (13 containers) per 
year when increased from 0% to 100%. 
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Figure 7.23  Effect of varying full border inspection rate (A) and the proportion of containers inspected 
with known ISPM 15 WP (B) has on total slippage. (□ represent current rates). Solid symbols refers to 
WP and empty symbols refers to bark) 
 
Incineration rate (%)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pe
rc
en
t s
lip
pa
ge
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 
Figure 7.24  The effect of the proportion of containers with contaminated WP either disposed of 
(incineration) or refused entry into New Zealand. (Solid symbols refers to WP and empty symbols 
refers to bark) 
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Total slippage of containers containing contaminated WP, (when all FCL containers 
undergo full inspection at border and containers with known ISPM 15 WP undergo 
further random inspection), altered with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies 
(Figure 7.25).  As inspection efficiency alone increased from 90% to 100%, total WP 
slippage decreased by 0.875% (3158 containers) and bark slippage by 0.10% (366 
containers) per year, irrespective of IR.  In contrast, treatment efficiency had a lesser 
impact, decreasing WP slippage by only 0.0397% (143 containers per year) and bark 
slippage by 0.009% (32 containers) per year.  This indicates that inspection efficiency 
had a limited influence on total slippage, decreasing WP and bark slippage by only 
0.088% (318 containers) and 0.0087% (31 containers) respectively per year per 
percent increased (Table 7.16). However, treatment efficiency had an even weaker 
influence, only decreasing WP slippage by 0.038% or 137 containers and bark 
slippage by no more than 0.0008% (3 containers) per year per percent increased. 
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Figure 7.25  The changes in slippage with random inspection of containers with known WP with the 
ISO 15 mark and with compulsory border inspection at varying inspection and treatment efficiencies.  
(□ represents the current efficiencies) (Solid symbols refers to WP and empty symbols refers to bark) 
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Table 7.16  Changes in slippage with compulsory border inspection and random inspection of 
containers with known WP ISO 15 marked with varying inspection and treatment efficiencies 
separately.  Current efficiencies are in bold. Bark slippage is in brackets 
50% IR 75% IR 100% IR Inspection 
Efficiency 
(%) 
Treatment 
efficiency 
(%) Total % Total % Total % 
100 100 18161 (2197) 5.031 (0.608) 18161 (2197) 5.031 (0.608) 18161 (2197) 5.031 (0.609) 
100 98 18217 (2202) 5.046 (0.610) 18189 (2199) 5.039 (0.609) 18161 (2197) 5.031 (0.609) 
100 95 18301 (2210) 5.069 (0.612) 18231 (2203) 5.050 (0.610) 18161 (2197) 5.031 (0.609) 
99 100 18477 (2228) 5.118 (0.617) 18477 (2228) 5.118 (0.617) 18477 (2228) 5.118 (0.617) 
99 98 18533 (2234) 5.134 (0.619) 18505 (2231) 5.126 (0.618) 18477 (2228) 5.118 (0.617) 
99 95 18617 (2242) 5.157 (0.621) 18547 (2235) 5.138 (0.619) 18477 (2228) 5.118 (0.617) 
98 100 18793 (2259) 5.206 (0.626) 18793 (2259) 5.206 (0.626) 18793 (2259) 5.206 (0.626) 
98 98 18849 (2265) 5.221 (0.627) 18821 (2262) 5.214 (0.627) 18793 (2259) 5.206 (0.626) 
98 95 18932 (2273) 5.244 (0.630) 18863 (2266) 5.225 (0.628) 18793 (2259) 5.206 (0.626) 
97 100 19109 (2291) 5.293 (0.635) 19109 (2291) 5.293 (0.635) 19109 (2291) 5.293 (0.635) 
97 98 19165 (2296) 5.309 (0.636) 19137 (2294) 5.301 (0.635) 19109 (2291) 5.293 (0.635) 
97 95 19248 (2305) 5.332 (0.638) 19179 (2298) 5.313 (0.637) 19109 (2291) 5.293 (0.635) 
96 100 19425 (2322) 5.381 (0.643) 19425 (2322) 5.381 (0.643) 19425 (2322) 5.381 (0.643) 
96 98 19480 (2328) 5.396 (0.645) 19453 (2325) 5.389 (0.644) 19425 (2322) 5.381 (0.643) 
96 95 19564 (2336) 5.419 (0.647) 19494 (2329) 5.400 (0.645) 19425 (2322) 5.381 (0.643) 
95 100 19741 (2354) 5.468 (0.652) 19741 (2354) 5.468 (0.652) 19741 (2354) 5.468 (0.652) 
95 98 19796 (2359) 5.484 (0.654) 19768 (2356) 5.476 (0.653) 19741 (2354) 5.468 (0.652) 
95 95 19880 (2368) 5.507 (0.656) 19810 (2361) 5.488 (0.654) 19741 (2354) 5.468 (0.652) 
 
 
 
7.4 Discussion 
The contamination of used vehicles, sea containers and their contents are major 
biosecurity risks to transit ports and importing nations.  These risks have the potential 
to have a severe negative impact on a nation’s environment, health and economic 
productivity.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, only contaminants that are considered a 
biosecurity risk and are not detected at the border have the potential to negatively 
impact any importing nation. As such, contaminants that have gone undetected by 
border management procedures (slippage) are of most concern.   
 
Management and Policy decisions 
The importation of used vehicles, sea containers and woodpacking (including bark) 
follow the same general importation pathways and biosecurity management 
procedures, thereby enabling a comparison of the effects that altering each border 
management procedure had on slippage.   
 
Chapter 7: Slippage along Three Importation Pathways 183 
Pre-shipment Inspection and Treatment 
To reduce biosecurity risks entering New Zealand, MAF encourages pre-shipment 
management of commodities and vessels imported into New Zealand (Anon. 2003i, e, 
d, 2005).  Pre-shipment inspection and treatment must be conducted within a given 
number of days prior to shipment, and conform to specific instructions for storage 
after inspection and treatment until shipping as outlined in relevant IHS (Anon. 
2001b, 2003b, d).  Evidence suggests that pre-shipment management of commodities 
and vessels reduces the spread of unwanted pest and organisms, thereby permitting a 
reduction of inspections and other procedures upon arrival at the port of destination 
(Anon. 2005) (Stanaway et al. 2001, Anon. 2003i, Nendick and Sarty 2006).  This 
reduction in inspection and other biosecurity measures leads to a reduction in the cost 
of the compliance, as each inspection and the possible subsequent treatments are an 
added cost to the importer (exacerbators) in addition to the costs of the ‘down time’ 
these procedures incur (see Chapters 5 and 8). 
 
The effect of pre-shipment management on slippage along the used vehicle 
importation pathway was simulated based on information from several sources.  Pre-
shipment inspection and treatment requires used vehicles to be inspected and treated 
in a manner that complies with the IHS for Treated Used Vehicles Imported into New 
Zealand and consignments to be accompanied by appropriate documentation.  
Increasing the proportion of used vehicles undergoing pre-shipment inspection from 
0% to 100% increased slippage by 1.36% per year.  This increased slippage rate could 
result from the re-contamination of the vehicles in the period from inspection or 
treatment to unloading at their final destination (Anon. 2005, Nendick and Sarty 
2006), and/or from inaccurate inspection (Anon. 2003i) and treatment.  This 
undetected contamination or potential recontamination is compounded with the 
reduced inspection rate (and subsequent treatment when required) of used vehicles 
with pre-shipment inspection and treatment. 
 
Pre-shipment inspection and treatment of WP material requires the WP material being 
used to be treated and marked in a specific manner (generally ISPM 15 mark) prior to 
the loading of containers.  The model estimated that increasing the proportion of 
containers containing manifested marked WP, which have accompanying certificates 
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increased slippage by 1.36% per year.  This was based on the assumption that WP 
with the ISPM 15 mark had been treated and inspected within the regulations outlined 
in the ISPM 15 standard and was therefore less likely to be contaminated, thereby 
enabling a reduction in inspection and subsequent treatments upon arrival in New 
Zealand.  As with the used vehicles, the increased slippage rate can be attributed to 
either re-contamination en-route or inadequate inspection and treatment or both 
(Anon. 2003i).  Recent studies have shown that, as ISPM 15 treatment is aimed at 
killing organisms that reside in the wood at the time of treatment but does no require 
elimination of bark, bark and wooding infesting insects of quarantine significance can 
re-infest and successfully reproduce in logs and boards with residual bark after ISPM 
15 treatment (Haack 2006, Haack and Petrice 2009).  In addition, Haack and Petrice 
(2009) contended that there maybe other factors contributing to the re-infestation of 
ISPM 15 woodpackaging, including the possibility that the ISPM 15 prescribed 
treatment may be insufficient in killing all insects and that some treatments are 
improperly applied (whether knowingly or as a result of faulty equipment or 
facilities).  Despite these findings, Haack and Petrice (2009) concluded that even if 
some insects of quarantine significance were introduced via ISPM 15-compliant 
woodpackaging material, arriving insects populations are likely to be relatively small 
and thus hard to detect. 
 
For both used vehicles and woodpackaging, consignments that have undergone pre-
shipment inspection and treatment undergo different border procedures upon arrival in 
New Zealand than those that have no pre-shipment management.  All consignments of 
both used vehicle and woodpackaging that have not undergone any pre-shipment 
procedures or where accompanying documentation did not meet IHS requirements, 
are required to undergo full inspection and treatment (where necessary) irrespective of 
origin (Anon. 2003e, c).  In contrast, used vehicles that have had pre-shipment 
inspection and treatment are subject to a random inspection of 10% of each 
consignment and containers known to contain woodpackaging marked with the ISPM 
15 mark are to be inspected ‘where possible’ (Anon. 2003c).  These reductions in 
inspections and subsequent treatment rates are aimed at reducing the cost to the 
importer and the down time of containers and vehicles.  This study has shown that a 
reduction in border inspections, although aimed at facilitating trade, increases the 
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slippage along the used vehicle and WP importation pathways and increases the risk 
of invasive species entering and establishing within New Zealand. 
 
In contrast, there are currently no pre-shipment requirements for the sea containers 
themselves, consequential all sea containers themselves are treated in the same 
manner upon arriving in New Zealand. 
 
Border Inspection 
To prevent the importation of unwanted pests and organisms, MAF regulations 
require commodities and vessels under the Section 22 of the BSA (1993) to meet 
regulations in the applicable IHS to the satisfaction of MAF officials before being 
imported into New Zealand.  All imports are required to be accompanied by the 
appropriate documentation (see Chapter 6) and are subject to either random or 
compulsory inspections upon arriving in New Zealand.  These inspections are 
conducted on the wharf or off the wharf at a MAF approved transitional facility (see 
Chapter 5) by either a MAF accredited person or a MAF inspector.  Evidence shows 
that border inspections are very successful at detecting biosecurity risks (Anon. 
2006d) and that any unwanted pest or organism that goes undetected by the border 
inspections has the potential of establishing and having severe implications for our 
environment (Nendick and Sarty 2006). 
 
Inspection efficiency 
As inspection was shown to have the most influence on overall slippage along all 
three importation pathway, the accuracy of the inspection or inspection efficiency had 
the strongest influence on slippage. 
 
Used Vehicles  
The model for the vehicle pathways estimated that under current management 
procedures 1.63% of all used vehicles entering New Zealand annually are deemed 
clean but are in fact contaminated.  Although altering any one of the management 
procedures in place did have an effect on slippage, altering efficiencies of the systems 
already in place had the greatest effect on the overall slippage rate, of which 
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inspection efficiency had the strongest influence.  Whereby increasing the inspection 
efficiency from the estimated to 100% (Table 7.6) decreased the slippage by 99.9% 
from 2964 vehicles annually to 2 (Table 7.17). 
 
Sea Containers 
The sea container model estimated that under current regulations 5.75% of containers 
are given biosecurity clearance and enter New Zealand each year although they are 
contaminated.  Although altering each of the procedures reduced slippage, increasing 
inspection efficiency under current regulations had the strongest influence on slippage 
(Table 7.9), without altering any other management procedures.  Whereby increasing 
the inspection from the current rate of 97% to 100% slippage decreased by 91% from 
20,756 containers annually to 1796 containers (Table 7.17). 
 
Woodpackaging  
The study estimated that of the approximately 49% of all containers entering New 
Zealand that contained some form of WP, 4.12% were estimated to be contaminated 
although it had been given biosecurity clearance (Table 7.12).  The model estimated 
that although altering all the tested management procedures did have an effect on 
slippage, inspection efficiency had the strongest influence on slippage (Table 7.13).  
Increasing the inspection efficiency from 97% (the current rate) to 100% decreased 
slippage by 48% for all sea containers entering New Zealand per year (Table 7.17). 
 
Table 7.17  Total slippage along three pathways.  Units of measure are units imported.  
Imported units 97% 100% % change 
       Used vehicles 2964 2 99.9 
       Sea containers 20758 1796 91 
       Woodpackaging 7246 3795 48 
 
 
Intuitively the rate and accuracy of inspections and treatments of imported units at the 
border are key aspects of a biosecurity management system.  It is also logical that if 
all units are treated upon arrival in New Zealand and treatment efficiency was 100%, 
then there would be zero slippage and no need for inspections.  However given the 
number of units imported into New Zealand annually and the variety of importation 
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pathways and commodities, the infrastructure required and the time needed to conduct 
such treatments would adversely affect New Zealand’s trade.  In addition to the 
infrastructure and time needed, there are the environmental impacts of the treatments 
themselves that would also need to be considered.  Therefore the policy decisions 
used in the sensitivity analyses were those that could be implemented with minimal or 
non-significant disruption to trade, were non biased and could be supported by 
science, as required by the international agreements that New Zealand is party to.  As 
such, this study highlights how increasing the rate and accuracy of inspection of 
imports at New Zealand’s borders reduces the risk of invasive species entering New 
Zealand via the three pathways, thus providing a balance between facilitating trade 
and maintaining New Zealand’s Biosecurity. 
 
Although it is widely accepted that inspection methods and treatment procedures for 
commodities and sea containers are not 100% accurate (Anon. 2003i, 2006d), the 
impact that 100% inspection and treatment efficiencies had on total slippage were 
estimated to highlight the effect that requiring more than the 97% accuracy currently 
expected of MAF inspectors had; a reduction in potential invasive species entering 
New Zealand undetected.  Increasing current inspection efficiencies can be achieved 
through in-depth training of all persons inspecting the imported units and possibly 
longer time allowed for such inspections.  As currently the majority of imported units 
are being inspected by persons other than MAF trained inspectors, increasing the 
efficiency of inspections can be considered to be achievable by altering the persons 
inspecting from those MAF accredited persons to MAF inspectors.  This change in 
policy in conjunction with increasing inspection rates for all imported units is 
considered to have minimal impact on trade and the financial impact of such an 
alteration is the focus of the Chapter 8. 
 
Methods and procedures for the inspection of sea containers and their contents are 
constantly being researched and updated, with substantial changes leading to a review 
of the import health standards themselves (Anon. 2000).  Pervious studies and reviews 
have suggested new techniques for internal inspections of containers, including x-ray 
screening of containers and a probe camera (Anon. 2003i), a more in-depth discussion 
of these potential aids for inspections is in Chapter 9.    
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7.5  Conclusion 
The simulation of all three pathways using the developed model demonstrated how 
altering the management procedures both for pre-shipment and at the border affects 
the rate at which contaminated used vehicles, containers and commodities passed 
biosecurity border procedures (slippage).  The models showed that compulsory pre-
shipment procedures for used vehicles and WP increased slippage, while compulsory 
border inspection and subsequent treatment along all three pathways moderately 
decreased slippage.  Reducing slippage along all three importation pathways whilst 
facilitating trade, was most efficiently achieved by increasing the accuracy of 
inspections from 97% to 100% without altering any other border management 
procedures. 
Chapter 8 189 
Chapter 8 
Estimating the Cost of Future Slippage 
“Estimating the economic impacts that are associated with non-indigenous species is also 
difficult; nevertheless, enough data are available to quantify some of the impacts on 
agriculture, forestry, and public health.”  (Pimentel et al. 2000).  
 
8.1  Introduction 
Biosecurity activities are a critical aspect of New Zealand’s health, productivity and 
ability to gain access to foreign markets.  While there is little doubt that the legislation 
aimed at protecting national biodiversity and productivity has significant benefits, there 
are associated costs.  These costs are difficult to estimate, and little work has been 
published on the cost of complying with legislation and regulations (Anon. 2005), such as 
the BSA (1993) and related import and export regulations. 
 
In terms of cost and benefit of biosecurity, the fundamental question is whether or not 
policy and regulations set in place are worthwhile, i.e. does the environment and society 
benefit more with the policies and regulations in place than they would in their absence 
(Smith and Clough 2000).  Another key issue is the amount of resources a community or 
nation can put into maintaining or controlling biosecurity at all levels.  Often, activities 
such as monitoring, managing or eradication of established pests are limited by resource 
constraints.  Therefore economic assessments are carried out to determine optimal levels 
of resource allocation for the desired and realistic social and environmental benefits. 
 
Smith and Clough (2000) conducted a review of the key economic issues facing New 
Zealand’s biosecurity systems, in which they concluded that “Biosecurity can be regarded 
as a production process, like other aspects of security – protection against foreign 
adversaries, environmental catastrophes or the internal security breaches represented by 
criminal behaviour.”  In addition, as risks associated with biosecurity can be the result of 
unintentional introductions or unforeseen effects of deliberately introduced organisms, 
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economic principles for other accident prevention can loosely be applied to these 
biosecurity risks. 
 
It is widely accepted that there are three general economic aspects to biosecurity: 
1. Regulation of precautions that reduce either the chance of unintentional 
introductions and the unforeseen effects of deliberate introductions, or lessen their 
possible severity (pre-border management); 
2. Effective border biosecurity measures (including inspections and treatments) and 
monitoring for incursions (border management); and 
3. Response and management of incursions once they have been detected (post 
border management). 
 
Although biosecurity measures can be seen as a combination of these complementary 
measures and activities, decisions are needed to determine the components required and 
the relative emphasis given to each chosen component.  This decision process will ideally 
result in the most effective resource allocation in terms of benefit achieved at minimal 
cost (Smith and Clough 2000). 
 
In order to understand the economics of biosecurity it is important to identify the inputs 
required, the outputs sought, and the transformation processes that will need to be applied.  
As each biosecurity risk or breach poses a unique set of risks, the measures used to 
achieve the desired results vary.  The cost per unit of risk reduction achieved also varies, 
as do the costs and benefits within a community and across different communities (Smith 
and Clough 2000). 
 
Smith and Clough (2000) highlight that in general, the cost of excluding unwanted 
organisms from New Zealand at the pre-border and border level is expected to be less 
than the cost of allowing them in and then dealing with the consequences.  Smith and 
Clough also point out that the benefits of biosecurity activities (reducing risks or 
economic disruption from unwanted organisms) are indivisible, therefore logistically 
difficult to charge for on a user pays basis or taxing the wider community benefiting from 
it.  However, there are biosecurity activities to which benefits can be clearly linked, e.g. 
industries or communities to specific interests, such as primary producers.  Therefore, not 
all biosecurity measures need to be regarded as a national public good, thus providing 
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cases of biosecurity activities for which cost recovery from interested parties is possible 
(Smith and Clough 2000, Anon. 2006a) (see Chapter 6). 
 
Currently in New Zealand, the majority of inspections for imported units (such as used 
vehicles and woodpackaging) and the vectors (sea containers) are conducted by MAF 
accredited persons at MAF approved transitional facilities (see Chapter 6).  These 
facilities and their inspectors are required to be audited annually by MAF officials.  The 
costs associated with these transitional facilities and MAF accredited persons and any 
inspections or audits by MAF officials are met by the importers.  As such, the costs of 
managing New Zealand’s biosecurity at the border are already being met by the import 
sector.   
 
8.1.1  Objectives 
Given the nature of the benefits resulting from biosecurity activities are such that they are 
not always visible or measurable, quantifying them is very difficult.  However, there must 
be a method of ascertaining the effectiveness of the policies in place.  In order to measure 
a region’s freedom from unwanted pests, critical thresholds can be set up, beyond which 
policies may be deemed as ineffective or failing.  Such thresholds vary depending on the 
industry’s or community’s willingness to pay for a given level of biosecurity activity 
(Smith and Clough 2000). 
 
In order to minimise the risks and costs associated with the importation of commodities 
and the craft that are used to transport them, regulations and standards have been 
developed.  New Zealand along with other WTO and FAO member nations have 
developed individual standards and regulations that are in the best interest of the 
respective nation whilst still meeting the nations international commitments (Chapters 4 
and 5).  New Zealand’s standards are known as Import Health Standards (IHS).  In order 
to recover costs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) has set up regulations 
with which the Government recovers the costs of managing New Zealand’s biosecurity 
(see Chapter 6) from industry sectors or individuals, who it deems risk exacerbators 
(Table 8.1). 
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Table 8.1: Users of Biosecurity; Beneficiaries and Exacerbators (Smith and Clough 2000) 
Use beneficiaries Non-use beneficiaries Risk exacerbators 
   Commercial Farming Public Health Importers 
Horticulture industry Ecosystem biodiversity Tourists 
Forestry industry Indigenous species Primary industries 
Fishing industry Future generations  
Commercial animal breeders   
Future generations in these 
industries   
 
 
As importers are considered to be exacerbators, the Biosecurity Cost Regulations enables 
the Government to recover all costs associated with importation of commodities and 
vessels from the industry, including the cost of inspections conducted by MAF officials.  
As such the main objective was to predict the total recoverable cost of the inspections 
when all inspections are conducted by MAF inspectors for the three models developed in 
Chapter 7; Sea containers, Used vehicles and Woodpackaging (including Bark).  The 
models developed are extensions of the four models in Chapter 7.  With the specific aim 
to: 
 
• Forecast the number of sea containers, used vehicles and woodpackaging (and 
bark) that are imported into New Zealand for the next 10 years; and  
• Determine the recoverable cost of inspections when all inspections are conducted 
by MAF inspectors and with the increased efficiency required to achieve a specific 
slippage rate along each of the three pathways. 
 
8.2  Methodology 
The development of the three models for estimating the costs of the inspections along all 
three pathways are described in detail in Chapter 7 and Appendix IV.  The findings of 
Chapter 7 indicate that the effectiveness or accuracy of inspections is a crucial aspect of 
the biosecurity system that can be altered by a policy decision that can reduce slippage 
into New Zealand with minimal impact on trade.  For the purposes of this study, all 
inspections are conducted by MAF inspectors, who are assumed to have a certain level of 
knowledge and training and are considered to be experts.  The recoverable cost of 
inspection along each pathway was calculated with the adapted three models (where the 
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bark was included in the woodpackaging model) and the total costs of inspections that are 
recoverable by the government were estimated.  For details of each model see Chapter 7 
and Appendix III and for the details of Biosecurity Cost Regulations see Chapter 6 and 
Appendix IV. 
 
8.2.1  Cost per Inspection 
The recoverable cost of a MAF inspector is set out in the Biosecurity Cost Regulations 
2003 and 2006 (see Chapter 6) as an hourly rate with associated costs such as travel miles 
being an additional charge.  Based on the information available from various sources (see 
below for details), the time taken for inspecting units along the three pathways varied.  
For the purposes of these models the current inspection efficiencies were achieved with an 
average time of nine minutes to inspect a used car and average of one hour to inspect a sea 
container. 
 
In order to increase the inspection efficiencies, the time taken for each inspection was 
calculated using an exponential decay curve (see the results section for details).  The cost 
of each inspection along each of the three models developed in Chapter 7 was estimated 
by varying the time taken for each inspection by a MAF inspector, based on the hourly 
charge rate set out in the Biosecurity Cost Regulations 2003 and 2006. 
 
8.2.2  Model Assumptions and Weaknesses 
The main purpose of these models was to establish a framework to analyse how the 
variables of the importation pathways affect the costs recovered by MAF.  Several 
assumptions had to be made in order to construct these models: 
 
• Model development:  The models used in this section are extensions of the 
models described in Chapter 7, therefore the assumptions and weaknesses that are 
associated with those models also apply to the models used to estimate the cost of 
inspections; 
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• Costing: Due to the limited information available, the cost for increasing 
inspection accuracy was assumed to be time dependent for all three models, with 
factors like knowledge, training and experience not measured.  Costs also 
incorporate the number of and time taken for inspections that are assumed to 
conducted along all three pathways; 
 
• Used Vehicles:  Data was collected from several sources, thereby creating a 
discrepancy in the data.  This model assumed that inspections last an average of 9 
minutes (Anon. 2006e), with these times incorporated into the overall costs; 
 
• Sea containers: Data was collected from several anonymous sources, with the 
average external inspection assumed to last 15 minutes and internal inspection 
lasting an hour. Again these inspection times were incorporated in the total costs 
along this pathway; 
 
• Woodpackaging: Data from several sources indicated that the inspections lasted 
about an hour, as they are an internal inspection of a container.  Therefore each 
inspection is assumed to be an hour long.  This is incorporated into the total 
inspection costs along this pathway. 
 
8.3  Results  
Total slippage and associated recoverable inspection costs along the three pathways (Sea 
containers, used vehicles, woodpackaging) were estimated with the three models 
described in Section 7.3.  The results are presented here for each of the three pathways. 
 
8.3.1  Used vehicles 
The following regression was fitted to the data presented by NZTA74, to linearly 
extrapolate the number of used vehicles imported into NZ until 2016 (Figure 8.1). 
 
Number of cars = 7964.3*year – 15.81x106                                                           (8.1) 
                                                 
74
 http://www.landtransport.govt.nz/statistics/motor-vehicle-registration/2005/ 07 July 2006 
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Figure 8.1  The number of used vehicles imported into New Zealand from 1985 to 2016 
 
The following equation was used to extrapolate the time taken per inspection to achieve a 
given inspection efficiency (Figure 8.2). 
 
Inspection Efficiency = 1 - exp(-0.38962*Time)                                                            (8.2) 
 
Figure 8.2  The time taken to achieve a given inspection efficiency for used vehicles. 
 
Using the predicted number of used vehicles imported from equation 8.1 the total slippage 
per year along the used vehicle pathway for the next 10 years was estimated.  There was a 
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predicted 35.09% (104,456 vehicles) increase in the annual number of used vehicles 
imported into New Zealand (Table 8.2).  To increase the inspection efficiency from the 
current 97% to 100%, the time taken per inspection increased by a factor of 2.67 from 9 
minutes to 24 minutes per inspection using equation 8.2 (Figure 8.2).  The recoverable 
cost of inspecting used vehicles was predicted to total $5.44 million for 2006 under 
current inspection efficiencies and Cost Regulations, with a total of 3,310 contaminated 
used vehicles entering New Zealand undetected in 2006.  Increasing the inspection 
efficiency from 97% (the current rate) to 100% increased the overall recoverable cost by 
61.92% annually and slippage decreased to 2 used vehicles per year.  A comparison 
between the Cost Regulations of 2003 and 2006 showed that the 2006 regulations also 
increased the recoverable cost of inspecting vehicles by 27.7% annually. 
 
Table 8.2  Predicted total slippage and cost of total inspections from 1993 to 2016 for import used vehicles 
for the Biosecurity (cost) Regulations 2003 and 2006: at 97% and 100% inspection efficiency.  (Cost units 
NZ$ millions). 
  
97% 100% 
Year 
Predicted 
number of 
used 
vehicles 
Predicted 
total 
Slippage 
$ Predicted 
total 
Slippage 
$ 
2003 2006 2003 2006 
1993 79257 1294 1.54 2.13 0.8 4.04 5.59 
1994 88753 1449 1.72 2.38 0.9 4.52 6.25 
1995 98249 1604 1.91 2.64 1.0 5.01 6.92 
1996 107745 1759 2.09 2.89 1.1 5.49 7.59 
1997 117241 1914 2.27 3.15 1.2 5.97 8.26 
1998 126737 2069 2.46 3.40 1.3 6.46 8.93 
1999 136233 2225 2.64 3.66 1.4 6.94 9.60 
2000 145730 2380 2.83 3.91 1.5 7.43 10.27 
2001 155226 2535 3.01 4.16 1.6 7.91 10.94 
2002 164722 2690 3.20 4.42 1.7 8.39 11.61 
2003 174218 2845 3.38 4.67 1.8 8.88 12.28 
2004 183714 3000 3.56 4.93 1.9 9.36 12.95 
2005 193210 3155 3.75 5.18 2.0 9.84 13.62 
2006 202706 3310 3.93 5.44 2.1 10.33 14.28 
2007 212202 3465 4.12 5.69 2.2 10.81 14.95 
2008 221698 3620 4.30 5.95 2.3 11.30 15.62 
2009 231194 3775 4.48 6.20 2.5 11.78 16.29 
2010 240690 3930 4.67 6.46 2.6 12.26 16.96 
2011 250186 4085 4.85 6.71 2.7 12.75 17.63 
2012 259682 4240 5.04 6.97 2.8 13.23 18.30 
2013 269178 4395 5.22 7.22 2.9 13.71 18.97 
2014 278674 4550 5.41 7.48 3.0 14.20 19.64 
2015 288170 4705 5.59 7.73 3.1 14.68 20.31 
2016 297666 4860 5.77 7.99 3.2 15.17 20.98 
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8.3.2  Sea Containers 
The following regression was fitted to unpublished data from MAF (2004), to extrapolate 
the number of sea containers entering NZ from all countries every year until 2016 (Figure 
8.3). 
 
Number of containers = 10367*year-20.54x106                                                       (8.3) 
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Figure 8.3  The number of sea containers imported into New Zealand from 1993 to 2016 
 
The following equation was used to extrapolate the time taken per inspection to achieve a 
given inspection efficiency (Figure 8.4). 
 
Inspection Efficiency = 1 - exp(-0.058443*Time)                                                          (8.4) 
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Figure 8.4  The time taken to achieve a given inspection efficiency for sea containers. 
 
Using the predicted number of sea containers imported from equation 8.3, the total 
slippage per year along the sea container pathway for the next 10 years was estimated.  
There was a predicted 28.99% (213,060 sea containers) increase in the annual number of 
sea containers imported into New Zealand (Table 8.3).  To increase the inspection 
efficiency from the current 97% to 100%, the time taken per inspection increased by a 
factor of 2.63 from 60 minutes to 158 minutes per inspection using equation 8.4.  The 
recoverable cost of inspecting sea containers (external and internal) was predicted to total 
$117.36 million for 2006 under current inspection efficiencies and Cost Regulations, with 
a total of 30,011 contaminated sea containers entering New Zealand undetected.  
Increasing the inspection efficiency from 97% (the current rate) to 100% increased the 
overall recoverable cost by 42.98% and slippage decreased to 2,596 sea containers, for 
2006.  A comparison between the Cost Regulations of 2003 and 2006 showed that the 
2006 regulations also increased the recoverable cost of inspecting sea containers by 
27.7% annually. 
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Table 8.3  Predicted total slippage and cost of total inspections from 1993 to 2016 for sea containers 
imported from all countries for both 2003 and 2006 Biosecurity (cost) recovery regulations: at 97% and 
100% inspection efficiency.  (Cost units NZ$ million). 
 
  
97% 100% 
Year 
Predicted 
number of 
containers 
Predicted 
total 
slippage 
$ Predicted 
total 
slippage 
$ 
2003 2006 2003 2006 
1993 244900 14083 39.82 55.07 1218 69.83 96.58 
1994 266206 15308 43.28 59.86 1324 75.90 104.98 
1995 287512 16533 46.75 64.65 1430 81.98 113.38 
1996 308818 17759 50.21 69.45 1536 88.05 121.79 
1997 330124 18984 53.67 74.24 1642 94.13 130.19 
1998 351430 20209 57.14 79.03 1748 100.20 138.59 
2000 394042 22659 64.07 88.61 1960 112.35 155.39 
2001 415348 23885 67.53 93.40 2066 118.43 163.80 
2002 436654 25110 70.99 98.19 2172 124.50 172.20 
2003 457960 26335 74.46 102.98 2278 130.57 180.60 
2004 479266 27560 77.92 107.77 2384 136.65 189.00 
2005 500572 28785 81.39 112.57 2490 142.72 197.41 
2006 521878 30011 84.85 117.36 2596 148.80 205.81 
2007 543184 31236 88.31 122.15 2702 154.87 214.21 
2008 564490 32461 91.78 126.94 2808 160.95 222.61 
2009 585796 33686 95.24 131.73 2914 167.02 231.01 
2010 607102 34911 98.71 136.52 3020 173.10 239.42 
2011 628408 36137 102.17 141.31 3126 179.17 247.82 
2012 649714 37362 105.63 146.10 3232 185.25 256.22 
2013 671020 38587 109.10 150.90 3338 191.32 264.62 
2014 692326 39812 112.56 155.69 3444 197.40 273.03 
2015 713632 41037 116.03 160.48 3550 203.47 281.43 
2016 734938 42263 119.49 165.27 3656 209.55 289.83 
 
 
8.3.3  Wood Packaging 
The following regression was fitted to unpublished data from MAF (2004), to interpolate 
the number of container with WP entering NZ every year until 2016 (Figure 8.5). 
 
The number of containers = 21306*year-42.22x106                                                (8.5) 
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Figure 8.5  The predicted number of sea containers with WP imported into New Zealand from 1993 to 2016 
 
The following equation extrapolate the time taken per inspection to achieve a given 
inspection efficiency (Figure 8.6). 
 
Inspection Efficiency = 1 - exp(-0.058443*Time)                                                          (8.6) 
 
. 
Figure 8.6  The time taken to achieve a given inspection efficiency for wood packaging within sea 
containers 
 
Using the predicted number of sea containers containing woodpackaging imported from 
equation 8.5 the total slippage per year along the sea container pathway for the next 10 
years was estimated.  There was a predicted 31.98% (114,037 sea containers) increase in 
Chapter 8 201 
the annual number of sea containers containing woodpackaging imported into New 
Zealand (Table 8.4).  To increase the inspection efficiency from the current 97% to 100%, 
the time taken increased 2.63 times from 60 minutes to 158 minutes per inspection using 
equation 8.6.  The recoverable cost of inspecting sea containers containing 
woodpackaging material (external and internal) was predicted to total $25.42 million for 
2006 under current inspection efficiencies and Cost Regulations, with a total of 15,561 
sea containers containing contaminated woodpackaging material entering New Zealand 
undetected.  Increasing the inspection efficiency from 97% (the current rate) to 100% 
increased the overall recoverable cost by 61.96% and slippage decreased to 13,138 sea 
containers in 2006.  A comparison between the Cost Regulations of 2003 and 2006 
showed that the 2006 regulations also increased the recoverable cost of inspecting 
vehicles by 27.7% annually. 
 
Table 8.4  Predicted total slippage and cost of total inspections from 1993 to 2016 for sea containers with 
woodpackaging imported from all countries for both the 2003 and 2006 Biosecurity (cost) recovery 
regulations: at 97% and 100% inspection efficiency.  (Cost units NZ$ million) 
 
  
97 100 
Year 
Predicted 
number of 
containers 
Predicted 
total 
Slippage 
$ Predicted 
total 
Slippage 
$ 
2003 2006 2003 2006 
1993 118173 7270 11.87 16.42 6138 31.19 43.14 
1994 128540 7908 12.92 17.87 6676 33.93 46.92 
1995 138907 8546 13.96 19.31 7215 36.66 50.71 
1996 149274 9183 15.00 20.75 7753 39.40 54.49 
1997 159641 9821 16.04 22.19 8292 42.13 58.28 
1998 170008 10459 17.08 23.63 8830 44.87 62.06 
1999 180375 11097 18.13 25.07 9368 47.61 65.85 
2000 190742 11735 19.17 26.51 9907 50.34 69.63 
2001 201109 12372 20.21 27.95 10445 53.08 73.42 
2002 211476 13010 21.25 29.39 10984 55.82 77.20 
2003 221843 13648 22.29 30.83 11522 58.55 80.99 
2004 232210 14286 23.33 32.27 12061 61.29 84.77 
2005 242577 14923 24.38 33.71 12599 64.02 88.55 
2006 252944 15561 25.42 35.16 13138 66.76 92.34 
2007 263311 16199 26.46 36.60 13676 69.50 96.12 
2008 273678 16837 27.50 38.04 14214 72.23 99.91 
2009 284045 17475 28.54 39.48 14753 74.97 103.69 
2010 294412 18112 29.58 40.92 15291 77.71 107.48 
2011 304779 18750 30.63 42.36 15830 80.44 111.26 
2012 315146 19388 31.67 43.80 16368 83.18 115.05 
2013 325513 20026 32.71 45.24 16907 85.91 118.83 
2014 335880 20663 33.75 46.68 17445 88.65 122.62 
2015 346247 21301 34.79 48.12 17984 91.39 126.40 
2016 356614 21939 35.83 49.56 18522 94.12 130.18 
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8.3.4  Bark 
The following regression was fitted to unpublished data from MAF (2004) to interpolate 
the number of sea containers with WP contaminated with bark entering New Zealand until 
2016 (Figure 8.7). 
 
Number of containers = 1202.6*year – 23.83x105                                                   (8.7) 
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Figure 8.7  The number of sea containers with WP contaminated with bark imported into New Zealand 
from 1993 to 2006 
 
Using equation 8.7 the total slippage for sea containers containing WP material 
contaminated with bark imported into New Zealand until 2016 was predicted.  The model 
predicted that the number of sea containers containing WP material contaminated with 
bark imported increased by 46.92% (13229 containers) from 2005 to 2016.  As the bark 
model only considers bark that is a contaminant of WP, all the costs associated with the 
inspection of containers with WP also apply to bark (see Part 8.3.3 of this chapter). 
 
8.4  Discussion 
The cost of managing New Zealand’s biosecurity is ever increasing as a result of 
increasing volumes of international trade and the increasing number of nations that New 
Zealand trades with (Chapter 3).  The increasing volume of trade has placed a huge 
demand on the infrastructure in place to manage biosecurity risks, including inspections 
themselves, the inspection facilities and the points of entry (Anon. 2006e, d).  In order to 
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meet the financial demands of managing biosecurity, the New Zealand Government 
introduced the Recovery (Cost) Regulations in 2003, which were revised in 2006 (Chapter 
6).  These regulations provide the Government with the means to recover cost for 
biosecurity measures that are a direct result of imports (i.e. cost of inspection conducted 
by MAF officials), from the importers who are considered to be exacerbators.  In a 2005 
report, the cost of compliance with biosecurity clearance measures for the import industry 
(Table 8.5) was estimated to be between $81 million to $125 million per annum which is 
approximately 0.9-1.4% of the total value of the “risk goods” imported into New Zealand 
annually (Anon. 2005). 
 
Table 8.5  The distribution of the costs associated with managing New Zealand’s biosecurity between the 
Importers (exacerbators) and MAF Biosecurity New Zealand. 
Importers Biosecurity New Zealand 
Establishing Transitional facility Training of staff 
Training staff to run transitional facility Managing and or eradicating any invasive species 
Employing any additional staff 
 
Managing and maintaining the transitional facility 
 
Auditing of the transitional facility by a MAF official 
 
Inspections required by a MAF inspector 
 
Analysis of any contaminant found 
 
Managing any contaminant found within the transitional 
facility 
 
 
The models developed in Chapter 7 showed that the accuracy or efficiency of the 
inspections at New Zealand’s borders was the most influential step in the three pathways 
in terms of decreasing over slippage entering New Zealand.  Increasing the efficiency of 
inspections (either by increasing the time taken per inspection or by increasing the 
knowledge and experience base of those inspecting) at New Zealand’s border is 
considered to have minimal impact on the commitments to the various international trade 
agreements the New Zealand Government is party to (see Chapter 4). 
 
It is intuitive that an increased efficiency is achievable by increasing the time taken per 
inspection and by ensuring that the inspections are conducted by adequately trained and 
experienced individuals.  For the purposes of this study MAF inspectors were considered 
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to be adequately trained and experienced inspectors that can effectively inspect units in 
the time needed.  Based on MAF inspectors conducting all required inspections per unit 
imported, the time taken per inspection was varied to increase the inspection efficiency 
from the currently accepted 97% to the ideal 100% and this study highlights the cost of 
such an increase for the import sector. 
 
8.4.1  Cost of Compliance under Current Conditions 
Currently only the used vehicles without pre-shipment inspections require compulsory 
border inspection, whilst a random 10% of used vehicles with pre-shipment inspections 
are inspected upon arrival.  With these inspection rates and under the 2006 Cost 
Regulations, this study estimated that the total cost of recoverable inspections would 
increase by 46.8.% or by $2.55 million from 2006 to 2016, based on the estimated 
increase in the number of used vehicles imported into New Zealand annually.  
 
Since 2003, all containers and their contents were to undergo full inspection irrespective 
of any pre-shipment inspections or treatments.  With this 100% inspection rate and under 
the 2006 regulations, the total recoverable cost of inspecting sea containers was estimated 
to increase by 40.8% or approximately $47.91 million from 2006 to 2016, based on the 
estimated increase in the number of sea containers imported into New Zealand annually. 
 
The woodpackaging used in sea containers requires separate inspections based on the IHS 
Woodpackaging Material from All Countries (2003).  This requires that all 
woodpackaging without ISPM 15 stamp to be inspected while only 10% of 
woodpackaging with the ISPM 15 stamp is inspected upon arrival.  With these inspection 
rates and under current (2006) Cost Regulations, this study estimated that the total cost of 
recoverable inspections would increase by 40.9% or by $14.4 million from 2006 to 2016, 
based on the estimated increase in the number of sea containers packed with 
woodpackaging material imported into New Zealand annually. 
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8.4.2  The Cost of Increasing Inspection Efficiency  
Increasing the inspection efficiency along the three pathways from the current level (97%) 
to the ideal 100% was estimated to increase the cost of inspections by 61.92% ($8.84 
million), 75.36% ($164.48 million) and 61.96% ($57.18 million) respectively for used 
vehicles, sea containers and woodpackaging (Table 8.6).  These correspond to an increase 
of $43.61 per used vehicle inspected from the estimated current recoverable cost per 
inspection of $26.83 to a total of $70.44 per vehicle, an increase of $169.48 per container 
inspected from the estimated current recoverable cost per inspection of $224.88 to a total 
of $394.36 per container and an increase of $226.05 per container packed with 
woodpackaging inspected from the estimated current recoverable cost per inspection of 
$139.00 to a total of $365.06 per container packed with woodpackaging material. 
 
As the cost of inspecting WP encapsulates any contaminant of WP, including bark, the 
models were not used to estimate the cost of inspecting WP with bark separately.  The 
reason for simulating the number of containers containing WP contaminated with bark 
was to highlight the risk potential of bark alone as a contaminant. 
 
Table 8.6  The predicted increase in cost of inspections per unit imported into New Zealand. (Cost units 
NZ$ million) 
Imported unit 
2003 2006  
97% 
($) 
100% 
($) 
97% 
($) 
100% 
($) 
% 
Change 
Used Vehicles 19.40 50.95 26.83 70.47 61.92 
Sea containers 162.58 285.12 224.88 394.36 75.36 
Woodpackaging 100.49 263.94 138.98 365.06 61.96 
 
 
It is important to note that there are other costs involved in attaining compliance with 
biosecurity regulations that are also recoverable by MAF but were not covered by these 
models; such as, travelling related costs of MAF inspectors, inspection of documents, 
identification of organisms found and monitoring and verification of sea containers 
(Anon. 2006e).  The models developed also did not allow for the possibility that the 
importation rates of commodities (especially used vehicles) and sea containers reaches a 
plateau before 2016.   
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In addition to the costs the importer is expected to pay MAF, the importer has to pay for 
other processes such as treatment, destruction and transport, as well as the ‘down time’ 
(the time needed for all procedures to be completed, during which the importer is unable 
to either sell or use the commodity) before the imported item is given biosecurity 
clearance.  Anon. (2005) estimated the total costs of compliance to be an average of c. 
$224-$400 per untreated used vehicle imported and c. $200 per imported used vehicle that 
under went pre-shipment procedures.  
 
As the cost of protecting New Zealand’s environmental, economic and public heath can 
be divided into two major areas; prevention and management, it is important to gauge the 
cost of the trade off between facilitating trade and the New Zealand’s Government 
sovereign right to protect New Zealand.  Although Pimentel et al. (2000) and (2004) 
discussed the difficulty in measuring the true cost of invasive species in the United States 
of America, they go some way to establishing an estimate cost of known invasive species.  
Pimentel et al. (2000) and (2004) estimated that invasive alien species cause $US 137 
billion per year in environmental damage and losses in 2000 and $US 120 billion per year 
in 2004.  In New Zealand, 93% (c. $NZ 20.6 million) of the cost of border biosecurity in 
2006 was funded by third parties (i.e. import sector), which indicates that the bulk of 
MAF’s resources, in conjunction with the resources of the Department of Conservation, 
was utilised for management of invasive species post border.   
 
8.5  Conclusion 
Based on the most efficient scenario for each of the four importation pathway described in 
Chapter 7; the total cost of inspections recoverable by MAF were estimated for all used 
vehicles, sea containers, woodpackaging and bark imported into New Zealand.  The 
models estimated that there was an approximate increase of 50% in volume imported 
from 2005 to 2016 along all four pathways; and increasing the inspection efficiency to 
100% required an increase of between $0.34 million and $4.54 million annually. 
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Chapter 9: 
Discussion 
 
“The current regulation of biological invasions rests on an unwarranted presumption 
(that the invader will cause no harm) and on risk assessment procedures that are 
narrowly focused, subjective, often arbitrary and unquantified, and subject to 
political interference.  Although this current approach dominates international 
treaties and most national policies, it has not stemmed the rising tide of biological 
invasions.” (Simberloff 2005) 
 
9.1  Introduction 
To conserve the unique biota of New Zealand, the New Zealand Government must 
adequately protect its borders from biological invasions (Chapters 2 and 6).  To 
provide the desired level of protection within the continually changing global 
environment requires ongoing research, revision of border management procedures 
and relevant legislation (Simberloff 2005, Simberloff et al. 2005).  The increasing 
number of nations New Zealand trades with increases the potential risks associated 
with trade (Work et al. 2005, Haack 2006).  The protection of New Zealand’s borders 
against the introduction of unwanted pests and organisms is referred to as Biosecurity 
(Chapter 2).  In 2001 the New Zealand Biosecurity Strategy Development Team 
clearly defined biosecurity for the first time as ”the protection of New Zealand’s 
economy, environment and people’s health from the risks posed by pests and 
diseases”75. 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 (Anon. 2001c) 
Chapter 9: Discussion 208 
9.2  The Role of International Agreements in the Development of 
Domestic Biosecurity Legislation and Regulations in New Zealand 
As a member of international organisations New Zealand’s domestic legalisation and 
regulations relating to trade have to be in accordance with the trade agreements New 
Zealand is party too.  While some of these international agreements and treaties have 
some environmental protection provisions, it is important to remember that their 
primary emphasis is on reducing barriers to trade, which can encourage the least 
restrictive measures for preventing the introduction of alien species (Everett 2000).  
Although the scopes of the international agreements are far reaching and can include 
some environmental provisions, they do not specifically refer to biosecurity (Chapter 
4).  Despite the lack of direct references to biosecurity, these international agreements 
include aspects that influence how New Zealand and other member nations restrict the 
movement of commodities and vessels (Powell 2002).  International trade agreements 
(such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (1947 and 1994) and 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement (1995)) require any restriction 
placed on the trade of any commodity from another member nation to be based on 
scientific evidence (Anon. 2003a).  The emphasis placed on risk assessment as a 
means of balancing trade and biosecurity measures is problematic given that it is 
impossible to truly assess all the possible risks involved in trade, and it is also difficult 
to quantify the known risks (Simberloff 2005).  Thereby it is made difficult for a 
nation to defend any decision to restrict or prevent the entry of a commodity that may 
possibly be a vector for unwanted pests and diseases in the current international 
environment (for example the changes the New Zealand Government made for the 
importation of Californian Table Grapes in 2001) (Anon. 2002b).  The dependence on 
risk assessment also has the potential to limit further development of current policies 
and management procedures as the current resource allocations restrict the research 
into potential risks (Simberloff 2005, Simberloff et al. 2005).  This is supported by 
the findings of this study, which suggests that the current biosecurity management in 
New Zealand requires more resources to be allocated to maintain the management 
procedures themselves as well as to the building of a more in-depth information base 
(Chapter 8).   
 
When developing the Biosecurity Act (BSA) (1993) the New Zealand Government 
had to reach a balance between facilitating trade and protecting its national interests in 
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accordance with its international obligations as a member of the WTO and FAO 
(Chapter 5) (Anon. 2003a).  The sections of the Act relating to the importation of 
goods, vessels and people in Part III of the Act have the most relevance in terms of 
international trade and how New Zealand meets its international obligations.  
Although Part III does not substantively alter the previous importation procedures as 
such (Webb 1995) it requires that all importations must be given a biosecurity 
clearance before being allowed into New Zealand, irrespective of the commodity, 
vessel or person having already obtained an import permit in accordance with the 
relevant import health standard (IHS).  This is especially the case when importing 
commodities deemed ‘risk goods’ by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) 
(Chapter 5), the majority of which are imported from the Pacific Islands, Africa and 
Central/South America (Chapter 3) (Anon. 2003i).  In terms of international trade, the 
most relevant aspect of Part III is Section 22, which allows for the development of 
standards that all imports are required to meet before being imported. 
 
Developing IHS under Section 22 of the Biosecurity Act (1993) (Chapter 5), MAF 
must abide Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the SPS (1995) Agreement, which allows for the 
development of domestic risk assessment and appropriate measures under specific 
conditions (Chapter 4).  This paragraph provides the means for trading nations to 
develop procedures and standards, which provide the level of protection deemed 
appropriate by that nation.  Procedures and standards developed by a member nation 
are required to be non-discriminative and non-arbitrary and must only be applied if 
necessary and only to the extent required.  However, one problematic aspect of the 
SPS (1995) its underlying assumption that introduced species can be considered as 
safe.  The risk associated with the introduction of new species should have to be 
proven instead of assumed prior to the importation of the species into new 
environments (Simberloff 2005). 
 
An integral aspect of the international agreements is the harmonization of standards 
relating to the importation requirements such as treatments.  An example of this is the 
ISPM 15 for woodpackaging material.  This international standard requires 
woodpackaging material to be treated in a specific manner, which in turns reduces the 
importation requirements of consignments packed with material carrying the ISPM 15 
stamp.  However, recent studies have shown that the international standards which 
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encourage less restrictive inspection procedures may not be as effective as believed, 
for example ISPM 15 of woodpackaging material, Haack (2006), Haack and Petrice 
(2009), and Zahid (2008) demonstrated that woodpackaging material that is ISPM 15-
compliant can be re-infected with wood boring insects and fungi after treatment, 
especially when bark is present, or the treatment itself may not be effective.  This is 
supported by this study, which shows that although all the prescribed international 
precautions were taken approximately 5.75% of all sea containers entering New 
Zealand annually have some form of contamination (Chapter 7).  These findings are 
also supported by other studies, which have shown that international trade is the major 
pathway for the introduction of invasive species despite international standards 
relating to biosecurity (Stanaway et al. 2001, Simberloff 2005, Simberloff et al. 2005, 
Work et al. 2005, Costello et al. 2007, Colunga-Garcia et al. 2009, Vizzini 2009). 
 
Despite allowing for the development of domestic standards, the WTO and FAO 
encourage member nations to adopt the international standards developed by the 
Codex Commission (for plant and plant products) and the OIE (animal and animal 
products) (Chapter 4).  Nevertheless, where scientific evidence provides sufficient 
proof, the WTO and FAO allow procedures and standards to be more stringent in 
order for nations to adequately protect their environmental, economic and public 
health.  However, when import restrictions are placed on specific commodities, and 
sometimes specific commodities from specific nations, member nations of the WTO 
and FAO are required to substantiate these restrictions within the WTO or FAO 
dispute forums.  This highlights that the focus of the WTO and FAO is to ensure the 
economic stability of the international market and that market restrictions must be 
completely justified, with the SPS (1955) preserving risk assessment (Chapter 6) as 
the basis for limiting trade (Simberloff 2005). 
 
9.3  How Effectively New Zealand Manages its Borders 
New Zealand trades with approximately 135 different countries, with sea containers 
originating from over 924 seaports worldwide (unpublished MAF data).  In addition 
to the large number of possible points of origin, the vast variety and sheer volume of 
commodities imported (Chapter 3) have lead to an increase in the possible risks 
associated with international trade (Anon. 2001d, Stanaway et al. 2001, Anon. 2003a, 
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Simberloff 2005).  The volume and variety of trade exceeded the infrastructures at 
New Zealand’s six major seaports receiving international sea containers (Stephenson 
et al. 2003), therefore under Section 39 of the BSA (1993) MAF developed 
transitional facilities (Chapter 6).  A transitional facility can be any area anywhere 
within New Zealand that meets the requirements set out by MAF for inspection, 
storage, treatment and quarantine as well as for the holding and destruction of 
uncleared goods imported into New Zealand (Anon. 2003h).  Given the function of 
these transitional facilities, they can be considered as points of entry along with sea 
and airports (Chapter 6).  IHS have been introduced for the development of 
transitional facilities and for the procedures involved with transitional facilities 
receiving a variety of goods (Anon. 2006d).  In addition there are also standards that 
outline the maintenance and regular auditing of each facility.  Each facility is 
approved for a given period of time after which approval must be reapplied for.  This 
leads to the annually varying number of transitional facilities. Over 7000 such 
registered facilities existed in April 2004. 
 
In January 2003 MAF implemented a 100% sea container inspection policy (Anon. 
2003b, i) i.e. every container imported into New Zealand is required to undergo a full 
six sided external inspection and a full internal inspection.  These inspections are to 
be conducted at approved transitional facilities by MAF accredited persons.  Any 
contamination found is to be reported to MAF through an online reporting system76 
and the contamination must be dealt with in the manner prescribed in relevant IHS.  
Initially, MAF accredited persons were trained online, with the applicant reading 
online modules and completing an online questionnaire.  The flaws of this 
accreditation process were highlighted by the Royal Forest and Bird Protection 
Society, when one member of the society gained accreditation for sea container 
inspection for his pet cat on 17 February 200477.  Although the accreditation process 
has since become more involved78, for a person to become accredited to conduct the 
inspections, still no formal training or background in science is required. Apart from 
                                                 
76
 http://atf.maf.govt.nz/_ins/welcome.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fDefault.aspx 28-02-2007 
77
 http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/mediarelease/2004/0217_cataccreditation.asp 28-02-2007 
78http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/commercial-transport-and-border-management/registration/operators-
and-inspectors 28-02-2007 
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the auditing of transitional facilities undertaken by MAF inspectors, the reporting 
system relies on the integrity of these MAF accredited persons, of which there were 
21,630 on 17th January 200779.   
 
In the first nine months of 2006, 327,864 sea containers were imported into New 
Zealand from 55 different countries, 1.8% (5,755 containers) of which were found to 
be contaminated when inspected by MAF accredited persons (Anon. 2006b, c).  It is 
interesting to note that MAF acknowledges that a reported 25,370 containers entered 
New Zealand in that same period from unknown origins (Anon. 2006b, c).  The 
models used in this study, however, predicted that in addition to the contamination 
found at inspection some contamination passes through inspections unnoticed and 
enters New Zealand (Chapter 7).  The model estimated that under current regulations 
and procedures approximately 1.63% of used vehicles and 5.75% of sea containers 
enter New Zealand with biosecurity clearance although they are in fact contaminated 
(slippage).  The models showed further that, although altering some border 
management procedures had an effect on the total slippage, the accuracy of the 
inspections was the most influential aspect of the current management process with 
regard to slippage.  Increasing the inspection accuracy from the 97% MAF currently 
expects of its inspectors (Anon. 2003c) to the ideal 100% reduced the total slippage 
rate by 99.9% for used vehicles and 91% for sea containers imported annually. 
 
Although the predicted current slippage rates appear to be low, these rates of 1.63% 
(used vehicles) and 5.75% (sea containers) represent approximately 2,969 
contaminated used vehicles and 20,759 contaminated sea containers that entered New 
Zealand in 2006.  It is important to remember that given there are now over 7,000 
points of entry (including transitional facilities, sea and airports: see Chapter 6), 
which are spread out within New Zealand, these contaminated used vehicles and sea 
containers have the potential to introduce unwanted pest and organisms into a wide 
range of regions, some of which are remote and could be considered more vulnerable 
to invasion.  The organisms that contaminate the used vehicles and containers, such as 
the painted apple moth (Anon. 2002d), red fire ants (Anon. 2002e), spiders (Anon. 
2002b) and mosquitoes (Anon. 2002c) have the potential to negatively impact on both 
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the environment as well as public health (Anon. 2002f).  Organisms that are 
considered to be biosecurity risks associated with woodpackaging and bark such as 
insect and fungi species have the potential to detrimentally impacting on plantation 
forestry as well as other primary industries and native flora (Bulman 1992, Simberloff 
2005, Simberloff et al. 2005, Work et al. 2005).  Given the isolation and distribution 
of these 7,000 points of entry (Chapter 6), management of possible incursions 
becomes very difficult and more expensive (Stephenson et al. 2003). 
 
This study showed that increasing the accuracy of the inspections strongly influences 
the total slippage rate along the three importation pathways (Chapter 7).  Increasing 
the inspection accuracy from the currently required 97% to the ideal 100% reduced 
overall slippage to 0.001% of all used vehicles and 0.5% of all sea containers entering 
New Zealand.  A slippage of 0.001% of approximately 200,000 used vehicles 
imported annually is only 2 vehicles and 0.5% slippage along the sea container 
pathway is 1,639 containers annually.  However, given the size and the number of sea 
containers imported, the variety and volume of their contents and the number of used 
vehicles entering New Zealand annually, 100% inspection accuracy is considered an 
unrealistic target (Anon. 2003i, 2006d).  Therefore, the simulations assessed the 
slippage rate with inspection accuracy higher than that presently expected (97%) but 
less than the ideal 100% (Chapter 7).  The results show that even increasing the 
inspection accuracy by one percent the total slippage decreased to 0.5% and 1.75% 
per year for used vehicles and sea containers respectively. 
 
The Biosecurity Act (1993) has through a series of IHS provided the private sector  
with the means to import the units and transport them along specified routes to 
specific locations to be inspected in a prescribe manner by a MAF accredited person 
(Chapter 5 and 6).  Should the units be contaminated, the recording and specific 
treatments are also prescribed by the relevant IHS.  In order to increase the current 
inspection efficiency, careful consideration must be given to the requirements of the 
international agreements the New Zealand Government is party to as well as to the 
existing infrastructure, the availability of resources and to the effectiveness of any 
proposed change to the existing system.  The international agreements require an un-
biased system where all importation measures that exceed those of the international 
standards are based on scientific evidence (Chapter 4). By introducing specific 
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inspection requirements unilaterally to all units imported the system remains un-
biased.  In New Zealand, the existing infrastructure is flexible and constantly 
changing, as transitional facilities are reviewed annually (Chapter 6), and this study 
showed that an increase in inspection efficiency would improve the existing system 
(Chapter 7). 
 
A major assumption of this study is that inspection efficiency is a direct result of 
adequate training and experience of those persons that are conducting the inspections 
and the time taken for each inspection (Chapters 7 and 8).  It was also assumed that 
MAF inspectors received the adequate training and gain sufficient experience so that 
they are capable of inspecting all imported units accurately given sufficient time for 
inspection.  This study theorises that requiring all units imported to be inspected and 
all inspections be conducted by MAF inspectors will have minimal impact on the 
international agreements as this requirement would be unbiased and does not further 
impact the commodity trade or the origin of the commodity.  Given that all sea 
containers are already to be inspected upon arrival and that all used vehicles without 
pre-shipment management and all woodpackaging material without ISPM 15 are to be 
inspected, requiring all imported units to be inspected is not considered to be a major 
change to the current system and will have minimal impact on the New Zealand 
Governments international commitments.  It is also considered that who conducts the 
required inspection is a national issue that will not create biased importation 
requirements.   
 
9.4  The Cost of Managing New Zealand’s Biosecurity 
In the budget for 2005-06, the New Zealand Government allocated approximately 
$157.315 million for Biosecurity, of which 95% ($149.239 million) was allocated to 
MAF.  The other 5% was allocated to the Ministry of Health for managing the public 
health aspects of New Zealand’s biosecurity.  In addition to Governmental funding 
MAF is expected to recover costs expended on biosecurity measures as outlined in 
Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations (1995) (Chapter 6 and Appendix V).  In a recent 
study, MAF estimated that the cost of biosecurity compliance for importers to be 
between 0.9-1.4% of the total value of the ‘risk goods’ imported, or between $81 
million to $125 million per annum (Anon. 2005).  Importers are responsible for the 
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costs of completing biosecurity clearance for all imported commodities and packaging 
(Chapter 6 and 8). Such costs include: 
• Setting up and maintaining transitional facilities, 
• Training of personnel to become MAF accredited inspectors, 
• Providing the relevant documentation and the inspection of the provided 
documentation by MAF personnel,  
• Inspections at transitional facilities, 
• Inspection of commodities or packaging by a MAF inspector should one be 
required, 
• Treatments if required, both pre-shipment and at border,  
• Re-inspections, 
• The auditing of the transitional facilities by MAF at regular intervals. 
 
MAF estimates that importers or other third parties funded approximately 93% ($20.6 
million) of the cost of cargo biosecurity clearance services provided by MAF in 2005-
06 (Anon. 2006a).  In 2006 the MAF Quarantine Service (MAFQS) had 178 full time 
inspectors (totalling 258,100 chargeable hours per annum) that conducted the majority 
of the tasks subject to the cost recovery in the regulations (Anon. 2006e).  This 
limited number of inspectors throughout New Zealand may account in part for the 
reported inconsistencies within the management of the sea container pathway (pers. 
com. public MAF meeting 2005 and pers. com. Anon. 2005).  In 2006, the Auditor 
General’s Office also highlighted the inconsistent enforcement of regular audits of 
transitional facilities and the inconsistent level of prosecutions when requirements are 
not met throughout New Zealand (Anon. 2006d).  It is this inconsistency in practice 
and unstable regulations that contribute to the increase of the overall cost of 
biosecurity compliance for industry (Anon. 2005).  It is important to note that 
resource requirements and allocations (for border management) do not solely depend 
on the overall volume of goods moved, but also on the number of different points of 
entry, peaks in patterns of delivery and by the changes in the biosecurity risks 
associated with the different pathways or points of origin (Pinfield 2001). 
 
The costs associated with each inspection type (Anon. 2006a, e) are a reflection of the 
time and resources needed for a MAF inspector to conduct an inspection.  It is 
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interesting to note that MAF estimates that the time taken for inspecting used vehicles 
is approximately 9 minutes for used motor cars and motor vehicles (not exceeding 
3,500kg) and 21.6 minutes for used heavy motor vehicles (weight exceeding 3,500kg) 
(Anon. 2006e).  Upon consulting with companies within the importing industry, 
biosecurity clearance procedures for sea containers themselves (including inspection 
and decontamination if required) takes between 40-60 minutes, while the procedures 
for FCL or LCL can take between 1-8 hours depending on the commodities within the 
sea container (pers. com. Anon. source 1 2005).  
 
In 2006 MAF adjusted the hourly rate of inspectors associated with sea containers and 
used vehicles under the premise of making the cost recovery more accurate and 
ensuring that any changes in practice required at the border are covered under the cost 
recovery system (Anon. 2006a).  These changes were made in consultation with the 
public and interested parties through public meetings and submissions.  The review of 
recoverable cost was initiated when the forecast for 2005/2006 under 2003 regulations 
showed a revenue deficit for MAF operating expenditure of $1.4 million.  The 
changes implemented in 2006 projected an increase in revenue from importers of $3.5 
million to $22.7 million resulting in a forecast of a $1.1 million operations 
expenditure surplus (Anon. 2006a).  The cost of MAF inspections of sea containers 
was increased from $50 to $98 per hour to more accurately reflect the actual cost for 
an inspection conducted by a MAF inspector.  In contrast, the cost associated with the 
inspection of used vehicles decreased under the new regulations, reducing the cost per 
inspection from $50 to $25 (Anon. 2006e). 
 
The models developed in this study showed that inspection accuracy was the most 
critical management aspect to affect slippage in the importation of sea containers and 
their contents and used vehicles (Chapter 7). Therefore, the economic models used in 
this study assessed the cost of inspections to the importers if MAF inspectors 
inspected all imported containers and used vehicles (Chapter 8).   The models 
predicted total recoverable costs (i.e. the cost to importers) for inspecting used 
vehicles and sea containers in 2006 of $5.44 and $117.36 million respectively, given 
an estimated 193,210 used vehicles and 500,000 sea containers were imported.  When 
the inspection accuracy was increased from the 97% currently expected to the ideal 
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100% the predicted recoverable costs increased by 61.92%, 75.36% and 61.96% for 
used vehicles, sea containers and woodpackaging respectively.   
 
This study proposes that MAF inspectors are sufficiently trained and experienced to 
provide the required increase in accuracy of inspections.  The study therefore also 
assessed the cost of MAF inspectors inspecting all units imported along the three 
pathways.  As the sheer volume of units imported still exceeds the traditional 
infrastructure at the sea and airports, transitional facilities or similar infrastructures 
are still required.  However, the manner in which the transitional facilities are 
established, managed and audited is policy driven and is flexible.  As such, in order to 
increase the efficiency of inspections as estimated by this study, Government policy 
will need to be changed in such a manner as to remove the ability for non-MAF staff 
to conduct inspections of all imported units at the transitional facilities. 
 
9.5  Potential Technology to Aid with Inspections or Managing 
Slippage 
In addition to ensuring that inspections are conducted by trained and experienced 
personnel in the time required to be accurate, there have been advances in technology 
to aid with inspections.  In 2003 the Sea Container Review evaluated methods and 
tools/equipment to aid in the inspection and treatment of sea containers and their 
contents.  As part of the survey, inspectors tested a probe camera on a pole at door 
inspections and while the trail was not proven to be statistically significant, the 
camera did increase the rate of detecting woodpackaging within sea containers.  The 
Review also examined other potential inspections aid such as Electronic Sniffer 
Technology, which can be used to detect snakes and spiders (equipment used to 
measure changes in CO2 within containers, similar technology to that used by border 
control officers to detect illegal immigrants in the USA), Automatic Container 
Washing Machines, which can be used to dislodge eggs clusters and other 
contaminates from external surfaces of sea containers and heat treatments, which 
involve subjecting the container to higher temperatures than most insects can survive 
(Anon. 2003i).  However, the review concluded that these aids were not practical to 
be implemented and not suitable for all units imported, and their cost of establishing 
and operating was not considered to be offset by the benefits. 
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9.6  The Cost of Prevention Vs the Cost of Management 
With regard to the cost of managing New Zealand’s biosecurity, it is important to 
consider the cost of prevention in relation to the cost (economically and 
environmentally) with no or limited prevention.  This study estimated that to improve 
the prevention of invasive species entering New Zealand requires the cost to the 
private sector to increase by between 60-90%.  However, the cost (economically and 
environmental) of invasive species successfully establishing in New Zealand has the 
potential to be far reaching and in most cases irreversible (species extinction and 
ecosystem loss) (Costello et al. 2007).  Although the true cost of invasive species is 
difficult to measure, some studies have attempted it.  Pimentel et al. (2000 and 2006) 
estimated that the 50,000 known invasive species in the United States of America 
have cost in excess of $US120 billion, in terms of environmental damage and losses 
they are estimated to have caused.  The absolute impact that invasive species have had 
on New Zealand’s economic and environmental health has not been quantified in 
dollars and this is an area for future research. 
 
This study has highlighted information gaps that are areas for potential future 
research; these include taking steps to estimate the financial impacts the invasive 
species already present in New Zealand have had and are continuing to have on New 
Zealand’s economy, conducting detailed studies into how the inspections of different 
commodities and vessels can be improved on an operational level and investigate the 
specific policy amendments or restructuring of the existing border management 
system that would enable all inspections to be conducted by MAF. 
 
The majority of importers see the compliance with biosecurity procedures as a part of 
their normal business, integrating it in such a manner to reduce their costs where 
possible and factor them into the price of products for the consumer.  Among the 
industry there is also an understanding that biosecurity measures are there for the 
protection of the long term sustainability of their businesses (Anon. 2005, Anon 
Source 1 2005). 
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Conclusion and Management Implications 
 
The very act of trading creates the risk of introducing species into new environments 
and with international trade increasing all trading nations need to be vigilant in order 
to minimize the spread of unwanted pests and diseases.  As New Zealand depends on 
trade for its prosperity, New Zealand is party to international trade agreements that 
seek to achieve a balance between limiting the spread of potentially invasive species 
and facilitating trade (Anon. 2003a).  In trying to achieve this balance, international 
agreements aim to harmonise international standards for the transport of commodities, 
persons and vessels by requiring scientific evidence for limiting the movement of 
goods (Anon. 2003a, WTO 2003).  In conjunction with international agreements such 
as the GATT (1994) and SPS (1995), New Zealand has developed domestic 
legislation (e.g. the Biosecurity Act (1993) and subsequent importation regulations) 
that prescribe the requirements for the importation of commodities, persons and 
vessels into New Zealand.  Despite both international and domestic legislation, 
invasive species are still being introduced into New Zealand (Bulman 1992, Anon. 
2002d, Ridley 2003, Hewitt et al. 2004). 
 
Trading creates the risk of introducing invasive species by establishing both physical 
pathways (e.g. the movement of commodities via the sea containers) and physical 
vectors (e.g. the commodities harbour or transport invasive species).  The specific 
pathways along which invasive species are transported are not easily detected given 
the vast volume and the variety of commodities moved (Green 2000). However, there 
have been cases, where the incursion of an invasive species has been directly linked to 
specific pathways. For example, the importation of the painted apple moth along the 
used vehicle pathway (Anon. 2002d), the black widow spider on Californian table 
grapes (Anon. 2002b) and wood boring insects on wood products (Haack 2006). 
 
Given the risks associated with international trade are numerous and in cases 
unforeseeable, the goal for biosecurity is implementing effective management 
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procedures that ensure an acceptable level of risk prevention is achieved and 
maintained.  The thesis of this study was to assess New Zealand’s management 
procedures for specific aspects of three importation pathways (the sea containers and 
associated woodpackaging material, and used vehicles), and to provide an in-depth 
analysis of possible management solutions with risk assessment based models. 
 
The findings of this study showed that altering the current management procedures 
affected the rate at which contamination passed through New Zealand’s biosecurity 
related border management (slippage) along all three pathways.  The developed 
models estimated that under current regulations approximately 5.75% of all sea 
containers, 4.12% of all sea containers containing woodpackaging and 1.63 % of all 
used vehicles that enter New Zealand annually are contaminated although they have 
been given biosecurity clearance.  The sensitivity analyses showed that although 
altering management procedures (including pre-border and border) had an effect on 
slippage, the accuracy of the inspection had the strongest influence on slippage along 
all three pathways (Chapter 7).  Increasing the inspection accuracy by 3% decreased 
slippage to 0.5% for all sea containers, to 2.16% for sea containers containing 
woodpackaging and to 0.001% for all used vehicles imported annually.  
 
As the accuracy of the inspections was the most influential aspect of the border 
management procedures, the study estimated the cost of biosecurity compliance if 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) inspectors inspected every unit imported.  
Under current regulations the cost of compliance relating to inspections (if MAF 
inspectors conducted all inspections) was estimated to be $117.36 million for the sea 
container pathway, $35.16 million for the woodpackaging pathway and $5.44 million 
for the used vehicle pathway.  To achieve the desired reduction in slippage the cost of 
compliance to the importers was estimated to increase by 60-90% (Chapter 8) to 
$205.81m for sea containers, $92.34m for wood packaging and $14.28m per annum 
for used vehicles.  However, due to the information available, these models did not 
factor in the possibility of a plateau or maximum level of imports of sea container and 
used vehicles.  Therefore these findings should be considered preliminary and be 
treated with caution. 
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The development of transitional facilities under the BSA (1993) (Chapter 6) has 
enabled MAF to implement a six-sided sea container inspection policy with minimal 
disruption to trade.  These transitional facilities, some 7,000, are distributed 
throughout New Zealand and are classed as points of entry.  However, these facilities 
increase the potential impact of incursions as some of them are in remote and 
vulnerable areas, where the introduction of an invasive species can have a devastating 
impact on indigenous flora and fauna.  Despite the potential for severe negative 
environmental impacts these facilities, if sufficiently managed, provide New Zealand 
with the ability to ensure a level of biosecurity protection that is deemed acceptable 
by MAF. 
 
Considering New Zealand’s international obligations under the WTO and FAO any 
changes made to regulations that affect or limit the movement of goods are to be 
supported by scientific evidence (Chapter 4).  Altering management procedures such 
as compulsory pre-shipment inspection or treatment have ramifications for the 
countries exporting to New Zealand and therefore New Zealand’s international 
obligations.  However, how imported units such as sea containers or used vehicles are 
inspected upon arriving in New Zealand is a matter of domestic regulation (Chapter 5) 
that should have limited ramifications on any international agreement New Zealand is 
party to.   
 
10.1  Management Implications 
Since 2003 MAF has been accountable for the majority of the management of the 
New Zealand’s Government Biosecurity programme and in 2004 the biosecurity 
activities conducted by the Ministry of Fisheries were also transferred to MAF, 
establishing MAF as the lead governmental agency responsible for the end to end 
management of New Zealand’s biosecurity80.  In recent audits and reviews, the 
processes with which MAF manages New Zealand’s border management and 
biosecurity have come under scrutiny (Anon. 2000, Anon. 2002b, c, d, e, f, g, Anon. 
2003i, Anon. 2006d).  The reviews and audits have highlighted inconsistencies with 
enforcement of importation regulations, such as the auditing of transitional facilities, 
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prosecution of infringements and the development and implementation of review 
import health standards (Anon. 2003i, Anon. 2006d).  Recent studies have also 
highlighted that sea containers and their contents pose a major biosecurity risk to New 
Zealand and made recommendations to rectify any inconsistencies found (Anon. 
2003i, Anon. 2006d, Green 2000).  The Sea Container Review (2003) recommended 
enhancing the knowledge of the public and industry regarding biosecurity 
information, increasing the use of compulsory offshore certification of imported 
commodities, harmonising international standards in relation to the shipment of cargo, 
developing a more sophisticated electronic database shared between government 
agencies and a six-sided inspection of sea containers (which has since been 
implemented) (Chapter 1). 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the accuracy of the inspection at the border 
appeared to have the greatest influence on the amount of contamination entering New 
Zealand.  As the majority of these inspections are currently being conducted by 
accredited person at transitional facilities throughout New Zealand, this study 
concludes that if inspections are conducted by MAF inspectors or personnel with 
sufficient training and experience the accuracy of inspections will increase and 
slippage will decrease.  In order to increase the inspection efficiency the New Zealand 
Government will have to make policy decisions that will restrict how imported units 
are inspected including what units are inspected and who inspects them.  
Implementing compulsory border inspections by MAF inspectors (sufficiently trained 
and experienced) will require MAF to strategically invest (employ and train) in 
personnel to conduct inspections.  Although this study’s findings indicate that 
ensuring that MAF inspectors conduct inspections will reduce slippage, investigating 
the specific policy amendments or restructuring of the existing border management 
system that would enable all inspections to be conducted by MAF is outside the scope 
of this study; these are topics for further research. 
 
Taking into account the Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations (2005), the investment by the 
New Zealand Government into the training of these accredited persons or the 
employment of more than the current 178 MAF inspectors has the potential to 
significantly reduce the risk of incursion, and the cost of the actual inspections would 
be recoverable.  In addition, increasing the number of MAF inspectors throughout 
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New Zealand would not effect New Zealand’s international trade obligations, nor 
would it involve any major restructuring of current regulations and procedures.  
Increasing the number of MAF inspectors may also have the benefit of further 
reducing biosecurity risk by reducing the risk of dishonest operators from failing to 
sufficiently inspect and report contamination in order to reduce operating costs and 
increase productivity. 
 
Although this study showed that inspection was the most pertinent management 
procedure along the assessed pathways, achieving an acceptable level of protection is 
obtained through the integrated management of both pre-border and border 
procedures (Smith and Clough 2000, Anon. 2003i).  This includes the treatment of 
commodities to ensure the known associated risks are minimised (such as heat 
treatment of woodpackaging (Rapp 2001), the correct treatment and storage of 
California table grapes (Anon. 2002b)). 
 
Recent international studies into the prevention of the spread of invasive species have 
highlighted that despite the best intentions of international agreements, domestic 
legislation and regulations, the major limiting factors in preventing the spread of 
invasive species are politics and funding along with insufficient knowledge 
(Simberloff 2005, Simberloff et al. 2005).  Given the emphasis placed on the 
prevention of the spread of invasive species both internationally and domestically, a 
greater level of resources allocated to the protection of unique ecosystems such as 
New Zealand is required (Simberloff 2005).  In addition to the investment of 
intensifying the training of inspectors, greater resource allocation for research into the 
risks posed by trade and into possible technologies for identification and detection of 
biosecurity risks or invasive species can only aid in the race to achieve the desired 
level of biosecurity promoted by scientists (Green 2000, Ridley 2003) and the New 
Zealand Government (Anon. 2002g, 2006d). 
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Glossary 
Accredited Person A person who has attended and passed a course in basic 
MAF biosecurity awareness. 
Approved Approved by the Director-General MAF, or delegate, 
for the intended purpose. 
Biosecurity clearance A clearance under section 26 of the BSA 1993 for the 
entry of goods into New Zealand. 
Biosecurity Control Area A place that is a part of a port approved as a place of 
first arrival in accordance with section 37(1) or by 
written agreement with the Director-General for the 
purposes of the BSA 1993. 
Consignment Any unaccompanied goods covered by one bill of 
lading, imported by one imported, on one conveyance, 
at one time. 
Container A sea freight container built to specifications 
promulgated by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation or similar structure. 
Contamination Animals, insects or other invertebrates (alive or dead, in 
any life cycle stage including egg casing or rafts), or 
any organic material of animal origin (including blood, 
bones, hair, flesh, secretion, excretion), viable or 
unviable plants or plant products (including fruit, seeds, 
leaves, twigs, roots, bark) or other organic material 
including fungi; or soil or water; where such products 
are not the manifested cargo being imported. 
Conveyance Any craft, truck, cargo container, horse–box, wagon, 
cart, dray, cage, kennel, or vehicle that is or has been 
used for the conveyance of, or has been come into 
contact with, any organism or organic material. 
Craft Any aircraft, ship, boat, or other machine or vessel used 
or able to be used for the transportation of people or 
goods, or both, by air or sea 
CusMod The New Zealand Customs Service database used to 
issue holds and releases for imported consignments 
Declarant The person, generally an importer or import’s agent, 
who makes the electronic declaration into CusMod 
using an import entry or ECI report. 
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Devan  The process of fully unpacking a container’s contents. 
Door inspection Visual inspection of what can be seen of the internal 
state of a container when the door is opened, without 
removing goods from the container. 
Dunnage  Material (often wood) used to secure or support a 
commodity but which does not remain associated with 
the commodity (based on FAO 2002a). 
ECI report A report generated through the web-based Electronic 
Cargo Information (ECI) New Zealand Customs Service 
interface. 
Exporter The person or company who supplies the goods for 
export. 
External inspection Inspection of the external sides (generally 4) of a 
container. 
FAK  Freight of all kinds – goods for multiple consignees 
within a single container, devanned at an off-wharf 
facility. 
FAO  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
FCL  Full container load – generally a container with goods 
for a single Consignee 
High Risk Container Containers which have a higher risk than average 
probability of being contaminated or carrying 
unmanifested or prohibited packaging material, or those 
without a complaint quarantine declaration. 
IHS  Import Health Standard – a document specifying the 
requirements to be met for the effective management of 
risks associated with the importation of risk goods (such 
as sea containers). 
Import Entry an electronic declaration made by a customs broker or 
freight forwarder in CusMod which relates to an 
individual consignment that has been imported 
Importer The person or company who imports goods. 
Incursion The establishment of a species within an area previously 
un-inhabited by the species aided by the activities of 
humans. 
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Inspection A visual inspection by an inspector of sufficient 
thoroughness to detect the presence of insects and other 
contaminates that can be seen on or in the container. 
Inspector A person appointed under section 103 of the BSA 1993. 
LCL  Less than a container load – a container with goods 
consolidated for multiple consignees. 
Non-Compliance  the absence if a quarantine declaration (or equivalent 
system) or un-notified presence of internal or external 
contamination, unmanifested wooden packaging 
material, prohibited packaging material or non-clean 
wooden packaging 
Manifest A document describing the contents of a container 
(cargo and packaging), the importer and/or agent, vessel 
and port of arrival, and in some cases, certification or 
treatments that have been applied to the container. 
Packaging Packing material of the cargo within the container such 
as cases, boxes, drums, and carton, as well as material 
used to stabilise cargo within container such as 
dunnage. 
Quarantine Declaration Is a declaration attesting to the interior and exterior 
cleanliness of the container and whether any restricted 
packing or packaging is used within the cargo or 
container. 
Transitional Facility  A place approved as a transition facility in accordance 
with section 39 of the BSA 1993 for the purpose of 
inspection, storage, treatment, quarantine or holding of 
containers 
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List of Legislation 
Legislation        Date 
Domestic 
Alcoholic Liquor Advisory Council Act     1976 
Anti Personnel Mines Prohibition Act    1998 
Arms Act         1983 
Biosecurity Act        1993 
Children, Young Persons & Their Families Act    1989 
Commerce Act        1986 
Companies Act        1993 
Conversation Act        1987 
Copyright Act        1994 
Crimes Act        1961 
Customs and Excise Act       1996 
Customs and Excise Regulations      1996 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act    1968 
Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act    1988 
Evidence Act        1908 
Fair Trading Act        1986 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act   1993 
Financial Transaction Reporting Act     1996 
Goods and Services Tax Act      1985 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act    1996 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act    2004 
Immigration Act        1987 
Import Control Act       1988 
Maritime Transport Act       1994 
Medicines Act        1981 
Mercantile Law Act       1908 
Misuse of Drugs Act       1975 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act      1990 
Official Information Act       1982 
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Ozone Layer Protection Act      1996 
Passport Act        1992 
Postal Services Act       1998 
Privacy Act        1993 
Public Finance Act       1989 
State Sector Act        1988 
Statistics Act        1975 
Tariff Act         1988 
Telecommunications Act       2001 
Temporary Safeguard Authorities Act     1987 
Trade in Endangered Species Act     1989 
Trade Marks Act        2002 
Wine Makers Act        1981 
 
International 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement    1995 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs    1947 
         1994 
International standards for Phytosanitary measures the 
International Plant Protection Convention   1952 
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List of Equations  
The Used Vehicle Model Equations: 
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The Woodpackaging and Bark Model equations: 
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Biosecurity (Costs) Regulations 2006 
Schedule: Costs Payable for Activities 
 
Item Function, power, or duty for which 
costs are payable 
Costs Costs payable by 
Inspection at International Mail Centre 
 
1 Inspection of goods (other than goods 
imported for the personal use of the 
importer) at the International Mail Centre, 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or 
not those goods should be cleared. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved. 
Importer. 
2 Tests, examinations, and treatments of 
imported goods, that harbour, or may 
harbour, an organism, that are— 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved; and actual and 
reasonable costs of the 
tests, examinations, and 
treatments. 
Importer. 
  (a) carried out by the Ministry's 
Quarantine Service; and 
    
  (b) necessary to identify the 
organism, so as to enable an 
inspector to decide whether the 
goods should— 
    
    (i) be cleared; or     
    (ii) be moved from a transitional 
facility to a containment facility; 
or 
    
    (iii) continue to be held in a 
transitional or containment 
facility (as the case may be). 
    
3 Surveillance of discharge of goods, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the 
goods should be cleared. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved. 
Importer. 
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Inspection of shipping containers and offshore craft 
 
4 Inspection of a shipping container that 
does not meet entry requirements. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved. 
Importer, or any other 
person (including the 
person's or importer's 
agent), who transports the 
shipping container by ship. 
5 Inspection of a craft located offshore, for 
the purpose of determining whether the 
craft contains any organism that poses a 
threat to the biosecurity of New Zealand. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved. 
Operator of the craft. 
Inspection of motorcycles, mopeds, and motor vehicles 
 
6 Inspection, and each re-inspection after 
treatment, of a consignment, of a single 
used motorcycle or moped, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the 
consignment should be cleared. 
$15.00 per motorcycle 
or moped. 
Importer. 
7 Inspection, and each re-inspection after 
treatment, of a consignment, of a single 
used motor vehicle having a gross laden 
weight not exceeding 3 500 kg (other than 
a motorcycle or moped), for the purpose 
of ascertaining whether or not the 
consignment should be cleared. 
$25.00 per motor 
vehicle. 
Importer. 
8 Inspection, and each re-inspection after 
treatment, of a consignment, of a single 
used motor vehicle having a gross laden 
weight exceeding 3 500 kg, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the 
consignment should be cleared. 
$50.00 per motor 
vehicle. 
Importer. 
Inspection of goods not prescribed elsewhere in Schedule 
9 Inspection, and each re-inspection after 
treatment, of any goods that are required 
to be inspected under the Act for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the 
goods should be cleared, and for which 
costs are not prescribed elsewhere in the 
Schedule 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved. 
Importer. 
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Monitoring controls on new organisms and inspection of animals or animal material 
 
10 Monitoring controls on new organisms in 
containment facilities. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved; and $96.10 for 
each veterinary 
inspector involved. 
Person holding an 
approval (issued under the 
Hazardous Substances and 
New Organisms Act 1996) 
to import the organism 
into containment, or to 
hold the organism in 
containment; or (where 
there is no approval) the 
importer or owner of the 
organism or the goods that 
harbour the organism. 
11 Inspection of an animal that is intended to 
be cleared, or directed to a transitional or 
containment facility, on arrival. 
$28.70 per animal. Importer. 
12 Inspection of an animal that— $100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
Operator of craft. 
  (a) is on board a craft within New 
Zealand territory; and 
    
  (b) is not intended to be cleared.     
13 Inspection and monitoring of an animal 
held in a transitional or containment 
facility, for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether the animal should— 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
Importer. 
  (a) be cleared; or     
``  (b) be moved from a transitional 
facility to a containment facility; 
or 
    
  (c) continue to be held in a     
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transitional or containment 
facility, as the case may be. 
14 Inspection of a consignment of animal 
material (other than fish meal), for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether or not it 
should be cleared. 
$28.70 for each 
consignment of trade 
samples that are not 
veterinary medicines, 
biological products, or 
agricultural compounds; 
and $57.40 for each 
consignment in every 
other case. 
Importer. 
Inspection and monitoring of plant 
 
15 Inspection and monitoring of a plant, held 
in a transitional or containment facility, 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether it 
should— 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
involved 
Importer. 
  (a) be cleared; or     
  (b) be moved from a transitional 
facility to a containment facility; 
or 
    
  (c) continue to be held in a 
transitional or containment 
facility, as the case may be. 
    
Treatment, destruction, or disposal of risk goods 
 
16 Treatment, before being cleared, of risk 
goods imported— 
Actual and reasonable 
costs of the treatment: 
and any costs of 
packaging, storing, 
forwarding, and 
returning the goods 
before and after 
treatment. 
Importer. 
  (a) in a person's baggage (whether 
or not the baggage is 
accompanied); or 
    
  (b) through the mail; or     
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  (c) among personal effects.     
17 Treatment of imported risk goods, other 
than risk goods specified in item 16 of the 
Schedule 
Actual and reasonable 
costs of treatment; and 
any costs of packaging, 
storing, forwarding, and 
returning the goods 
before and after 
treatment. 
Importer. 
18 Destruction, transportation, reshipment, or 
other disposal of goods. 
Actual and reasonable 
costs of destruction, 
transportation, 
reshipment, or other 
disposal. 
Importer. 
19 Supervising, or advising on, destruction, 
transportation, reshipment, or other 
disposal of goods. . 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved 
Importer. 
Permits issued under import health standards 
 
20 Processing an application for a permit 
under import health standards. 
$105.00 for each 
application processed. 
Applicant. 
21 Processing an application for an 
amendment to a permit issued under 
import health standards. 
$105.00 for each 
application processed. 
Applicant. 
Transitional and containment facilities 
 
22 Processing an application for approval of 
a transitional or containment facility. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
Applicant. 
23 Inspecting and compliance auditing of a 
transitional or containment facility, to 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
Applicant or facility 
operator (as the case may 
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ascertained whether or not it should be 
approved, or continue to be approved, 
under section 39 of the Act. 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
be). 
24 Processing an application for approval as 
a facility operator. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
Applicant. 
25 Investigating and compliance auditing of 
a facility operator, or proposed operator, 
to ascertain whether or not the operator or 
proposed operator should be approved, or 
continue to be approved, under section 40 
of the Act. 
$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 
per hour for each 
veterinary inspector 
involved. 
Applicant or facility 
operator (as the case may 
be). 
Functions, powers, and duties not prescribed elsewhere in Schedule 
 
26 Performing a function, power, or duty— .$100.00 per hour for 
each general inspector 
and biosecurity adviser 
involved; and $96.10 for 
each veterinary 
inspector involved. 
Person whose actions 
result in the function being 
required 
  (a) required to be undertaken under the 
Act; and 
    
  (b) not prescribed elsewhere in the 
Schedule. 
    
 
 
 
 
